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 Behind Beijing’s East Asian maritime assertiveness
24 July 2013 by Chong-Pin Lin

 
這是澳洲雪梨大學網站上貼的拙作英文翻譯，敬請賜正。此文更早貼在英國諾丁漢大學中國政策研究所，時為2013年3月21日。

My article "Behind Beijing' s East Asian maritime assertiveness", originally posted on Nottingham University China Policy Institute website on March 21, 2013,  has been reposted on Sydney University website:

http://www.chinastudiescentre.com.au/securitydefence/behind-beijings-east-asian-maritime-assertiveness/
24 July 2013 by Chong-Pin Lin

For China, 2008 was a year of dramatic diplomatic gains: Beijing reached agreement with Moscow and Hanoi on their disputed borders; President Hu Jintao concluded a successful state visit to Tokyo with an agreement on Sino-Japan cooperation, which was followed with an agreement on the peaceful development of East China Sea resources; the establishment of a military hotline between the PLA and Pentagon; the successful staging of the Olympic Games; and a decrease in tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

In 2009 Beijing seemed to throw away most of its hard-won international goodwill as it began asserting its maritime sovereignty in East Asia. Chinese boats and aircraft in the South China Sea repeatedly confronted the Impeccable, a US ocean surveillance ship. Contentious episodes also erupted between China and Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines. These events provided the US, which was eager to expand its presence in the region, with welcome justification to act graciously as the invited outside power to balance China.

Beijing’s shift in behavior in East Asia has pitted most of its neighbors explicitly or tacitly against China, and towards the US. This geostrategic situation is disadvantageous to China’s long-term national interests. Why did Beijing’s leaders, who pride themselves on being students of Sun Tzu, allow this to happen?

Three plausible explanations follow:

1. The departure of Zeng Qinghong. Zeng, China’s former Vice President and the “king-maker” of Chinese politics who catapulted Xi Jinping into the position to succeed Hu Jintao, was instrumental in Beijing’s intelligent handling of relations with the US, Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong after 2002. The 2008 corruption allegations involving his son led to Zeng withdrawing from public life and ceasing his input into Beijing’s foreign policy which resulted in a decline in Beijing’s handling of external challenges.

2. China’s post-financial crisis hubris. China was the last major power to be hit by the global financial crisis and the first to begin recovery. Chinese officials that subsequently visited the US reported how despondent the Americans were, which stirred up Chinese national sentiments and overconfidence, which led to maritime confrontations.

3. The Bo Xilai challenge. Bo, the now disgraced former “lord of Chongqing”, had harbored ambitions to eventually replace Xi Jinping, the designated successor of Hu, as China’s next top leader. To do so he needed to discredit Hu Jintao. Bo reportedly continuously criticized “the center” for being weak during his regular meetings with PLA generals. Bo then launched his “Chongqing model” campaign in 2009, which involved “singing the red” to inspire Maoist revolutionary zeal and “smashing the black” to harshly punish alleged social criminals. In order to alleviate domestic pressure, Hu allowed the PLA Navy and associated maritime surveillance forces to toughen their treatment of non-Chinese activities in maritime areas over which Beijing claimed sovereignty. However when Bo was stripped of all official positions in April 2012, Beijing’s handling of maritime disputes with its neighbors morphed into a more nuanced style, which suggests that Beijing no longer takes knee-jerk measures due to domestic pressure, but acts with thoughtful calculation.

First, react rather than provoke. The 2012 Sino-Japan Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute began when Tokyo’s Mayor Shintaro Ishihara sought to purchase the disputed islands which started a chain reaction that is still ongoing. In contrast, the 2010 Sino-Japan Senkaku/Diaoyu clash began when a Chinese fishing boat rammed a Japanese coastguard ship.

Second, avoid physical damage while adopting an escalating posture. Unlike in the 2011 Sino-Vietnamese row over the Spratly Islands, where Chinese ships broke the Vietnamese boats’ underwater surveying cables, in recent disputes the Chinese parties have not harmed their counterparts.

Third, continue diplomatic contacts despite bilateral discord. Beijing maintained diplomatic contacts with the Philippines during the April-May 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff and has done the same with Tokyo.

Fourth, stress extra-military instruments. From April 2012, China used extensive economic punishments against the Philippines and Japan during maritime disputes.

Fifth, go through Washington to contain the disputes. In both the Scarborough Shoal and the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes, the US stopped short of publicly lending full support to its allies the Philippines and Japan, due to Beijing’s efforts to exert influence over Washington, although privately the US might have reiterated its support of its allies.

Toughness abroad yields domestic returns. It seems that Beijing’s post-2009 East Asian maritime assertiveness was signified by recklessness stemmed primarily from domestic political rivalry. When the rivalry waned, diplomatic sophistication came back to the fore.

Chong-Pin Lin is a Professor in the Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Taiwan.  He formerly served as Taiwan’s Deputy Minister of National Defense and was first Vice Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council.
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