林中斌 部落格 / Blog Chong-Pin Lin

Harkabi, “Theory & Doctrine in Classical & Modern Strategy”

中西戰略思想比較專題參考閱讀
下載網址如下：
https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B7GUQTtcorbzVW1jZmtKN0hOVDA

Will China's Rise Lead to War?

Will China's Rise Lead to War? 作者： Glaser, Charles, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr2011, 卷 90, 刊號 2

Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism

The rise of China will likely be the most important international relations story of the twenty-first century, but it remains unclear whether that story will have a happy ending. Will China's ascent increase the probability of great-power war? Will an era of U.S.-Chinese tension be as dangerous as the Cold War? Will it be even worse, because China, unlike the Soviet Union, will prove a serious economic competitor as well as a geopolitical one?

China's Search for a Grand Strategy

China's Search for a Grand Strategy. By: Jisi, Wang, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 90, Issue 2

A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way

ANY COUNTRY'S grand strategy must answer at least three questions: What are the nation's core interests? What external forces threaten them? And what can the national leadership do to safeguard them? Whether China has any such strategy today is open to debate. On the one hand, over the last three decades or so, its foreign and defense policies have been remarkably consistent and reasonably well coordinated with the country's domestic priorities. On the other hand, the Chinese government has yet to disclose any document that comprehensively expounds the country's strategic goals and the ways to achieve them. For both policy analysts in China and China watchers abroad, China's grand strategy is a field still to be plowed.

作者:June Teuful Dreyer
書名:China's Political System
章節:Chapter 14 Foreign Policy
PDF連結請按此:
https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B7GUQTtcorbzanRJMTZfa2ttM00

China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status

China's rise in the Middle East

  

  It's unrealistic to expect that Washington could have excluded Beijing from the Middle East. But the rate of Chinese progress occurs amid a perception that the U.S. is withdrawing from the region.

By David Schenker and Christina Lin

November 16, 2010

Copyright © 2010, Los Angeles Times

Preventing a War Over Taiwan

Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing War over Taiwan” Foreign Affairs March/April 2005 pp.53-63
Abstract (Summary)

One of the greatest dangers to international security today is the possibility of a military confrontation between China and Taiwan that leads to a war between China and the US. Such a war would be not only tragic but unnecessary, since it would result in a failure of imagination and diplomacy - fought because a place that has long declared itself independent was attacked for doing so again. Neither Beijing nor Taipei wants a war, but both sides have adopted policies that run an unacceptably high risk of bloodshed over the next several years. The Bush administration should therefore take steps now to reduce the prospect of conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Understanding what those steps should be, however, requires getting past the rhetorical constructs that have dominated discussion to date. Given the relatively brief window of opportunity during which a stable framework agreement can be reached, the Bush administration should move quickly.

 

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BEIJING’S NEW GRAND STRATEGY: AN OFFENSIVE WITH EXTRA-MILITARY INSTRUMENTS

Chong-pin Lin
12/18/2006

As the United States hedges against a potential military confrontation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Beijing has opted to circumvent Washington’s preparations by adopting a grand strategy that utilizes “extra-military instruments” to gradually diminish the preponderant influence of the United States. These instruments—economic aid, cultural contributions, legal compulsion and diplomatic coercion—transcend, but certainly do not exclude the use of military force. Indeed, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is, borrowing from the PLA’s descriptions of itself, “prepared but preferably unused” (bei er bu yong), and serves as the backbone of China’s extra-military instruments. While these instruments are primarily “soft,” their effects can often be “hard,” as illustrated by Beijing’s aggressive international strangulation of Taiwan’s “lebensraum” [1]. In constructing its new grand strategy, China appears to have infused elements of realpolitik into a number of its traditional objectives, with its priorities as follows: (1) maintain domestic stability at all cost; (2) cooperate with, rather than contradict the United States; (3) assist the growth and development of China’s neighbors, assure them of their security and win their friendship (fulin mulin anlin); (4) reunify Taiwan without war, reserving the use of force as a last resort; (5) cultivate Europe and Russia to serve as counterweights to the United States; and (6) fill in the post-Cold War power vacuums in Latin America and Africa.
 


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