Before the Chinese Communist 17th Party Congress convened in Beijing on October 15, 2007, many had expected the Party General Secretary Hu Jingtao to highlight the Taiwan issue with strong words. The reason was simple. Taiwan President Chen Shuibian had for several months launched a fanfare campaign for his country to join the United Nations under the name of Taiwan, rather than the Republic of China, which was perceived to be inching toward declaring a de jure Taiwanese independence.
One international journalist stationed in Beijing warned in early October that Hu “intends to make Taiwan a focus of the upcoming congress” and that he would “garner support” within the Party “for using force”. A veteran China watcher from KMT, the Taiwan opposition party, expressed worries then that “the cross-strait tension is now worse than in 1996 and 1999”, years when the People’s Liberation Army lobbed missiles in the Straits and flew fighters invading Taiwan’s air space respectively. He predicted that Beijing in the coming Party Congress would surely “oppose Taiwanese independence with tough statements.”
When Hu delivered his keynote speech at the Party Congress, he soft-pedaled the Taiwan issue, totally ignored Taipei’s UN campaign, deleted the customary “mantra” that “we oppose Taiwanese independence, one China one Taiwan, and two Chinas” from the corresponding section in the 16th Party Congress speech in 2002, and offered an olive branch to Taipei for negotiating a “peace treaty”. The surprise, in fact, could have been anticipated, had two trends-- already developing--been taken into consideration. One is how Hu has differed from his predecessor Jiang Zemin on Taiwan policy. The other is what has determined Beijing’s posture on Taiwan since the 1990s. Such trends would most likely continue through 2008 and augur Beijing’s more agile and sophisticated Taiwan policy to come. These constitute the main focus of this paper, which will also explore future implications, and submit policy recommendations.
“Beijing’s Taiwan policy” in this paper comprises both Beijing’s persistent, long-term strategy on Taiwan, and its short-term tactics. The former includes such overarching principles as “one China principle” first defined in 1954, “peaceful unification”, first conceptually declared in January 1979 and then verbally enunciated in October 1981[5], and “one country, two systems”, first officially appeared in June 1983 but did not receive wide public attention until February 1984.[6] All three have been upheld by Beijing as guidelines to cross-strait operations to this day. Beijing’s Taiwan tactics--swinging widely from military intimidation to economic enticement, or from verbal attacks to charm offensives-- are subject to adjustments in different times, at different places, and even towards different people.
How Hu Differs from Jiang on Taiwan Policy
As Hu incrementally took over from Jiang – the Party in November 2002, the military in September 2004, and the state in March 2005, Beijing’s Taiwan policy, while remaining unaltered in four aspects, began to change in other four. The most concrete manifestation of the change is the “anti-secession law” (ASL) proclaimed on March 14, 2005. In balance, the changes seem to have outweighed the continuities in form, while the latter remain formidable in substance.
Continuities: First, Beijing has continued to increase the number of short-ranged ballistic missiles—Dongfeng 11 and DF15—deployed across the Taiwan Straits at the rate of some 70 a year. By Januray 2008, the total count reached more than 1000. Second, Beijing has continued, and perhaps even intensified, its international strangulation of Taiwan’s “lebensraum”. Under Beijing’s escalated diplomatic offensives supported by an expanding war-chest, the number of countries that fully recognized Taiwan has continued to dwindle (Table 1, Taiwan’s Broken Relations). Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations, even of non-political in nature, have been relentlessly blocked by China. Third, Beijing’s afore-mentioned overarching principles on Taiwan have continued to appear in official documents, though the definition of “the one China principle” has gone through several modifications, and “one country, two systems” has been verbally mentioned less since 2005 (Table 2, Beijing’s Evolving One China Principle). Fourth, Beijing has continued to accelerate its efforts to acquire a high-tech military capabilities to “deter the U.S. and seize Taiwan” in a war of paralysis rather than annihilation.
Change 1 –Timetable for Unification Dropped: During Jiang’s reign, a timetable for cross-strait unification, to be achieved with force if necessary, was under constant discussions, although Jiang never publicly ruled a final decision on it. The dates mentioned at different stages were 2005, 2007, 2002, 2010, and 2020. Since Hu took over, the issue has been shelved. At least, no mentioning of a unification timetable has surfaced so far. On September 24, 2004, five days after Hu took over the chairmanship of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission, he reportedly approved at an internal meeting a new guideline on Taiwan policy which reflected his patience: “strive for negotiation, prepare for war, and fear not Taiwan’s procrastination”(zhengqu tan, zhunbeida, bupaduo)[10].
Change 2 – Extra-military Emphasis: Cross-strait military tension flared up twice when Jiang was in power. Since Hu took over, none has occurred. In addition, the much touted Dongshan-Island military exercises previously held annually in mid-year near the Taiwan Straits have ceased since 2005 after being scaled down in 2004. Granted, amphibious and air-borne exercises that are perceived to simulate attack on Taiwan have been held elsewhere. They no longer have received sensationalizing media coverage in Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing newspapers. PRC officials’ once favorite statement, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1986 and reiterated over fifty times a year in the late 1990s, that “we do not renounce the use of force on Taiwan” has disappeared since the ASL came into effect in March 2005.
Instead, Beijing has stressed the use of other means than the military on Taiwan. In December 2003, the PLA announced in its “decree of political work” the concept of the “three wars- psychological, legal and on media”. In fact, Beijing has expanded its tools on Taiwan even beyond these three to include economic, cultural, social and other extra-military instruments. In handling Taiwan, Hu has not given up the military option as the last resort but prefers to stress other measures. The concept “extra-military emphasis”, which transcends without excluding the pure military instrument, depicts Beijing’s approach more realistically than the popular term of “soft power”. At an internal high-level meeting in August 2007, Hu pointed out that the major task of the PLA is a war with Taiwan, yet attacking the island would bring six negative impacts including tainting the 2008 Olympics, damaging economic development of China’s southeast coast, impairing Beijing’s foreign relations, losing foreign investment in China, causing casualties of the soldiers, and pushing back the progress of China’s modernization.
Change 3 – Outreach inside Taiwan: Jiang ceased contacts with Taiwan authority under the KMT since August 1999 after former Taiwan President Li Tenghui termed the Taiwan-China relationship as a “special state-to-state” one. Since the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) began ruling Taiwan in 2001, Jiang continued his no-contact policy with both the new ruling party DPP and the new opposition KMT. In contrast, Hu has actively reached out to the political parties in Taiwan besides contacting various elements in the society, such as scholars, journalists, artists and businessmen. His approach was typified by his instruction to China’s Central People’s Broadcasting Station in August 2004 that its work toward Taiwan “should enter the island, the household of Taiwanese people, and their minds”. In December 2007, Beijing even began reaching out to Taiwanese military officers for cooperation to uphold “Chinese national unification” against Taiwanese independence.
Under Hu, Beijing in the spring of 2005 received with much trumpeted extravaganza the leaders of Taiwan’s “pan-blue” opposition parties, mainly the KMT and the People’s First Party. Regular dialogue forums and open communication channels were established since with them. Meanwhile, even the non-governmental DPP elites –legislators, scholars, and businessmen—have received courteous invitations to visit China with growing frequency.
Change 4 – Sweeter Carrot and Harder Stick: Hu has taken a more pronounced “two-prong approach” – simultaneously applying the hard- and the soft-hand -- on Taiwan than Jiang. To sum up Hu’s new style, the author in May 2005 coined the popular phrase in Chinese “the hard hand becomes harder and the soft one, softer” (yingde geng ying, ruande geng ruan) which was later anglicized as “sweeter carrot and harder stick”. Such characterization was inspired by two sets of events that had occurred. The first is the proclamation of ASL which stipulated that future PRC government applies “non-peaceful means” on Taiwan if “Taiwanese independence forces…should act…to cause… Taiwan’s secession from China”. It was widely perceived to be a bolder act toward Taiwan than any undertaken by Jiang. Underneath though, the ASL is a more sophisticated ploy than most have realized (see Box “The Anatomy of the Anti-secession Law”). Second, China started not too long afterwards launching a series of soft measures across the Straits apparently with the objective to “win over the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese compatriots”. By late April 2007, the count of such charm offensives had reached 38 (Table 3, Beijing’s Post-ASL Cross-strait Soft Offensives). These acts on Taiwan were softer and more concrete than what Jiang had ever attempted.
The Anatomy of the Anti-secession Law |
Chong-Pin Lin October 2007 The ASL comprises ten articles. The first through the five restate Beijing’s fundamental principles on Taiwan, and contains nothing new. The tenth simply declares that the Law comes into effect when promulgated. ￭The sixth deals with cross-strait exchanges, and the seventh, cross-strait negotiations. They are both soft in nature, and amount to 385 Chinese words. ￭The eighth stipulates how a decision of executing the non-peaceful means is reached: by both the State Council, which consists of all civilians, and the Central Military Commission, in that order. Moreover, the decision shall be promptly reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’ Congress. ￭The ninth provides the caveats of the eighth by setting limits of the damages when the non-peaceful means are applied: Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals are not to be harmed. ￭The eighth and the ninth constitute the hard part of the ASL, and contains 263 words. Therefore, in word counts alone, the soft portion outweighs the hard in the ASL. ￭The eighth strikes a remarkable departure from the past. When China took military actions beyond its peripheries, it used to require a decision made by the Central Military Commission alone, which meant simply the directives given by the topmost strongman such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Now, under the ASL, additional hurdles need to be passed before the “non-peaceful means” could be waged on Taiwan. ￭The ninth is a “mission impossible”. What kinds of weapons today, when fired, can evade hitting “Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals” on one hand, and strike the “Taiwan independence secessionist forces” on the other? As a student of military affairs for decades, the author knows of none. ￭Furthermore, the concept of “non-peaceful means” is much broader than war. On an imaginary spectrum going from war at the scale of 100 to peace at zero, the “non-peaceful means” could extend from 10 to 100, which gives China’s future civilian leaders plenty of elbow room to comply with the ASL while avoiding a bloody military conflict across the Taiwan Straits when the Taiwan independence forces cross the “red-line”. ￭In light of the soft-offensives launched at Taiwan after the passage of the Law, it seems that: (1) the Law was meant to be, instead of a legal preparation for war against Taiwan, rather a legal preparation for Beijing’s efforts to win over the hearts and minds of Taiwanese; and (2) the Law was meant more to unshackle the hands of Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs officials to promote cross-strait engagement from internal hawkish oppositions than to intimidate the Taiwanese, although the latter were further antagonized and alienated as a result.
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Change 4 – Constrain Taipei through Washington: Under Jiang, Beijing reacted not only more strongly but also more directly toward Taiwan whenever Taipei exhibited inclinations toward independence. Hu, instead, put pressure on Washington to rein in Taipei in such occasions while Beijing took a back seat. One way to illustrate the difference is to trace how Beijing handled Taiwan’s independence-flavored campaign fever, once every four years, prior to the presidential election on the island. During these times, Taiwanese politicians galvanized the voters for a greater turnout by nationalistic rhetoric or acts that seemed to poke at Beijing’s sensitivity on Taiwan’s “splittism”.
Before the March 1996 election, Beijing launched missile tests in the Taiwan Straits. Three days before the March 18, 2000 election, the then PRC premier Zhu Rongji waved his fists on TV warning Taiwanese voters not to support the DPP candidate or the consequences could be disastrous. Before the March 2004 election, two years after Hu had taken over the Party, China resorted to neither military intimidation nor verbal attacks. Beijing instead internationalized the Taiwan issue – hitherto considered as domestic -- for the first time by sending a communiqué -- devoid of inflammatory words -- to all foreign embassies asserting Beijing’s position.
In the years approaching the 2008 election, as Taiwan President Chen on several occasions flirted with the idea of independence, Washington promptly issued admonitions while Beijing remained quiet. From mid-June to early December 2007, at least in nine different occasions, high-ranking U.S. officials reiterated objections to Taiwan’s UN referendum (Table 4, U.S. Officials Warning Taiwan).
In fact, Beijing by then had shifted its battlefield with Taiwan from the Straits to Washington and beyond. Since July 2003, China’s Taiwanese Affairs Office Director Chen Yunlin has paid annual visits to the U.S. capital urging American officials and scholars that they must contain Taipei’s “independence adventurism”, or Beijing would step in to handle the matter with whatever means available, and by then Washington should have no rights to intervene anymore. Likewise, Chen has made similar trips to Brussels since 2005, and two each in 2006 and 2007. In 2007, Chen even paid three visits to Washington in July, September, and December. In between, Chen’s deputies Sun Yafu and Ye Kedong added in their lobbying tours in the U.S. in January and November respectively. Furthermore, with the China-Japan détente unfolding, Ye extended his U.S. trip with a visit in Tokyo, apparently to apply indirect pressure on Taiwan.
In retrospect, under Hu, Beijing toward Taiwan has become more patient, less inclined to saber-rattle, more self-restrained in avoiding fueling Taiwan independence by verbal threats, more proactive in engaging Taiwan’s society, and more indirect in constraining Taipei’s pro-independence moves by going through Washington and other foreign capitals. Beijing’s promulgation of ASL marked both a peak of hard approach on Taiwan policy and a turning point. Since then, on its Taiwan policy, China’s “stick” remains hard but has not hardened further, while its “carrot” has continued to sweeten. Extrapolating Hu’s style on Taiwan policy, definitely distinct from Jiang’s, one should not have been surprised by how Hu handled the Taiwan issue with a kid-glove at 17th Party Congress.
Determinants of Beijing’s Taiwan Policy
Cross-strait interactions in the 1990s saw both accommodations and contentions, each highlighted by positive or negative milestone events respectively. The former were the April 1993 and October 1998 meetings between the high-level representatives of the two sides, when Beijing managed these processes with finesse, prudence, and flexibility. The latter were the 1995-96 and the 1999 Strait crises, when Beijing exhibited inflexibility in reacting bluntly and harshly to Taiwan’s challenges. It is worthwhile to re-examine the surrounding situations in which PRC leaders made their decisions. The situations include China’s domestic conditions, its relations with the U.S., and the Taiwan dynamics—words and deeds of leaders in Taipei—in Beijing’s perception.
Case 1—April 1993 Koo-Wang Meeting in Singapore: The meeting took place 14 months after Deng Xiaoping’s now legendary southern tour which lifted China out of the post-Tiananmen economic slump to a record high GDP growth of more than 14% in 1992 from 4% and 9% in 1990 and 1991. Meanwhile, Beijing-Washington relations had already improved, and Taipei had expressed goodwill both verbally and in action.
Deng’s daring venture out of Beijing also re-established his authority as the paramount leader—once weakened by the June 1989 Tiananmen tragedy—and re-stabilized China’s domestic political scene. The reconsolidation of his leadership was manifested in the surprise removal of the powerful Yang brothers in the September 1992 14th Party Congress. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, social stability was easily maintained as the once restive Chinese youths now devoted themselves to study abroad and money-making rather than politically problematic activities. By 1993, the PRC domestic situation—political, economic, and social—had turned quite favorable.
Beijing-Washington relations, damaged by Tiananmen, recovered sooner than most had expected. On June 30, 1989, special envoys of President George Bush, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger traveled to Beijing on a secret mission. They even were caught on CNN camera clinking their champagne glasses with PRC Premier Li Peng who reportedly had advocated Tiananmen repression. Despite lingering misgivings in US Congress toward Beijing, Scowcroft and Eagleburger went to Beijing again on December 9 to further improve the bilateral relationship. By 1992, relations between the two capitals had returned to normalcy. In October that year, the two signed a memorandum on market access, in which the US pledged to promote China’s participation in GATT, the predecessor of the World Trade Organization.
In October 1990, President Lee Tenghui established the National Unification Council, followed by the promulgation of the National Unification Guidelines in March 1991. In January 1991, a ministerial-ranking Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) was formally established, which was charged with Mainland policy research and planning, coordination, assessment and partial implementation. In February 1991, MAC approved the establishment of its semi-governmental arm, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), to directly deal with the Mainland authorities. These forward-looking policies, in response to the growing socio-economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait, sent a positive signal to Beijing of Taipei’s willingness to engage.
As the three determinants for Beijing’s Taiwan policy became favorable, Beijing adopted a more flexible approach managing the cross-strait affairs. Especially symbolic of Beijing’s flexible approach was that it followed suit of Taipei by establishing the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), the counterpart of SEF, in December 1991. Communications between SEF and ARATS began in January 1992, and continued to grow. This accommodating trend across the Taiwan Strait culminated in the historic meeting in Singapore in April 1993 between Dr. Koo Cheng-fu, Chairman of SEF and his counter part Mr. Wang Daohan.
Case 2—October 1998 Koo-Wang Meeting in Shanghai: This meeting occurred 22 months after PRC Premier Zhu Rongji had successfully wrestled the previously overheating economy down to a soft-landing by January 1997. Moreover, President Jiang Zemin, though without anymore the auspices of Deng Xiaoping who deceased in February 1997, smoothly concluded the crucial 15th Party Congress as his arch rival Qiao Shi quietly left the political stage. Both tasks had previously been considered daunting by observers. Meanwhile, social unrest, which was to dramatically rise in the subsequent years, remained tolerable.
Jiang’s trip to the U.S. in October 1997 was considered China’s most important such episode since Deng Xiaoping’s tour in 1979. It not only further boosted his political status at home, but also improved Beijing-Washington relations in a manifest manner for the first time since the March 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.
After the 1995-1996 cross-strait tension, Taipei continued to appeal to Beijing to resume the cross-strait talks but to no avail. In September 1997, Beijing leadership for the first time responded at the highest official level to Taipei’s request. Jiang Zemin in his 15th Party Congress report said that under the precondition that Taipei accept the “one China principle”, the two sides should open political talks on issues such as “ending the cross-strait state of hostility”. Taipei stood its ground by maintaining that resumption of cross-strait talks should require no precondition.
On November 30, 1997, the election for city mayors and county magistrates in Taiwan produced an unexpected result. The then opposition party DPP, won 12 seats while the ruling party Kuomingtang (KMT) retained only eight. Jiang Zemin was shocked and decided to take the previously ignored suggestion. The proposed idea was to resume cross-strait talks lest “the hearts and minds of people in Taiwan would drift further and further away from the Mainland”. On January 26, 1998, Qian Qichen in a press meeting reiterated Beijing’s more relaxed “one China principle”. On February 20, Taiwan’s Premier Vincent Siew reciprocated obliquely by saying at the Legislature: “Any issue that facilitates a peaceful cross-strait development and a democratic national unification can be proposed for cross-strait consultations and dialogues one step at a time”. Siew certainly did not embrace Beijing’s “one China principle” as officially defined.
On February 24, 1998, only four days later as if Beijing could not wait any longer, ARATS faxed to SEF a milestone letter suggesting three items: ■resumption of cross-strait talks, ■resumptions of ARATS-SEF exchanges, and ■arranging a meeting between Koo Cheng-fu and Wang Daohan on the Mainland (Appendix 1, Letter from ARATS to SEF February 24, 1998). Beijing’s stable precondition of “one China principle” for resuming cross-strait talks was absent in the offer, which illustrated poignantly Beijing’s tactical flexibility. The follow-up Taipei-Beijing interactions were brought to fruition on October 14-19 when Koo made an “ice-thawing trip” with his delegation to Shanghai where he met Wang, and later traveled to Beijing where he met Jiang.
Case 3—1995-1996 Strait Crisis: A series of threatening military exercises launched by Beijing in the Taiwan Straits occurred from late July 1995 to early March 1996 after Jiang Zemin underwent a succession crisis, Sino-U.S. relations plummeted, and Taiwan President Lee Tenghui irked Beijing by raising his country’s profile of sovereignty during a speech he delivered at his alma mater Cornell University in June 1995.
In September 1994, Deng Xiaoping decided to let Jiang Zeming, so far only China’s top leader in name, to inherit real power before Deng would leave the scene. This turning-point decision was revealed in the communiqué issued by the Party’s Fourth Plenum of the 14th Central Committee. Afterwards, Jiang took daring actions such as imprisoning the then all powerful Beijing mayor Chen Xitong, putting his imprimatur on the goodwill “eight point proposal” to Taiwan in January 1995, and recruiting en masse his “Shanghai clique” to Beijing. These aggressive moves invited countermoves from conservative elders, his contender Qiao Shi, and some PLA generals who were reluctant to take orders from the first civilian Chairman of the Central Military Commission. To the fully decorated soldiers, Jiang paled disappointingly before his predecessors Mao and Deng, both had proven their mettle through the crucibles of war. It was rumored that Qiao and the generals communicated through their secretaries. However, the top brass found an opportunity to challenge Jiang when Lee mentioned 17 times the “Republic of China” in his Cornell speech while Jiang was still planning to push for the cross-strait entente by sending ARATS official Tang Shubei to Taiwan in late May 1995 to prepare for another Koo-Wang meeting in July.
Prior to that, U.S. President Bill Clinton had issued a visa to Lee after overruling his Secretary of State Warren Christopher who had promised his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen that Lee would not come to the States. Beijing called back its ambassador in Washington to express utmost displeasure.
This was a period of volatility in three ways -- China’s domestic conditions, U.S.-PRC relations, and Taiwan dynamics – which led to the Strait crisis from July 1995 to March 1996. In short, two opposing political trends focusing on Jiang came to a head in Zhongnanhai. An abrupt reversal of seemingly Washington’s entire China policy exacerbated Beijing’s internal uncertainties. And Taipei’s pursuit of sovereignty status suddenly gained international exposure. Under the convergence of these events, Beijing went ballistic.
Case 4—1999 Strait Crisis: Beijing’s August 1999 saber-rattling in Taiwan Straits has been often attributed to Taipei’ provocation. In fact, long before Taiwan President Lee Tenghui gave an interview with Deutsche Welle on July 9, Beijing had already been embroiled in compounded difficulties in domestic conditions, and its relations with Washington had deteriorated. Lee’s comment that the status between China and Taiwan was a “a special state to state” relationship, perceived to denote Taiwanese independence, was more a triggering factor than the sole and major cause of the crisis.
Economically, China’s GDP growth in 1999 fell to 7.1% official figure, the lowest point in a continuous slide since 1992. In one year, consumer price index growth dropped from –0.60% in 1998 to –1.29% in 1999. That was the worst deflation according to price index change, since 1967 in PRC history.
Economic slowdown aggravated social instability by increasing the size of the unemployed. Unauthorized demonstrations almost doubled in number, from 60,000 in 1998 to 110,000 in 1999, according to Beijing’s official statistics. The variety of participants expanded to include the laid-off workers from the state-owned enterprises, the disgruntled farmers, teachers, cadres, and religious activists.
On April 25, Zhongnanhai leadership compound in Beijing was surrounded by up to 21,000 members of the Falungong cult. That was the largest protest movement in the capital since the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Jiang Zemin was appalled by their ability to mobilize without his knowledge, and their broad membership that penetrated the PLA, the Party, and the Public Security forces—supposedly the three most reliable organs of the rulers. He then avowed to crash this “evil” organization. The nation since late July was immersed in an anti-Falungong campaign whose battle-cry reverberated throughout the state-controlled media.
Meanwhile, tension simmered within Beijing’s top leadership. Jiang and other leaders were seen to distance themselves from Premier Zhu Rongji, and the rumors that Zhu requested to resign were spreading. Zhu was first blamed for the 1998 GDP growth failing to reach 8% as he had promised in March that year when taking the premiership. Then, he was criticized for making undue concessions to Washington in his April 1999 trip there without obtaining an agreement on WTO. Furthermore, he was charged for emboldening the Americans by his weak posture in April so that – it was so perceived in China -- the U.S. dared to humiliate China further by bombing the PRC embassy in Belgrade on May 8, 1999.
After Lee’s controversial comment, Beijing reacted so vehemently that seemed to overtake the crisis in March 1996. PLA fighters flying unprecedentedly busy sorties skirted and even invaded Taiwan’s aerial territories. Beijing turned on its propaganda machine in full-blast to lambaste Lee and his government. Thus, daunting PRC domestic conditions coupled with troublesome relationship with the US once again unwittingly provided a setting which metaphorically was oil on a heated frying pan only waiting for the spark from Taipei to ignite yet another cross-strait crisis.
Recurrent Pattern—What Determines Beijing’s Taiwan Policy: From the review of the four signpost events across the Taiwan Straits in the 1990s, a pattern has emerged. Beijing’s Taiwan policy seems to be affected by three determinants in the following order: first, China’s domestic conditions, second, Beijing-Washington relations, and third, Taiwan dynamics.
When China’s domestic conditions – political, economic, and social – are favorable, when Beijing-Washington Relations are stable, and when Taipei shows goodwill to engage China, Beijing is inclined to take a more flexible Taiwan policy characterized by softened rhetoric, prudent behavior, and more sophistication in operation.
Conversely, when China’s domestic conditions are unfavorable, when Sino-U.S. relations are unstable, and when Taipei tampers with independence, Beijing is more likely to take a contentious approach, lacking finesse, with harsh words, blunt gesture, and coercive moves.
The domestic factors are physically closest to the Beijing leaders themselves. If mismanaged, an unfavorable situation at home may unseat them from power. A favorable domestic situation, on the other hand, may allow greater elbow-room for Beijing leaders to score achievement in dealing with the external world. Therefore, leaders in Zhongnaihai while formulating their Taiwan policy must place the highest priority on domestic issues rather than on issues outside of China.
The U.S., to China’s decision makers, is more distant than the PRC domestic scene, but figures more prominently as a superpower in their minds than Taiwan, a small island.
Taiwan dynamics surely affects how Beijing adjusts its cross-strait tactics, but in comparison is less weighty than the immediate PRC domestic conditions and the mighty U.S. power. Since the turn of the century, China’s phenomenal economic growth has given Beijing leaders greater confidence and, therefore, more patience in dealing with Taiwan with the belief that time is on their side. Moreover, they have learned from past mistakes not to react too directly and strongly to Taiwan’s “provocation” lest independence advocates in Taiwan would gain in elections.
Current Assessment of the Determinants
The empirical observations summarized above may lend a useful reference framework to shed light on the forthcoming prospects of cross-strait relations. The three determinants of Beijing’s Taiwan policy are examined in the current context as the March 2008 Taiwan presidential election is approaching.
China’s Domestic Conditions: Several recent incidents have cast doubt on Hu’s command over the People’s Liberation Army. In January 2007, China caused an international uproar by successfully shooting down one of its satellites and spreading the debris in an already crowded space, while Beijing’s foreign ministry was embarrassedly caught without an explanation. In November, Beijing refused U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk to port in Hong Kong for the Thanksgiving holidays only to grant entry the next day on “humanitarian reasons”. Some observers opined that the PLA traditionally associated with the princelings – children of the Long March generation leaders – resisted the non-princeling Hu’s policy of engaging the U.S. armed forces.
On the other hand, Hu impressed observers by writing his political theory, “the scientific outlook of development” into the Party Constitution at the 17th Party Congress five years before he would retire. His predecessor Jiang – a princeling – achieved the same feat with “the three represents” only when he stepped down in November 2002. In fact, Hu began his power consolidation belatedly but has accelerated his progress. He started promoting generals in 2006, two years after taking the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, and appointing provincial leaders and ministers in 2005, two years after becoming the President of the nation. By the fall of 2007, three commanders of the seven military regions were promoted two ranks above their original positions – a sign of Hu’s growing authority, and one third of the sixty some provincial leaders were from the Communist Youth League, Hu’s major power base. Hu’s steady ascent in power has repeatedly outpaced expectations. Though not without trepidations, his progress in power consolidation points to a post-17th Party Congress political condition in China much more favorable than before.
Economically, China’s double-digit GDP growth since 2005 continued at 11.4% for 2007, though accompanied by worrisome inflation which averaged 4.8% for the year, the highest since 1996 when inflation registered 8.3%, which was far more serious than the current rate. Gravely alarmed, Beijing has taken multiple measures to curb the overflowing liquidity including raising by the end of 2007 the interest rate ten times and banks’ reserve requirement eight times to the highest level in 20 years. Under pressure from the U.S. and Europe, Beijing promised efforts to reduce trade surplus effective January 1, 2008 which will dampen inflation as well. Under the government’s heightened alertness on inflation, getting out of control would be unlikelyt.
Socials ills such as rampant corruption, yawning income gap, and growing pollution have worsened. In recent years, demonstrations, protests, and riots have become more frequent in China—rising from 58,000 in 2003 to 87,000 in 2005, according to figures released by the Public Security Ministry. However, so far, these activities have posed no serious threat to Beijing’s rule because unrests have been quickly nipped in the bud by either money or force, and charismatic opposition leaders are not in sight. It has been extremely difficult to network anti-government movements beyond the locality where the unrest first took place. The fact that Beijing government publicized the statistics of social disquiet to some extent demonstrated the confidence of the ruler.
The overall China’s domestic conditions by the end of 2007 were marked by power consolidation at the center, high economic growth accompanied by overheating though tightly monitored and proactively controlled, and social unrest growing in frequency but unable to coalesce. By and large, the outlook of 2008-- the year of the Olympics-- to the top leadership is much more that of growing confidence and rising aspiration than threatening instability.
Beijing-Washington Relations: In recent years, while incidents of Sino-U.S. frictions have never ceased to pop up periodically as before, the official exchanges between the two governments have remarkably expanded in four dimensions. First, the frequency of official contacts has been growing. Second, the visits between official counterparts have become regularized if not institutionalized in written agreements. PRC foreign minister and U.S. secretary of state, for example, have met annually several times, and often communicated by phone. Third, the levels of official exchanges have extended from the symbolic summits between presidents down to the working consultations between deputy assistant secretaries. Fourth, the variety of officials meeting their counterparts has expanded from diplomacy, commerce/trade, to the armed forces, and even space agencies. While distrust remains between the two governments, their official communications have reached an unprecedented magnitude. The implications are twofold. First, despite recurrent discords between the PRC and the U.S., an uncontrollable eruption of Sino-U.S. military conflict is unlikely. Second, Beijing can more easily go through Washington to restrain Taipei’s pro-independence attempts. For instance, on December 6, 2007, China’s President Hu took the initiative, for the first time, to talk to his U.S. counterpart George Bush on the hotline. That apparently smoothed over the Kitty Hawk porting dispute in late November, and allowed the two to exchange views again on Taipei’s UN referendum. In January 2008, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte while visiting Beijing issued another warning to Taipei on the referendum, and China allowed U.S. battleship Blue Ridge to port in Hong Kong.
Taiwan Dynamics: Taipei’s UN campaign before the March 2008 presidential election seems to have exceeded the intensity of all nationalistic activities before past presidential elections. While the majority of Taiwanese support the efforts to gain Taiwan’s international space, not all prefer declaration of a de jure independence which may jeopardize their own survival. Continuously over a decade, a majority of Taiwanese prefer status quo rather than independence or unification, which reflects the rational choice of their mind. On the other hand, those who call themselves “Taiwanese” have risen from 17% in 1992 to around 45% since 2006, dramatically overtaking the group self-identified as “Chinese” who have declined from 26% in 1992 to less than 6% in 2007. That reflects the sentimental choice of their heart. The two seemingly contradictory trends have coexisted. When a presidential election approaches, pro-independence politicians harp on the ethnic identity conflict in order to raise the voting participation of their basic supporters which amount to one third of the total voters. This has been particularly acute in 2007.
However, forces countering such escalated pro-independence fervor in the Taiwan society have also risen. For example, Robert Tsao, a former Taiwan chip tycoon of the United Microelectronic Corp. and once advisor to President Chen has launched a high-visibility crusade to promote a pro-reunification referendum since November 2007.
Overall Assessment and Observations: As the March 2008 Taiwan presidential election nears, the overall cross-strait picture that had been in 2007 mixed with both stabilizing and destabilizing factors began to clarify. Increasingly, the stabilizing determinants are outweighing destabilizing ones. China’s domestic conditions, though faced with a variety of socio-economic challenges, pose no serious threat to the growingly confident political leadership which has been strengthened as seen from the 17th Party Congress. Beijing-Washington relations, periodically tested by disruptive incidents, have been under control due to expanded official communication channels. The UN referendum campaign in Taiwan constitutes the only upsetting determinant on Beijing’s Taiwan policy, but is weighted down by the previous two determinants. Based on the empirical pattern of the 1990s, the overall assessment as of January 2008 suggests that Beijing continue to handle Taiwan with more finesse than force.
So far, Beijing has taken a two-pronged tactic with agility and sophistication. It has strengthened indirect pressure to constrain Taiwan independence from outside by pressuring foreign government officials, and mobilizing international opinion leaders, to denounce Taiwan’s UN referendum. On the other hand, Beijing has displayed restraint when facing Taiwanese population directly. It has soft-pedaled its rhetoric. Even when issuing stern verbal admonitions against de jure independence, Beijing used measured words. It also has lowered its military profile vis-à-vis Taiwan without abandoning the ongoing PLA preparations to deter the intervening U.S. forces and to seize the island in the future if necessary. PLA soldiers stationed on the DongshanIslands near the Taiwan Straits have reportedly received “political education” since the fall of 2007 to refrain from firing the first shot at Taiwan forces under all circumstances. In September, Taiwan naval officers aboard one Kid-class destroyer indicated that PLA naval ships and PRC hydrographical surveying ships had not been sighted for some time. In January 2008, the PLA dropped its guideline on “preparation for military struggles” meant for Taiwan independence, which hitherto had frequently been stressed when Chen Shuibian escalated the pro-independence drive.
Beijing’s indirect pressures on Taiwan have been launched worldwide with the objective to constrainTaiwan from all directions – the U.S., the E.U., and other powers – so that whatever the results of the forthcoming UN referendum may be, they shall produce no material effects outside the island. As previously mentioned, U.S. officials have reiterated objections to Taiwan’s UN referendum with an unprecedented intensity and frequency. That reflects the equally unprecedented pressure from Beijing on Washington on the matter. Beijing’s tactics of indirect pressure appeared to be effective. Reputable opinion polls conducted by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council indicated a precipitous decline of the pro-independence population in Taiwan from 26.8% in August 2007 to 19.1% in December and a corresponding rise of the pro-status quo population in the same period from 52.8% to 65.5%.( Figure 1, Unification or Independence). The dramatic victory of the anti-independence KMT in the Legislature election on January 12 partially confirmed that the voters in Taiwan considered too risky Chen Shuibian’s pro-independence policy in general and his UN referendum in particular. It may be inferred that Beijing would see working its tactics of containing Taiwan’s independence indirectly through Washington, and therefore a harsh military option became counterproductive and unnecessary.
In a similar vein, Beijing has reinforced its efforts in the European Union to convey a sense of urgency regarding Taiwan. That seems to have brought concrete results as well. For instance, French President Nicolas Sarkozy on November 26, 2007 apparently at Beijing’s behest denounced Taiwan’s UN referendum by harking on a more restrictive but antiquated definition of the “one China principle”, which Beijing has long replaced with more lenient versions in addressing the Taiwanese audience.
Implications and Recommendations
The discussions above have largely reaffirmed that how Beijing handles Taiwan is determined, in descending order of weight, first by China’s domestic condition, second by Beijing-Washington interactions, and lastly by Taiwan dynamics. The observations above also lead to the following implications how Beijing’s Taiwan policy may take shape after the March 2008 presidential election.
Beijing will continue what seems to have worked to restrict Taiwan independence.
First, the two-prong tactics. Beijing will adopt a soft, self-restraining approach on rhetoric and actions that directly affect how Taiwanese view Beijing. Beijing, however, will apply indirect pressure on Taiwan via “foreign” capitals by urging them to oppose Taiwan’s independence.
Second, an extra-military emphasis: Beijing will stress on using instruments on Taiwan beyond the pure military. They include economic allure, social engagement, cultural attraction, psychological pressure, legal maneuver, media-related campaigns and more. Beijing’s continuing rapid military modernization will strengthen its non-military tools as a backup.
Third, Beijing will ignore a timetable for unification for sometime to come.
Fourth, Beijing will deepen its out-reach in Taiwan’s society with both symbolic gesture and concrete policy implementations.
In addition, Beijing may break new grounds by contacting the Taiwan government, regardless whoever is elected president, Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT or Frank Hsieh of the DPP. A first Taipei-Beijing official contact since October 1998 may take place. In short, Beijing will apply more carrot than stick on Taiwan in the coming years.
In order to promote regional stability and prosperity for the ultimate interests of the people in China, Taiwan, and their neighbors, a three-way recommendation follows.
￭ Washington should maintain and even strengthen its official exchanges with Beijing but explore and expand incrementally Washington-Taipei channels for substantive rather than formal communication. Washington should further promote education exchanges between PLA cadets/officers and their U.S. counterparts.
￭ Beijing should gradually allow Taiwan international space in order to win the hearts and minds of Taiwanese people. Begin in the non-political organizations, and monitor how that favorably affects Taiwanese perception of China by commissioning opinion surveys conducted in Taiwan. Do realize that opinions in Taiwanese society are formed more bottom-up than top-down. Coordinate on Taiwan policy among Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of State Security, and the Taiwanese Affairs Office.
￭ Taipei should salvage the badly damaged official relations with Washington. Differentiate the CCP from the historical/cultural China
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