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Beijing on Taiwan and Beyond
Chong-Pin Lin
Panel presentation at FutureChina Global Forum 2014,
July 18, 2014, Shangri-la Hotel, Singapore
Chong-Pin Lin
Panel presentation at FutureChina Global Forum 2014,
July 18, 2014, Shangri-la Hotel, Singapore
Assignments from moderator:
“The moderator (Claude Smadja) turns to Chong-Pin Lin about the charm offensive deployed by Beijing towards Taiwan in the recent period and his assessment of the visit of Zhang Zhijun on the island. How does he view the warming up of ties with Taiwan in the overall context of China’s present international strategy (about 10 min)
“The moderator (Claude Smadja) turns to Chong-Pin Lin about the charm offensive deployed by Beijing towards Taiwan in the recent period and his assessment of the visit of Zhang Zhijun on the island. How does he view the warming up of ties with Taiwan in the overall context of China’s present international strategy (about 10 min)
Being from Taiwan, a small actor in international relations, I am honored to share the same panel with the best minds from big actors in world affairs – one of the best minds from Europe ( eyeing Claude Smadja), two of the best minds from China (eyeing 金燦榮 & 孫哲), and last but not the least, one of the best minds from the U.S. (eyeing Clyde Prestowitz).
I will address three issues: assessing Zhang Zhijun’s visit, highlighting Beijing’s current approach on Taiwan, and characterizing Beijing’s international strategy.
A. Zhang Zhijun’s Taiwan Visit Assessed
Zhang Zhijun was previously known as a poker-faced dignitary in the famously conservative Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. To everyone’s surprise, he morphed into a dancing and smiling public relations champion when coming to Taiwan at the end of June.
How do I assess his historic trip across the Straits?
I must say that it is a success from the perspective of Beijing for three reasons:
winning goodwill , fracturing the DPP, and furthering cross-strait integration:
1. Winning Goodwill: His unexpectedly soft touch left more positive impressions among the Taiwanese people than their lingering negative views of all Chinese officials always suspected for engaging in the united front tactics.
2. Fracturing DPP: His visit further fractured, though not really split, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party which used to be blatantly pro-independence, but no longer. The Party’s chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen even publicly expressed willingness to meet Zhang, which no predecessors of hers dared do. Zhang’s visit swept up a storm of debates in DPP on whether to freeze the Taiwanese independence clause in the Party’s charter.
3. Furthering Cross-strait Integration: His visit was the first time in more than 60 years that government officials across the Straits meeting each other on the island. The visit laid the foundation of regularized government-to-government interactions which for Beijing would be a step toward the eventuality that Beijing would like to see. Even if the DPP wins the 2016 presidential election, the clock cannot be turned back.
B. China’s Current Approach on Taiwan
Currently, China’s approach on Taiwan may be termed “More carrot than stick” (as coined in my January 2008 China Security article entitled as such). That approach evolved from “sweeter carrot and harder stick” (as coined in my February 1, 2005 China Times oped entitled “以智取勝” or “winning through wisdom”). And the latter grew out of 文攻武嚇 or “verbal battering and missile lobbing” during the 1995-96 Strait Crisis.
On Beijing’s current charm offensives on Taiwan, there are three caveats – the remaining stick, the 2004 milestone change, and Xi Jinping’s footprint:
1. The stick remains: Despite Beijing’s increasing softness and sweetness on Taiwan, the “stick” remains. That includes the One China policy, or disallowing the 23 million Taiwanese to choose their future by themselves. They must do it with their 1.4 billion mainland “compatriots”. The stick also includes the short-ranged ballistic missiles DF-11s & DF-15s deployed across the Taiwan Straits aiming at the island. The stick again includes the restriction of Taiwan’s international space.
2. Milestone Change around 2004: By 2004, Beijing leaders finally learned that their hard approach on Taiwan backfired. Intimidation actually provided nutrition to the budding pro-independence sentiments on the island. The sentiments grew bottom-up, not top-down as Beijing leadership had previously assumed by mirror-imaging the island based on their own top-down system on the mainland.
In August 2004, Hu Jintao gave the guideline on broadcasting on Taiwan: “Enter the island, enter the household, and enter the mind” (入島、入戶、入腦).
Thus, Beijing’s new approach on Taiwan became “to win the hearts and the minds of Taiwanese compatriots” (爭取台灣民心)
It all boiled down to the realization on the part of Beijing leaders that “To buy Taiwan is cheaper than to attack Taiwan” as I would describe it since June 2010.
3. Xi Jinping’s Footprint: By 2005, Xi Jinping had been an official stationed on China’s Southeast coast for 20 years. He had interacted with visiting Taiwanese elites personally. At close range, his observations differed from what Beijing saw. As he reflected his views to the capital, he left his footprint on the evolution of Beijing’s growingly sophisticated Taiwan policy.
Reportedly ,among other things, he suggested to Beijing to adopt the tactics that says “Influence the officials through the people, and Influence the government through businessmen” (以民逼官，以商逼政).
That is why Beijing’s more skillful two-pronged Taiwan policy, under Xi Jinping, will only continue, and may even grow more potent in the coming years.
C. Beijing’s International Grand Strategy
Beijing’s Taiwan strategy is a microcosm of Beijing’s international grand strategy with three shared characteristics:
Winning without fighting, two-pronged operations, and indirect approach
1. Winning without Fighting: ￭ Similar to “Buying Taiwan” strategy which is cheaper than attacking Taiwan. ￭Beijing’s unsaid long-term goal is “dominating East Asia without war” ( à la Sun Zi) ￭ Beijing’s key principle of achieving that goal is “Extra-military Emphasis”: With economic power, with diplomatic maneuvering, with cultural influence, with media campaigns, with legal instruments, with psychological tools ￭ Beijing’s rapid military modernization serves as the backbone of Beijing’s extra-military instruments￭ The idea is reminiscent of Teddy Roosevelt’s adage “hold a big stick and speak softly”.
2. Two-pronged Operation: ￭ Similar to Beijing’s “carrot and stick” Taiwan strategy the current version of which as previously mentioned is “more carrot than stick”.￭ Beijing wields a hard prong coupled with a soft prong ￭ Beijing’s guideline for handling troublesome relations with other countries is “Struggle without breaking” coined by Deng Xiaoping in May 1982 ￭ The current operational mode is “assertiveness short of belligerence” or bloodshed, coupled with diplomacy (e.g. Sino-Japan low-level diplomatic communications have never ceased since 2012 when Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands tension erupted again. )
3. Indirect Approach : ￭ Similar to Beijing’s “winning the hearts and minds” Taiwan strategy to isolate the independence diehards ￭ Circumvention or the Go (weiqi/圍棋) strategy￭ Beijing befriends those around China’s major rival and avoid direct conflict with the latter. ￭ For example, Beijing is strengthening relations with Russia, Germany, Latin America, Africa or the BRICS countries to contain the U.S.
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