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Sino–US and Cross-Strait
Relations under
the Post-‘11 September’ Strategic Settings
JIEMIAN YANG*
(* Jiemian Yang is a Senior Fellow and Vice President of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies)
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Sino–US relations and cross-Strait relations are always interrelated and so is the US policy towards cross-Strait relations. The United States has taken its global strategic and fundamental national interests as points of departure. The Bush Administration has undergone a cycle of being tough towards China and titling towards Taiwan Ž rst and then readjusting towards the middle ground. There are many reasons to explain this change and
the events of 11 September stand out very prominently. This change once again proves that once the US put strategic consideration Ž rst it will take all the necessary steps to ensure that the Taiwan issue should not be a damaging and/or diverting factor. However, there still exist fundamental differences over the Taiwan issue and the Bush Administration’s
military-to-military relations with and arms sales to Taiwan are matters of great concern.
the events of 11 September stand out very prominently. This change once again proves that once the US put strategic consideration Ž rst it will take all the necessary steps to ensure that the Taiwan issue should not be a damaging and/or diverting factor. However, there still exist fundamental differences over the Taiwan issue and the Bush Administration’s
military-to-military relations with and arms sales to Taiwan are matters of great concern.
The United States has always taken its national interests and global and regional strategy as its points of departure when formulating and implementing its policy towards Taiwan. Besides, Sino–US relations and cross-Strait relations are closely intertwined and interrelated with each other. Therefore, although the Taiwan issue, fundamentally speaking, is an internal one, it is strongly in uenced by international factors, especially the US factor.
The Roosevelt and Truman Administrations needed China during the period of World War Two and subsequently supported that the Japanese-occupied Taiwan be returned to China. The Nixon Administration held that it was in the interests of the US to unfreeze its relation with China to counter the then Soviet expansionism and decided to accommodate its position on Taiwan. In the same line of thinking the Carter Administration decided to shift its‘diplomatic recognition’ from Taiwan to China. However, when the United States thinks that it needs to contain China from its strategic viewpoints, it has never been hesitant in doing so. In the initial period of the Cold War, especially after the break for the Korean War, the United States reversed its ‘hands-off’ policy towards Taiwan and decided to prevent its reuni Ž cation with the Chinese mainland. Again in the early period of the post-Cold War period, the United States thought that it had won the Cold War and needed no strategic support from China, and so, consequently, the United States increased its pressure on China by emphasizing its ideologica l differences with China and its similarities with Taiwan.
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When George W. Bush came into the White House, the Bush Administration thought that one of its strategic focuses should be on containing China. It advocated that the United States and China were ‘strategic competitors’, that the Taiwan issue would be the one to evoke a head-on showdown between the two countries, and that the United States should get prepared strategically and militarily. In parallel, the Bush Administration agreed to a large amount of high-tech arms sales to Taiwan, to let Chen Shui-bian conduct ‘transit diplomacy’ in New York City and Houston, and to strengthen US–Taiwan military relations.
But the tough policy towards China and tilting one towards Taiwan of the Bush Administration were counterproductiv e and harmful to the American interests. In the wake of the EP-3 incident, the Bush Administration started to readjust its policies. The 11 September attacks have speeded up this readjustment. The changed and changing global strategic setting and the re-prioritizing of US foreign and security policies are the root causes of this readjustment. While its fundamental strategic thinking and policy towards Taiwan has not changed, the Bush Administration has made several important tactical changes. It now pays more attention to the strategic importance of stabilizing Sino–US relations. The Bush Administration dropped the term of ‘strategic competitor’ and started to talk about a ‘constructive cooperation’ with China. On its handling of its policy towards Taiwan, it has become more prudent and cautious in order to avoid its disruption with US overall strategic interests.
I. China policy making and shaping in the initial period
In the Ž rst half a year since the Republican candidate George W. Bush became the President on 20 January 2001, the Bush Administration, by taking advantage of the United States being the only superpower, unilaterally carried out its foreign and security policy. It claimed that it attached importance to Sino–US relations and it adhered to the position of ‘one-China’, but in reality, the Bush Administration emphasized toughness and confrontation, and tilted towards Taiwan in dealing with cross-Strait relations, thus putting Sino–US relations to a new serious test.
1. DifŽ cult transition and matching-up
China policy was not the focus of debate during the presidential campaign in 2000. This indicates that engaging China on the basis of economic and trade relations has been the minimum denominator of the mainstream, both within and without the US government. Moreover, this engagement will also be used as a means to gradually transform China. This is the so-called containment plus engagement policy. But the two parties do differ on which of the two elements should come Ž rst and what should be emphasized in dealings with concrete matters. On the whole the Bush Administration preferred a containment plus engagement policy while emphasizing the former.
Every new American administration will have to go through a transitional period and the Bush Administration is no exception, but it has the following features. First, the transition covers a wide range. With the change of administration, there are about 3,000 senior and middle-level ofŽ cials to be appointed. Nominees’ reviewing procedures have become increasingly complicated, excessively detailed and highly demanding, thus making it more difŽ cult for key ofŽ cials to be appointed. Second, the transitiona l period has obviously been prolonged. The American political circle has seen one scandal after another. Power struggles and in-Ž ghts have become Ž ercer. ConŽ rmations and hearings have had to go through protracted procedures. The appointments have met with growing difŽ culties. Every administration needs a few more weeks or months for the transition. The past two administrations of Bush senior and Clinton needed more than eight months to Ž ll all the appointments whereas the Kennedy Administration only needed less than two and a half months.1 This trend seems to continue. Third, owing to the fact that the President and the Congress are elected separately, this is likely to cause a so-called ‘divided government’, i.e. each party controls one branch of the government. The Bush Administration could not avoid this situation.
Particularly, the Bush Administration was also facing three major troubles in matching up with the Chinese government. First of all, the administration had in-house difŽ culties. The new president had neither experience nor strong voter support. There were competitions between the hardliners and moderates. The President also had difŽ culties in coordinating his team. Moreover, like the transitional period, the matching period also tended to be prolonging. Professor Robert Ross at the Fairbank Center of Harvard University holds that after Nixon every
administration needed at least 18 months to match up with China and Clinton’s Ž rst term of four years was just for this matching-up. ‘Once again, a new administration may have to endure a protracted period of US–China con ict before its China policy returns to the center.’2 Besides, the current Sino–US relations have made the matching-up period even more difŽ cult. After the mid-air collision on 1 April some political forces and mass media in the United States used the incident as an excuse to launch another anti-China wave. The following developments were then witnessed: the United States increased its arms sale to Taiwan; it issued a visa to Mr. Lee Teng-hui; it allowed Chen Shui-bian’s transit in New York and Houston; and it restricted or suspended contacts with the Chinese governmental, military and academic circles. It also initiated an anti-China resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission, appointed a Deputy Secretary of State as the so-called Coordinator on Tibetan Affairs, and arranged a meeting between President Bush and the visiting Dalai Lama. It was due to the US taking these measures that the two countries missed an opportunity to shorten and smoothen the matching-up period and fell into the usual cycle of suffering tense relations in the Ž rst half of the year.
2. Causes for changes
Given the special needs of Sino–US relations, the Bush Administration, before the completion of its foreign and security policy, had to deal with those urgent matters such as arms sales to Taiwan, human rights issues and the mid-air collision. There are many underlying reasons for the Bush Administration’s changes. The following are short-term causes. While in opposition the Republicans had vehemently attacked Clinton’s domestic and foreign policy, especially his China policy. Now that the Republicans had taken over the White House, the Bush Administration was doing its utmost to be different from its predecessor. George W. Bush lacked popular support and the Republicans could hardly control the Congress. George W. Bush was also aimed at the mid-term election in 2002 and the presidential election in 2004 and tried to win over more mandates by toughening up his policy. Besides, his election owed a great deal to big businesses, especially energy and military–industrial ones. According to the rules of the game and the political spoil system, George W. Bush must reciprocate by formulating and implementing policies including the China policy in their favor. Besides, the eight years of an oppositional role had made the Republicans accustomed to being critical but not responsible, ideological but not pragmatic. In addition, its inexperience and poor coordination had resulted in departmentalized interests, con icts of policy and confusions.
There were more deep-rooted causes. The rising comprehensive national strength and the inclination towards unilateralism have played a major role. In the past decade, the comprehensive national strength of the United States has increased by a big margin. The United States has further enhanced its strategic position in the world. The mainstream Americans were overconŽ dent. Republicans held that Clinton’s Democratic Administration did not fully use this advantage. In this context, the Bush Administration often overestimated its own strength while underestimating that of others. Therefore, it was inclined to adopt unilateral movements in conducting foreign relations.
The Republicans emphasized the ideological factor and national security interests. Having been known for their conservatism, the Republicans have a strong sense of being anti-China and pro-Taiwan. There are three major forces within the Bush Administration. Right-wing Republicans oppose any form of communism. The business community is for engagement with China. In between there are internationalist s with Colin Powell as their representative. In the initial period the right-wing Republicans were the leading force. President Bush’s role was to coordinate and make compromises.3 Bush’s election also gave a boost to the so-called Blue Team, which is known for its anti-China and pro Taiwan position as well as its emphasis on security interests.4 George W. Bush also drew a lesson from his father and tried to seek a good relationship with the right-wingers. Therefore, the Bush Administration went all out in showing its toughness in dealing with Sino–US and cross-Strait relations.
The Bush Administration was readjusting its global military strategy. On the basis of the adjustment of the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration was planning to gradually shift the US military focus from Europe to East Asia. Having had an overall review of US military strategy, mission, equipment and procurement priorities, the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared in May 2001 that the US would shift its strategic focus from Europe to East Asia. The Untied States would formally give up the decade-long target of winning two almost simultaneous theater wars. This new strategy was also aimed at coping with such sensitive situations as China’s would-be blockade of the Taiwan Strait or maintaining open passage of the Holtz Straits.5
The Bush Administration was re-evaluating China’s role. The Bush Administration was increasingly concerned about its strategic relations with China. It held that, among all major powers in the world, China alone was likely to pose a threat to the United States. The two countries would even go to frontal con icts possibly on the Taiwan issue. Moreover, the Bush Administration also held that China had already deemed the US as its biggest rival and it was imperative to make preventative measures before it was too late. Besides, the American side believed that the patriotism and anti-Americanism of the Chinese people in general and the younger generation in particular had vindicated the failure of changing China by engagement, instead, more outside pressure should be exerted. Last but not least, the American assessment of the Chinese government’s policy towards Taiwan had changed too. In the past, the US had believed that the Chinese mainland would not use force against Taiwan as long as the Taiwan authorities did not formerly declare independence. But the Bush Administration believed that the Chinese government would not allow the Taiwan issue to drag on indeŽ nitely. Therefore, the United States was adopting a series of measures to enhance its strategic hedging against China.
3. Features of earlier China policy
First, there was a duality in the Bush Administration’s China policy. It believed that China was a current competitor and potential rival but not an enemy. Mr Powell said at his conŽ rmation hearing, ‘China is not an enemy and our challenge is to keep it that way’.7 On the one hand, on strategic and political matters, the Bush Administration took China as a competing rival, the so-called ‘strategic competitor’. On the other hand, the United States also took China as its partner. George W. Bush said that ‘China is a major power and we must have constructive and open relations with China’,8 but economic and trade relations were deemed important and constructive factors. This basic standing of the Bush Administration had determined the characteristics of contradictions and struggles coexisting side by side with no-breakup in Sino–US relations.
Second, it had strengthened containment and hedging against China. Since taking power, the Bush Administration had tried hard to eliminate the possibility of China’s would-be challenges against the United States at both the global and regional levels. In the bilateral relationship, the United States had been pressing for China’s yielding to its will. In terms of concrete measures and movements, the Bush Administration had put forward: a missile defense system; military focus shifting eastwards; a toughening of stances towards China; and emphasizing security interests.
Third, it had stressed on internal coordination in dealing with China. President Bush paid particular attention to coordination with the right wing Republicans, integration of various sects inside the Republican Party, and uniting different political forces so as to put his own house in order and win re-election. At the same time, the Bush Administration tried to restrain opposition voices and ensure smooth making and implementing of its China policy.
Fourth, it had advocated for a ‘clear and Ž rm’ reaction to China. Vice President Dick Cheney once said that to the Chinese ‘we must very clearly state our viewpoints and under this circumstance they will make a best response’. Some Republicans held that no Americans would like a confrontation with China. However, if China wanted to start a crisis and if this crisis was unavoidable, then he United Sates had to respond. As to what responses the United States would make, nobody knows. It has to depend on the then circumstances.
Fifth, it is tilting towards Taiwan in its policy readjustment. The Bush Administration claimed that it would adhere to the basic principles of ‘one-China’, ‘Three Communique´s’ and the ‘Taiwan Relations Act’. Mr James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and PaciŽ c Affairs, stressed at a congressional hearing that on the Taiwan issue the Administration is for cross-Strait dialogue, economic cooperation and enhanced mutual understanding.11 On the cross-Strait dialogue, the Bush Administration believed that stressing and pushing for dialogue actually meant exerting pressure on the Chen Shui-bian authorities. Mr Torkel Patterson, Senior Director for East Asia and PaciŽ c Affairs at the National Security Council, once pointed out in a public speech that he did not think that cross-Strait dialogue needed any preconditions . The US government later tried to explain that this should represent no change of US policy towards Taiwan. However, the Taiwan side held that this statement echoed Chen Shui-bian’s that there should be no preconditions for cross-Strait dialogue.12 While retaining its overall and basic consideration, the US was readjusting its Taiwan policy in the following Ž ve aspects. One was to tilt towards Taiwan. Two was a gradual emphasis on ‘strategic clarity’. Three was to strengthen its military support to Taiwan. Four was to raise Taiwan’s position in the US global strategy hoping to use Taiwan to check on China. Five was to stress the democracy factor in the trilateral relations between the United States, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.
Sixth, it had also left room for exibility and maneuverability. While dealing with China, the Bush Administration had also shown its caution and exibility. In late March 2001, it extended high reception to the visiting Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen and the two sides held very good talks. When the mid-air collision occurred, the United States showed some restraint and cooperated with China for a diplomatic solution. President Bush also made it clear that he supported China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and offered Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status to China. On 1 June he sent a letter to the leaders of both congressional houses to request Congress consent on extending NTR to China for another year. In a statement following the letter, George W. Bush said that fair trade is not only important to raising the American living standard, but also developing a strong and productive relationship with China. He said that trade with China was beneŽ cial to the American agricultural producers and business enterprises. George W. Bush also stressed that the United States needed to keep dialogue and cooperation with China in the Ž elds of common interests.13 The Washington Post of 25 June reported that the US government had already decided to remain neutral on Beijing’s bid for hosting the Olympic Games in 2008. According to a State Department ofŽ cial on the condition of anonymity, the United States believed that China hosting the Olympic Games would produce positive results. In the meantime, the neutral standing of the Bush Administration would be conducive to promoting Sino–US relations. Besides, the US side was preparing for President Bush attending the Shanghai APEC conference and meeting with the Chinese President Jiang Zemin in October 2001.
4. Restraints
The Bush Administration’s China policy emphasizing toughening-up and confrontation was facing many restraints both at home and abroad. In terms of domestic pressure, the Bush Administration was facing the following: the US economy was slowing down with a recession looming ever larger; the Republicans were also restrained by the Democrats and those interest groups for engaging China and stabilizing cross-Strait relations. The change of position by Senator Jefords had changed the political landscape drastically. Senator Jesse Holms, a famous hardliner and anti-China Ž gure, had lost his chairmanship of the Foreign Relation Committee. Having lost its control over the Senate, the Republicans would have more difŽ culties in major foreign and security policy. It could be expected that the Democrats would put more checks on the Republican Administration on a number of foreign policy issues. Even within the Bush Administration and the defense/ military circles the hardliners could not be dominating on every issue at all times.
The Bush Administration was also confronting the following external pressures. On the US foreign policy agenda there were many major and knotty issues such as the Middle East and Korean Peninsula issues. Its decision to speed up the development and deployment of the missile defense system had resulted in opposition and/or criticism from Russia, China and even its European allies. Moreover, its abandoning of the Kyoto Convention Protocol had been criticized the world over. There were multi-dimensiona l restraints on toughening-up of the China policy and the tilting Taiwan stance of the Bush Administration. The world’s trend towards multipolarization is an increasingly important restraint on the United States. Internationally , few countries would like to follow the United States to contain China. The great majority of the Asia–PaciŽ c countries sincerely hope to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. They want neither to be forced to take sides in a Sino–US confrontation nor to see their and the region’s economic interests damaged. Therefore, they strongly advocate for stabilizing Sino–US as well as cross-Strait relations. During his meeting with President Bush in Washington, DC on 11 June 2001, Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong stressed that Sino–US relations must be stabilized, otherwise East Asia would be greatly affected.14
Besides, the United States could not ignore the rising China. China’s GDP in 2000 exceeded US$1 trillion. Thanks to its fast economic growth, the aggregate economic strength of China is narrowing the gap with the leading developed countries in the world. According to the statistics of the World Bank, China’s GDP in 1997 already ranked seventh in the world only after the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. By the end of 2000 China’s GDP was, by and large, on a par with that of Italy.15 No forces whatsoever in the world could stop China’s reform, opening-up and further rise. In the new century China would continue to enhance its position and role in international affairs. It will also be able to realize the three great tasks of developing its economy, unifying the motherland and safeguarding world peace. It was these factors that made President Bush say the following to Vice Premier Qian Qichen at their meeting in Washington, DC: ‘China is a great country with great potential. Both the United States and China are major powers in the world. The development of their bilateral relationship holds long-term impacts on the world. We must handle our relationship from a long-term and strategic perspective for the interests of our younger generation’.
II. Evolution of the Bush Administration’s Taiwan policy
In 2001 the Taiwan policy of the Bush Administration has not fundamentally deviated from that of the past three decades, but it has also showed some interesting changes. It goes from a cycle of noticeably tilting towards Taiwan at the beginning of the year, and then swinging towards the middle ground in the middle of the year, and Ž nally adjusting to talking about a constructive cooperation with China. The events of 11 September have forced the United States to deal with Sino–US relations and the Taiwan issue with a global strategic view. By the end of the year, the United States and China seemed to understand that it was in their best interests not to let the Taiwan issue get out of control.
1. Initial features
In terms of the Bush Administration’s Taiwan policy, its continuity with the previous administration exceeds the changes. The general framework of one-China and trade-based engagement is still in place.
To begin with the Bush Administration was taking a harder line toward China and expressing a ‘clear standing’ to help defend Taiwan. The Bush Administration believed that the Clinton Administration’s strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan was a soft policy that would even invite China’s use of force against Taiwan.17 In this context, President Bush spoke in an interview for ABC’s ‘Good Morning America’ program on 25 April 2001 that the United States had a duty to aid Taiwan in case of attack by the Chinese mainland and would do ‘whatever it took’ to help the island defend itself.18
Second, the Bush Administration attached greater importance to Taiwan in the US global and regional strategic consideration. In its overall consideration of global and Asia–PaciŽ c affairs the Bush Administration mainly tried to use Taiwan to put a strategic restraint on China. This restraint had the following three major aspects. One was to use Taiwan to prevent China from rising and becoming an equal to itself. Two was to use Taiwan to prevent China from realizing complete reuni
Ž cation. It hopes to maintain the cross-Strait status quo of ‘no reuniŽ cation, no independence, no war’ in the service of dividing China. Three was to use Taiwan’s so-called democracy process to in uence the political and societal systems on the Chinese mainland. It should be pointed out that since the second half of the 1990s, especially after the coming to power of George W. Bush, the United States has been strengthening its efforts to use Taiwan to restrain China.
Third, the Bush Administration, in its concrete dealings with the Taiwan issue, tried to avoid the previous administrations ’ commitments. The Bush Administration had no interest at all in mentioning the ‘Three Nos’ policy towards Taiwan. Rather, the United States has raised Taiwan’s strategic importance with a view to further restricting and checking the Chinese mainland. In April 2001, the United States announced its biggest arms sale (of US$4 billion) to Taiwan since the F-istration held fast despite strong protests from Beijing: it defended the so-called good-will statements of Mr Chen Shui-bian and criticized the Chinese mainland for lacking reciprocity; it lowered the threshold for Mr Chen’s US transit, allowing him to stop over in the more politically and economically important cities like New York City and Houston. It also issued a visa to Mr Lee Teng-hui, whose controversial trip to Cornell University in 1995 triggered the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. Some of the Bush Administration ofŽ cials even claimed that the United States would consider further arms sales to Taiwan if there was no improvement in China’s deployment of missiles and no dialogue with Chen Shui-bian, and that the Bush Administration would break away from the so-called administrative restraints on the levels of contacts with Taiwan.
The fourth point was related to differences over the missile defense issue. After George W. Bush took ofŽ ce in January 2001, the new administration followed through on its determination to go ahead with the development and deployment of a National Missile Defense system (NMD) and a Theater Missile Defense system (TMD). China strongly opposes any possible inclusion of Taiwan into TMD, as it would mean a closer and quasi-military relationship between the United States and Taiwan and would be an encouragement to the Taiwan ‘independence’ forces.
Fifth, there was an increasing understanding of the new trend in cross-Strait economic relations. Some ofŽ cials and Republican Ž gures pointed out that, given the economic difŽ culties in Taiwan, the prevailing thinking is that Taiwan’s future, in one way or another, is linked to the Chinese mainland. Taiwan is shifting its hi-tech industries to the Chinese mainland. The two sides are increasingly interdependent upon each other, but Taiwan is even more so. The accession of both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan presents another good opportunity for cross-Strait interactions. These developments are exerting political in uence already. Taiwanese business does not want ‘independence’ that will result in instability . ‘The big business will not put money in a destabilizing government.’ The American side also noticed that on the Taiwan island there was a growing proportion of people supportive of ‘one country, two systems’.22
There are many reasons contributing to the changes in the Bush Administration’s Taiwan policy. In addition to those mentioned above related to Sino–US relations, the following two reasons are note worthy.
First, there was a strong force inside the administration calling for putting security over other considerations , including economic ones, when making and implementing US China/Taiwan policy.
Second, a re-evaluation was going on about the strategic signiŽ cance of China and Taiwan to the United States. Increasingly, the Americans deemed China as a strategic threat and they put China together with North Korea, Indonesia and Pakistan as ‘powder keg states’. Moreover, China was the key ‘powder keg’ state or the entire region and would require sustained attention.23 Some American analysts held that in the opening decade of the twenty-Ž rst century, tensions in the
Taiwan Strait appear to be the principal threat to peace and prosperity in the Asia–PaciŽ c for the foreseeable future. They even viewed it as the ‘most dangerous’ ashpoint in Northeast Asia.24 Others put China before Russia in the order of challengers for US strategic interests, as there was no single dangerous issue in US–Russia relations like the Taiwan issue.25 As to Taiwan, the United States had increasingly used it to check the Chinese mainland in geopolitics and to show the transferability of US-type democracy to Asia.
2. Developments in Taiwan
The Chen Shui-bian Government has been confronting numerous difŽ culties in the political power struggle, economic decline, social turbulence and stalemate of cross-Strait relations. Therefore, the Chen Shui-bian Government has attempted to play down these difŽ culties by seeking successful foreign relations, especially with the United States.
First, it has tried hard to satisfy the United States by following the latter closely. Unlike Mr Lee Teng-hui, Mr Chen Shui-bian has paid special attention to the ideas and policies of the United States. One of Chen Shui-bian’s purposes was to obtain more support from the United States so that the Democratic Progressive Party could win a majority in the Legislature Yuan election in December 2001. Therefore, Taiwan and the United States have been coordinating quite smoothly. In return, the United States praised the Chen Shui-bian Government for its faith in democracy and sincerity in stabilizing cross-Strait relations.
Second, the Chen Shui-bian Government called for more military protection from and cooperation with the United States. The Taiwan authorities attempted to increase its weaponry purchase from the United States, upgrade Taiwan–US military cooperation, join the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) program and even conduct Taiwan–US joint military exercises.26 This movement of the Taiwan authorities just matches up with the strategic consideration of the Bush Administration. Taiwan is willing to be a junior partner in the service of the US reorientation of its military strategy.
Third, the Chen Shui-bian Government conducted strong lobbying at the US Congress for passing more resolutions and laws in its favor, maneuvers for upgrading its ‘ofŽ cial’ contact with the United States, and to increase its visibility in the United States. Mr Chen Shui-bian tried hard to capitalize on his transit in the United States to expand Taiwan’s international space. However, all these attempts and movements yielded very little because the general populace in Taiwan has been fully occupied by the internal difŽ culties in Taiwan.
Fourth, the Chen Shui-bian Government strongly feel the pressure for closer and easier economic exchanges with the Chinese mainland. It has been a common sense both inside and outside Taiwan that Taiwan’s economic future is closely linked with the mainland. Facing an ever-worsening economy and negative affects of refusal of the ‘Three Links’ and ‘going slow and being patient’ policy, it is increasingly difŽ cult for the Chen Shui-bian Government to resist closer and easier
economic and personnel exchanges with the Chinese mainland. On 22 July 2001 Taiwan set up the Advisory Council for Economic Development (ACED). ACED sets up Ž ve divisions, one of which is on how to improve cross-Strait economic relations.
3. Interim changes
In mid-2001 the Bush Administration started to review its Taiwan policy. Logically, the Bush Administration must review and make its China policy Ž rst. After the EP-3 incident in April 2001, both the United States and China went through a review of their policy towards each other. The Chinese government made it clear that it would not change its pre-EP-3 policy of stabilizing and developing Sino–US relations in spite of the incident. In the course of reviewing its policy, the Bush Administration said that it would not oppose Beijing’s bid to host the Olympic Games in 2008. By the end of July, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell had paid a one-day visit to Beijing, after which the Bush Administration formally dropped the controversial term of ‘strategic competitor’ and started to talk about a constructive relationship with China. On its Taiwan policy, the Bush Administration showed its duality. On the one hand, the Bush Administration did not want to reopen the wound of the Taiwan issue. The Bush Administration repeatedly expressed its commitment to the ‘one-China’ policy. On the other hand, the Bush Administration tried to strengthen its relationship with Taiwan. On many private occasions, its important Ž gures still advocated China’s threat to Taiwan, especially its missile deployment in the coastal provinces close to Taiwan. The Bush Administration kept on calling upon China to either remove or freeze these deployments.
There are many reasons to explain this duality of the Bush Administration’s policy towards Taiwan. First of all, in the transitional period of the new administration, the Bush Administration learnt through its dealings with China the importance and sensitivity of the Taiwan issue in the Sino–US relations. The United States must handle the Taiwan issue with care and caution. Secondly, the Bush Administration also realized that being tough towards China simply would not work. It should seek a more balanced and workable relationship with China.
SpeciŽ cally on the Taiwan issue, this interim period saw no urgent and provocative events. Therefore, the Taiwan issue was not the focus of the Bush Administration. Thirdly, owing to preparations for the upcoming participation in the APEC meeting by President Bush, neither China nor the United States wanted the Taiwan issue to disrupt the planned summit. Fourthly, most American allies and friends wanted a stable Sino–US relationship. They did not want to see the peace and stability being damaged by the Taiwan issue either. They tried various channels to advise the Bush Administration not to act in a rash way.
This interim and reviewing period once again proved that there is a large amount of room for the two countries to match up in the transitional period. It also shows that there is a oor to slow or check the downslide of Sino–US relations and a limit on US relations with Taiwan. After all, the US Taiwan policy should have to be governed by the overall and strategic considerations .
III. Events of 11 September and their impact
1. The events of 11 September and Sino–US relations
The unexpected events of 11 September have disrupted the strategic planning of the Bush Administration. Before 11 September the Bush Administration was working hard to shift its military focus from Europe to East Asia with special attention on China. The Bush Administration was also deploying to prevent China from adopting military measures to solve the Taiwan issue. However, the events of 11 September have pulled its attention to the immediate and direct threat of terrorism.
The events of 11 September have profoundly changed the foreign and security policy of the Bush Administration. Since its own territory is now under direct threat, the United States has had to make anti-terrorism the most important policy. In order to deal with the most dangerous and urgent threat of terrorism, the United States must seek more friends. The United States must readjust its relations with major powers such as Russia and China. In a word, the United States must create a favorable international environment.
As a result of 11 September, the whole world, including the United States, came to understand that it must seriously deal with the non-traditional threat and work for a common security. The United States in particular is reviewing its formally held view of Ž nding an enemy in a nation-state. The on-going anti-terrorism struggle has shown that China is not an enemy but a cooperator. In the meantime, it began to realize that it simply cannot go it alone.
The events of 11 September have also taught the United States that in the Asia–PaciŽ c region there are other places of concerns. The United States is now Ž ghting in South Asia and the Central Asia area. It needs to form and maintain an anti-terrorism coalition to sustain this war. To achieve this strategic goal, the United States must have an effective policy towards the Middle East, seek support from Russia and China and keep good working relations with Central Asian countries and Pakistan.
In this context, the Bush Administration is readjusting its China policy. Although its fundamental strategy and policy towards China remain unchanged, its concrete policy and tactics are changing. First of all, the Bush Administration has been emphasizing the importance of stabilizing and developing Sino–US relations. President Bush came to attend the APEC informal summit and met with the Chinese President Jiang Zemin. President Bush ofŽ cially termed Sino–US relations as ‘constructive cooperation’.28 This signiŽ cant change has contributed to the improvement of the atmosphere Ž rst and strengthening bilateral relations to follow. Secondly, both China and the United States used anti-terrorism to enhance their cooperation. The Chinese side expressed its deep sympathy over the events and expressed its Ž rm position to counter all forms of terrorism. The United States and China cooperated at the United Nations. In concrete dealings, the two countries have been working together in many aspects including intelligence sharing and Ž nancial check-up. Thirdly, in the United States there has been a marked improvement in general attitudes towards China. The anti-China voice is somewhat less vocal and Congress sees less anti-China bills. Besides, more Americans are stressing the importance of stabilizing and improving Sino–US relations.
2. The events of 11 September and Taiwan–US relations
In terms of US policy towards Taiwan, the following thoughts merit our special attention. First and foremost, the United States is rethinking its world strategy. The Bush Administration has started to realize the limits of unilateralist foreign and security policy. The United States needs to readjust its relations with major powers in the world, especially Russia and China. Secondly, the Bush Administration is re-prioritizing its foreign and security policy. For the Ž rst time the United States has to care about the security of its own territory. Now its most urgent threat and enemy is terrorism. In order to foster a global coalition against terrorism, the United States needs help and coordination from China. In the same line of thinking, the United States should concentrate its resources on the war against terrorism, not curbing China. Thirdly, the Bush Administration has started to realize the importance of the non-state actors in internationa l affairs. The security issue has gone far beyond the traditional realm of a nation’s physical and military security. It covers a wide range of aspects from military security to cultural security. Increasingly, non-state actors play important roles. Again, the United States needs China to cooperate in this respect as well. Fourthly, the Bush Administration has realized that, even though its basic interests concerning and basic policy towards Taiwan
will not change because of the events of 11 September, it has to be more cautious and careful in actual dealings with the Taiwan issue. In fact, the Bush Administration has since tried hard not to be confrontational with China over the Taiwan issue.
IV. Trends and tendencies
To stabilize and develop the Sino–US relationship is both the common desire of the two peoples and in their fundamental interests. Both China and the United States are major powers in the world. Despite the strained relations they are experiencing now, both countries share far more convergence than divergence of interests. Both want to maintain stable and predictable relations. China has always aimed at stabilizing and improving this most important bilateral relation.
First, economic and trade relations will continue to be the ballast of Sino–US relations. Bilateral trade and investment are constantly growing. In 2000 China–US trade volume was $74.5 billion, 21.2% higher than the year before. China’s export to the United States reached $52.1 billion, increased by 24.2%, while its import from the US was $22.4 billion, a 14.8% increase. In the same year, the number of newly approved US invested projects in China increased by 24.7% to 2,553. Contractual and actual US investment reached $7.87 billion and $4.37 billion respectively, indicating a 29% increase for the former and a 0.6% decrease for the latter. By the end of 2000, there have been 31,255 US invested projects approved by the Chinese authorities, involving $60.5 billion of contractual foreign investment and $30 billion of actual input.
Second, both countries share common strategic interests. China and the United States are two major powers with global in uence. They hold great responsibilit y for maintaining the peace, stability and development of the world as well as the various regions. The two countries share common interests in stabilizing the world economy, disarmament and arms control, non-proliferation , the Korean Peninsular issue and global issues. Moreover, in the era of political multipolarization and economic globalization, China and the United States have become increasingly interdependent, thus calling for the two countries to stabilize and improve their relations. Upon entering into the new century, both countries are re-evaluating their respective global strategy and policies towards each other. If they can enhance their consensus on global strategy, world and regional order and common interests, the two countries can promote their bilateral relations on a positive and healthy path.
Third, the two countries have already established a strong non-ofŽ cial network. The past 30 years since President Nixon’s visit to China, have seen a constant increase of non-ofŽ cial institutiona l and personal network across the PaciŽ c Ocean. This network has served as a stabilizer in addition to the ofŽ cial relationship . In the post-11 September Sino–US relations, this network will play an even bigger role
to advance their bilateral relationship.
Fourth, there will be more events ahead. The post-11 September events are still evolving. The major powers are readjusting their global and regional strategy around the Afghanistan arrangement, the Central Asia situation and other related matters. Moreover, they are trying their best to seek an advantageous position in the establishment of rules of anti-terrorism. Both China and the United States will be faced with many events of this nature in the future.
Given the past decades of experiences, one would be naõ¨ve to believe that the Taiwan issue would go away simply because of the events of 11 September and/or a better Sino–US relationship would come into being automatically. The United States has a big stake in keeping the Taiwan issue a ‘no-uniŽ cation, no independence, no-war’ one. The Bush Administration, like its predecessors, would continue the US basic policy towards Taiwan. It should also not be ruled out that in the future there would be new and more troubles over the Taiwan issue. We must fully understand and prepare for the worst scenario.
But there are also reasons for one to make the following tentative predictions. Firstly, both China and the United States will continue their limited but important strategic cooperation. The struggle against terrorism is a long and enduring one. It is in their fundamental national interests to cooperate to keep on Ž ghting against terrorism. This is an overwhelming task to both, but especially to the United States. Secondly, the two countries cannot remove the root causes of their fundamental
differences, yet they can put them under control. Their differences over the Taiwan issue were not made in one day, nor could they be solved overnight. Again, it is in their fundamental interests not to let it divert their attention, let alone make them confront each other. Thirdly, while the two countries are trying hard to prevent their differences from interfering with their overall relationship, there might be some chance that they could Ž nd ways to narrow their differences. Fourthly, in the involving course in power, the Bush Administration would understand better the
delicacies and sensitivitie s of the Taiwan issue. The Bush Administration will continue to walk on a thin line to balance its relations with the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. Fifthly, one must understand the political cycles in China and the United States. In China, there will be the 16th Party Congress to usher in a new generation of leaders. In the United States, there will be the by-election, a poll on the popularity of the Bush Administration and the Republican Party. These political cycles will exert some impacts on their concrete handling of the Taiwan issue.
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