“美國能成功地擊退中國攻台嗎？”《國家利益雜誌》2020年8月6日
accessed Aug 13, 2020
“美國能成功地擊退中國攻台嗎？”《國家利益雜誌》2020年8月6日
作者Daniel L. Davis為2015年以美國陸軍中校退伍的智庫學者。曾四次參加戰鬥，並獲勳數次。2012年他從阿富汗回國公開揭露軍事高層說戰事順利其實不然。那年他獲得說真話獎Ridenhour Prize for Truth-telling .
重點摘錄如下，全文隨後：
●最近美國國防部和蘭德公司所做的兵推顯示中美為為台灣軍事衝突的結果是美國戰敗。
Recent wargames jointly conducted by the Pentagon and RAND Corporation have shown that a military clash between the United States and China, especially over the Taiwan issue, would likely result in a U.S. defeat.
●中國要拿台灣不會打機場，而是打海上航空母艦、打美國衛星。
If China committed all-out to seize Taiwan, RAND analyst David Ochmanek explained, then it could accomplish its objective “in a finite time period, measured in days to weeks.” The reason, he said, is because it’s not, “just that they’ll be attacking air bases in the region. They’ll be attacking aircraft carriers at sea . . . They’ll be attacking our sensors in space. They’ll be attacking our communications links that largely run through space.”
●也許美國最後能抵抗中國攻台，但如此的勝利代價太大。除了人員損失、飛機被擊落、軍艦下沉以外，美國要花數千億美元建造防禦工事以防中國再犯台。
Perhaps America could eventually repulse China’s assault on Taiwan. Such a “victory,” however, would have a staggeringly high price for the country.
In addition to the cost to America in terms of lives lost, ships sunk, and airplanes shot down, the United States would then have the unenviable obligation to build a massive military presence on Taiwan and build up bases throughout the region to secure the country and prevent the next Chinese attempt to retake it. America would have to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on perpetually maintaining such defenses and constantly be at risk of a new attack.
●台灣到中國大陸的距離相當於美國佛羅里達州到古巴，而美國大陸到台灣的距離是6千海里。
Taiwan is roughly the same distance from the Chinese mainland as Cuba is from the tip of Florida; it’s almost six thousand nautical miles from Taiwan to the U.S. mainland.
●總之，美國若敗於中國，結果是災難；美國若為台灣打贏，結果是破產。
In short, losing a war with China would be catastrophic while “winning” a war over Taiwan would bankrupt America.
●美國最好遏止中國拿台灣的方法是鼓勵盟國包括台灣強化自己的防禦。
The best way America can help Taiwan and dissuade China from using force is to encourage all the friendly countries of the Asia-Pacific region—not only Taiwan—to engage in a buildup of its own self-defense capabilities.
●台北應以A2/AD “反介入與區域拒止”強化自己。
Taipei should continue to bolster its defenses through an A2/AD strategy of its own
August 6, 2020
Can America Successfully Repel a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan?
Few leaders in “establishment Washington” have taken the time to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
by Daniel L. Davis Follow @DanielLDavis1 on TwitterL
https://nationalinterest.org/…/can-america-successfully-rep… accessed August 13, 2020
There has long been heated debate over whether the United States should defend Taiwan in the case of a Chinese invasion, but little consideration to whether it successfully can. An unemotional assessment of the military capabilities of both China and the United States reveals the odds are uncomfortably high that the U.S. forces would be defeated in a war with China over Taiwan. What’s worse, even achieving a tactical victory could result in a devastating strategic loss. That’s not to say, however, that there aren’t alternative strategies to effectively preserve U.S. interests and at an affordable cost.
Few leaders in “establishment Washington” have taken the time to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Instead, decisionmakers routinely engage in seemingly cost-free rhetorical declarations about U.S. political preferences devoid of context. Policymakers have long argued to jettison the idea of “strategic ambiguity” that has underscored decades of America’s Asia policy, and outright declare that the United States would militarily defend Taiwan in the event of an attack.
Former Pentagon official Joseph Bosco reflected the desire of many this summer when he argued that Congress should pass the Taiwan Defense Act because “it will move U.S. policy just one step short of an open defense commitment to Taiwan.”
If signed into law, the act would obligate the U.S. government to “delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to [use military force to seize control of Taiwan].” It would be useful to stop and consider what those confident words would mean for America in practical terms on the ground, on and under the seas, and in the skies of the Asia-Pacific region. It doesn’t take long to realize it would be bad for the United States.
Any act or treaty the United States enters into should unequivocally have the net result of a more secure America, preserving (or expanding) the country’s ability to prosper. It is obviously not in America’s interest to tie itself to another state or entity if America must absorb all the risks and costs while the other party reaps the majority of the benefits. Extending a security guarantee to Taiwan fails in the first requirement and thoroughly meets the second.
Recent wargames jointly conducted by the Pentagon and RAND Corporation have shown that a military clash between the United States and China, especially over the Taiwan issue, would likely result in a U.S. defeat. In simulated wargames between the United States and China, RAND analyst David Ochmanek bluntly said America got “its ass handed to it.”
If China committed all-out to seize Taiwan, Ochmanek explained, then it could accomplish its objective “in a finite time period, measured in days to weeks.” The reason, he said, is because it’s not, “just that they’ll be attacking air bases in the region. They’ll be attacking aircraft carriers at sea . . . They’ll be attacking our sensors in space. They’ll be attacking our communications links that largely run through space.”
Perhaps the wargames underestimate America’s ability to counterattack or overestimate China’s ability to perform the operations. Perhaps America could eventually repulse China’s assault on Taiwan. Such a “victory,” however, would have a staggeringly high price for the country.
In addition to the cost to America in terms of lives lost, ships sunk, and airplanes shot down, the United States would then have the unenviable obligation to build a massive military presence on Taiwan and build up bases throughout the region to secure the country and prevent the next Chinese attempt to retake it. America would have to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on perpetually maintaining such defenses and constantly be at risk of a new attack.
Moreover, the geography would be a problem. Taiwan is roughly the same distance from the Chinese mainland as Cuba is from the tip of Florida; it’s almost six thousand nautical miles from Taiwan to the U.S. mainland. At a time when defense budgets are already causing more strain owing to the economic effects of coronavirus, it would cripple America were its defense budget to explode to cover a war with China. In short, losing a war with China would be catastrophic while “winning” a war over Taiwan would bankrupt America. Clearly, Washington needs a better way to compete with Beijing. Fortunately, there is a superior alternative.
The best way America can help Taiwan and dissuade China from using force is to encourage all the friendly countries of the Asia-Pacific region—not only Taiwan—to engage in a buildup of its own self-defense capabilities. China has famously hardened its defenses against the United States by means of anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) which would impose a severe cost on the United States for any attack against China. Taiwan should do the same.
Taipei should continue to bolster its defenses through an A2/AD strategy of its own so that the cost of forcible unification by China would be so significant—and ultimate success would not be guaranteed—that the Communist Party leaders in Beijing would not risk the potential loss. Even that, it must be admitted, would be no guarantee that China would never attack Taiwan. But for American policy, it doesn’t make sense to risk military defeat or financial ruin when our interests are not directly threatened.
Daniel L. Davis is a senior fellow for Defense Priorities and a former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army who retired in 2015 after twenty-one years, including four combat deployments. Follow him @DanielLDavis1.
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