林中斌 部落格 / Blog Chong-Pin Lin

BEIJING’S AGILE TACTICS ON TAIWAN

♣Conference on “The Political and Economic Reforms of Mainland China in a Changing Global Society”

♣College of Social Sciences, National Taiwan University, Taipei April 26, 2002


 

Chong-Pin Lin

☻This is a draft. Citation or quotation requires the author’s approval.

The views expressed here are purely personal, and do not represent the ROC government, or any agency thereof.

On March 15, 2000, People’s Republic of China Premier Zhu Rongi put on an unforgettable performance at a press conference in Beijing.




Download link: https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B7GUQTtcorbzSUZrV2o2bktuQXM 

As Chen Shuibian, candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), gathered momentum in the campaign for the forthcoming Taiwan presidential election, Zhongnanhai（中南海）expectedly felt uneasy. The obvious reason was that DPP had proclaimed to seek independence for Taiwan. Broaching war while shaking his fist, Zhu warned the voters in Taiwan, “Do not indulge in impulse with consequences that you will live to regret”.[1] Zhu’s strong tone on the Taiwan issue was seen to be “unprecedented, and his agitated delivery surprised those present”[2]. On March 18, Candidate Chen became President Chen. War did not break out across the Strait. Beijing’s reaction for months to come was passive and low-key, typified by its standard comment on Chen: “We will listen to his words, and watch his deeds”[3].

In July 2000, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Beijing. He came away impressed that its leaders had mellowed up regarding the cross-strait situation, because they told him that they had no intent to use force against Taiwan, although they reserved the right to do so. “I think it was quite a significant difference in both the tone and content of that message”, remarked Cohen on October 2, 2000 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington[4]. In the same month, Taiwan opinion leaders visiting Beijing apparently were fed with a different message. Upon their return, they announced their perception:“ The cross-strait situation is precarious, and bordering on an eruption of open military conflict”（情勢嚴峻，戰爭一觸即發）[5].

The two cases illustrate Beijing’s agility in handling the affairs across the Taiwan Strait. The former demonstrates the agility over time, or the temporal agility. The latter demonstrates the agility toward people from different places, or the spatial agility.

This paper attempts to focus on the former, and to explore the following questions: How does one define Beijing’s Taiwan policy, strategy, and tactics? What factors determine Beijing’s changing tactics on Taiwan? In what way do the determinants affect Beijing’s Taiwan tactics? How has Beijing adjusted its Taiwan tactics in recent times? What conclusions and implications can one draw from the study?

n  BEIJING’S TAIWAN TACTICS VS STRATEGY: domestic, international & Taiwan determinants

n  CASE STUDIES: two positive correlations

²  Deng’s January 1992 southern tour and the April 1993 Koo-Wang meeting in Singapore

²  Zhu soft-landed the economy by January 1997 and Koo met Wang in October 1998 in Shanghai

n  CASE STUDIES: two negative correlations

²  The 1995 succession trial and the 1995-96 Strait tension

²  Deflation, Falungong, and embassy bombing in 1999 constituted the backdrop for the Strait crisis following Taipei’s “two-state theory”

n  RECENT PERIODS OF BEIJING’S TAIWAN TACTICS

n  n CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

n   

BEIJING’S TAIWAN TACTICS VS STRATEGY: domestic, international & Taiwan determinants

Three related terms of frequent usage in this paper require distinction from each other. Beijing’s Taiwan policy, or cross-strait policy, encompasses the long-term goal, the short-term objectives, the accompanying guidelines and operations of how Beijing handles the Taiwan issue. Beijing’s Taiwan strategy denotes the long-term goal and guidelines of the policy; and Beijing’s Taiwan tactics focus on the short-term objectives, guidelines, and operations of the policy. Thus, Beijing’s Taiwan policy comprises both its Taiwan strategy and tactics.

The following sections try to illustrate the contrast between Beijing’s impressively persistent Taiwan strategy and its amazingly agile Taiwan tactics. A cornerstone of Beijing’s Taiwan strategy, “peaceful unification”, was first conceptually declared in January 1979 and then verbally enunciated in October 1981[6]. Staying alongside this long-term posture has been Beijing’s “non-renunciation of the use of force” against Taiwan, which has likewise remained intact since January 1979[7]. “One country two systems”, another such example, first officially appeared in June 1983 but did not receive wide public attention until February 1984[8]. Yet, all three have remained unaltered as the pillars of Beijing’s Taiwan strategy over the past two decades. They typify the long-term aspect of Beijing’s Taiwan policy. On the other hand, Beijing’s Taiwan tactics--swinging widely from military intimidation to economic enticement. or from verbal attacks to charm offensives-- are subject to frequent adjustment in different times, at different places, towards different people. Such tactical adjustment appears to best serve Beijing’s interests, or sometimes the personal interests of the leaders themselves as collectively determined by the leadership.

What makes Beijing change its Taiwan tactics? It seems that three kinds of factors determine when and how Beijing modifies its Taiwan tactics. In declining order of impact or importance, they are the domestic conditions, the international environment, and the Taiwan dynamics. In general, Beijing leaders show more flexibility in their Taiwan tactics when these determinants are favorable, and vice versa. However, some caveats warrant attention. Beijing’s flexibility manifests in prudent behavior, softened rhetoric, finesse and sophistication in operation, and/or greater willingness to engage Taipei (See Figure 1 Beijing’s Taiwan Tactics: Determinants).

Beijing employs flexible Taiwan tactics in the following situations. First, when the domestic condition is favorable: the economy fares well, the social stability is at least passable, and the political leaders maintain at minimum a modicum of unity in appearance. The core factor is that when the top leaders feel individually secure, they are more willing to be pragmatic on issues such as Taiwan. Second, when Beijing-Washington relations are stable, with open communications and frequent exchanges of official visits. However, when Beijing’s geopolitical standing vis-à-vis the other great powers is compromised, it resorts to prudent and soft Taiwan tactics. One example occurred after September 11, 2001 when Russia shifted its previous slightly more China-first orientation to lean toward the West. Third, when Taipei extends visible goodwill to Beijing, and avoids being perceived as provocative. The exception is when Taiwan voters strongly support their government in elections, which indicate that Beijing’s highhanded approach has backfired.

Conversely, Beijing leaders take a blunt, harsh, coercive and contentious approach in their Taiwan tactics when the determinants are otherwise. First, when the domestic condition is unfavorable: the economy is ridden with difficulties, the social unrest is rising, and the political leadership undergoes a period of uncertainty. Second, when Beijing-Washington relations are irregular and tense. One caveat follows. To use contentious tactics on Taipei when PRC-US relations are suffering, Beijing needs to feel confident in its geopolitical position with Moscow and its overall standing in the world community. Third, when Taipei government is viewed to be provocative, and Taiwan voters are perceived not to support their government.

Why are the three determinants ranked in such an order? The domestic factors are physically closest to the Beijing leaders themselves. If mismanaged, an unfavorable situation at home may deteriorate to unseat them from power. A favorable domestic situation, on the other hand, may allow greater elbow-room for Beijing leaders to deal with the external world. Therefore, leaders in Zhongnaihai must place the highest priority on domestic issues rather than on issues outside of Mainland China.

The US factor, though more distant than the PRC domestic scene, figures more prominently in the mind of Beijing leaders than the Taiwan factor. It is simply because the US is a superpower while Taiwan is a small country. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the US has become the most important international actor that Beijing must face.

The Taiwan factor does affect how Beijing formulates its cross-strait tactics, but in comparison carries less weight than the PRC domestic factor and the US factor.

While the leaders have high degree of consensus over Beijing’s Taiwan strategy, especially the final goal of unification, they have exhibited different inclinations on what best tactics Beijing should take. Their differences reflect both their vested interests and their positional perceptions. Three schools of Taiwan tactics are discernible. The first is the military school. The People’s Liberation Army believes that the eventual resolution of the Taiwan issue has to be a military one. The senior generals would cite history: no past unification of China was achieved peacefully. They seemed to be supported by the Party elders, and the political hardliners such as Li Peng, the Chairman of the National People’s Congress since March 1998 .

The second is the diplomacy school. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by its former Minister and currently the Deputy Premier Qian Qichen would argue that the military option not only is forbiddingly risky but also extremely costly; and that the best solution is diplomatic. By sufficiently squeezing Taiwan’s international space, or even reducing the number of countries recognizing Taiwan down to single digits, Taipei will eventually succumb to Beijing’s resolve and accept its design, the second school contends. Qian would refer to his track record in taking

away from Taipei since 1990 a remarkable series of countries then recognizing the Republic of China.

The third is the Shanghai school led by Wang Daohan, Chairman of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and once Jiang Zemin’s mentor. Wang seems to believe that the best tactics is through exchanges and dialogues, as both the military and the diplomatic tactics would alienate Taiwanese people from the Mainland. The Taiwan watchers in Xiamen fall into this category as well.

In general, favorable determinants for Beijing’s Taiwan tactics bolster the influence of the moderates, while unfavorable determinants strengthen the voice of the hardliners. It is noteworthy that since the end of the last decade, Qian Qichen seems to have gradually co-opted some of the suggestions from the Shanghai school, and has demonstrated a growing degree of rhetorical softening. Despite the failing health of Wang, the Shanghai school’s influence seems to have persisted, perhaps because its real but unrevealed guru has been Jiang Zemin himself.

CASE STUDIES: two positive correlations

Two cases of cross-strait interactions clearly illustrate how Beijing’s Taiwan tactics became more flexible when the three determinants as described above were mostly favorable.

Case One: Deng’s January 1992 southern tour and the April 1993 Koo-Wang meeting in Singapore.

The PRC economy was in a slump in 1990 and 1991, with the gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 4% and 9% respectively[9]. One of the causes was that the corrective political measures to cool the previous overheating in a cyclic economy proved to be excessive.[10] Another was that the international sanctions imposed on the PRC after the June 1989 Tiananmen incident reduced the much needed foreign investment. The most fundamental cause, however, was that economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping and pushed by Zhao Ziyang, Deng’s protégé and Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) until June 1989, were dealt a heavy blow by the tragedy. Zhao became a political non-person ever since. Deng, still nominally the paramount leader in the country, saw his actual influence undermined within the leadership hierarchy in Beijing.

In January 1992, Deng decided to break through the invisible box he found himself in. His bold move to tour southern China and to reiterate the policy of “reforms and opening” set the whole nation aflame with the zeal to pursue economic prosperity. By the end of 1992, China’s GDP growth soared to 14%[11]. With the backdrop of economic recovery, Deng reconsolidated his leadership which manifested in the surprise removal of the powerful Yang brothers in the October 1992 14th Party Congress. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, social stability was easily maintained as the once restive Chinese youths now dedicated themselves to study and money-making rather than politically problematic activities. By 1993, the PRC domestic situation—political, economic, and social—had turned quite favorable.

Beijing-Washington relations, damaged by Tiananmen, recovered sooner than most had expected. On June 30, 1989, special envoys of President George Bush, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger traveled to Beijing on a secret mission[12]. They even were caught on CNN camera clinking their champagne glasses with PRC Premier Li Peng[13] whose hands, in the eyes of many, were stained with the blood of Tiananmen. Despite lingering misgivings in US Congress toward Beijing, Scowcroft and Eagleburger went to Beijing again on December 9 to further improve the bilateral relationship.[14] By 1992, relations between the two capitals had returned to normalcy. In October that year, the two signed a memorandum on market access, in which the US pledged to promote China’s participation in GATT, the predecessor of the World Trade Organization.[15]

In October 1990, President Lee Tenghui established the National Unification Council, followed by the promulgation of the National Unification Guidelines in March 1991[16]. In January 1991, a ministerial-ranking Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) was formally established[17], which was charged with Mainland policy research and planning, coordination, assessment and partial implementation. In February 1991, MAC approved the establishment of its semi-governmental arm, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), to directly deal with the Mainland authorities[18]. These forward-looking policies, in response to the growing socio-economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait, sent a positive signal to Beijing of Taipei’s willingness to engage.

As the three determinants for Beijing’s Taiwan tactics became favorable, Beijing adopted a more flexible approach managing the cross-strait affairs. Symbolic in a succession of such measures was that Beijing followed suit by establishing the previously mentioned ARATS, the counterpart of SEF, in December 1991[19]. Communications between SEF and ARATS began in January 1992, and continued to grow. This accommodating trend across the Taiwan Strait culminated in the historic meeting in Singapore in April 1993 between Dr. Koo Chen-fu, Chairman of SEF and his counter part Mr. Wang Daohan.

Case Two: Zhu soft-landed the economy by January 1997 and Koo met Wang in October 1998 in Shanghai.

The PRC economy suffered from malicious cycles, about four years each, of intense overheating and drastic plummeting since Deng launched the policy of “reforms and opening” in the early 1980’s. When the booming economy after 1992 started to show signs of forthcoming overheating in 1993[20], Deng summoned Zhu Rongji, the former Mayor of Shanghai to Beijing, and entrusted him with the job of reining in the wildly cyclic economy. Zhu was designated Executive Vice-premier in March 1993, and became President of the People’s Bank of China later that year. Zhu then proclaimed a policy of “economic macro-adjustment”(宏觀調控). Most observers, including this author, were pessimistic about the prospect of his success on such a daunting task.[21] In January 1997, it became evident that the economy soft-landed without crashing under Zhu’s masterfully aggressive management.[22] A “halo” began to hang over his head for achieving the “mission impossible”.

In September 1997, again to the surprise of most China watchers, Jiang Zemin consolidated his leadership in the crucial 15th Party Congress by quietly squeezing out his arch-rival Qiao Shi. Zhu was named as the new Premier. Thus, the new Jiang-Zhu team inspired much aspiration for a better tomorrow in the nation. Meanwhile, social unrest, which was to dramatically rise in the subsequent years, remained tolerable[23]. Jiang’s trip to the US in the following month was considered the most important such mission since Deng Xiaoping’s tour in 1979[24]. It not only further boosted his political status at home, but also improved Beijing-Washington relations in a concrete and manifest manner for the first time since the March 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.

Even after the cross-strait tension, Taipei continued to appeal to Beijing to resume the cross-strait talks but to no avail. In September 1997, Beijing leadership for the first time responded at the highest official level to Taipei’s request. Jiang Zemin in his 15th Party Congress report said that under the precondition that Taipei accept the “one China principle”, the two sides should open political talks on issues such as “ending the cross-strait state of hostility”[25]. Taipei stood its ground by maintaining that resumption of cross-strait talks should require no precondition.

On November 30, 1997, the election for city mayors and county magistrates in Taiwan produced an unexpected result. The then opposition party DPP, won 12 seats while the ruling party Kuomingtang (KMT) retained only eight. Jiang Zemin was shocked as he had been advised earlier that year by his Taiwan analysts that the DPP would lose badly because it was fractured. That was a judgment apparently based on the seemingly divisive public debate within the DPP on its Mainland China policy in February 1997. The blind-spot of the observers was failing to understand the unorthodox nature of DPP: it does not avoid exposing internal disagreements but does reunify in good time.

Jiang decided to take the previously ignored suggestion submitted to him around April 1997 from someone associated with Wang Daohan in Shanghai. The proposed idea was to resume cross-strait talks lest “the hearts and minds of people in Taiwan would drift further and further away from the Mainland”[26]. On January 26, 1998, Qian Qichen in a press meeting redefined Beijing’s “one China principle” in a more relaxed manner. The definition used to read “There is only one China in the world; Beijing is its only legitimate representation; and Taiwan is (an inseparable) part of one China”[27]. Qian replaced the second part by saying that “the integrity of China’s sovereignty and territory cannot be violated”. On February 20, Taiwan’s Premier Vincent Siew reciprocated, in a way, by saying at the Legislature: “Any issue that facilitates a peaceful cross-strait development and a democratic national unification can be proposed for cross-strait consultations and dialogues one step at a time”.[28] Siew in fact did not embrace Beijing’s “one China principle”.

On February 24, 1998, only four days later as if Beijing could not wait any longer, ARATS faxed to SEF a milestone letter suggesting three items: ■resumption of cross-strait talks, ■resumptions of ARATS-SEF exchanges, and ■arranging a meeting between Koo Cheng-fu and Wang Daohan on the Mainland (see Appendix I, Letter from ARATS to SEF February 24, 1998). Beijing’s stable “one China principle” precondition for resumption of talks was absent in the offer, which was a poignant illustration of Beijing’s tactical agility in dealing with Taipei. The follow-up Taipei-Beijing interactions were brought to fruition on October 14-19 when Koo made an “ice-thawing trip” with his delegation to Shanghai where he met Wang, and later traveled to Beijing where he met Jiang.[29]

CASE STUDIES: two negative correlations

In contrast to what the previous two cases demonstrate, Beijing’s Taiwan tactics tended to be brusque, threatening, over-reactionary, and averse to communication when the three determinants were unfavorable. Two such cases follow.

Case three: The 1995 succession trial and the 1995-1996 Strait tension

On September 28, 1994, the Chinese Communist Party’s Fourth Plenum of the 14th Central Committee issued a communiqué. Its cryptic wording belied its momentous significance. It stated: “The new great task of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics—reforms, opening, and modernization of China…-- was initiated by our second-generation leaders with Deng Xiaoping at the core, and is now continuing to march forward under the third-generation leaders with Jiang Zemin at the core”.[30]

Viewed with hindsight, the statement reflected a brave and noble decision made by Deng, the then untitled helmsman of the country, to try out his heir-apparent Jiang Zemin while Deng himself was still alive as a backup. It meant that the ultimate decision-making power for major policies now went to Jiang. Deng apparently intended to avoid Mao’s failure—holding onto power until death and bequeathing a weak leadership soon to be replaced. The result was that as arranged successor, Jiang endured while Hua Guofeng, Mao’s heir-apparent, floundered. Nonetheless, Jiang underwent a vexing succession trial, or a quasi-succession crisis, if not a full-blown one. This period of delicacy in Beijing leadership in fact was the backdrop of the Strait crisis from July 1995 to March 1996. In short, two opposing political trends focusing on Jiang came to a head in Zhongnanhai. Exacerbating Beijing’s internal difficulties were an abrupt reversal of seemingly Washington’s entire China policy, and Taipei’s suddenly surging international exposure. Under the convergence of these events, Beijing went ballistic.

Jiang’s Proactive Measures: Since the fall of 1994, Jiang shed his image as a member of the supine “wind faction”（風派）, and began to take a series of ambitiously proactive measures to strengthen his position. The first was to daringly put his imprimatur on the potentially explosive cross-strait policy, known as the “Jiang’s eight-point proposal” proclaimed on January 30, 1995[31]. The second was to drag down Chen Xitong（陳希同）, the all-powerful mayor of Beijing, who had resisted issuing Jiang a residence in Beijing in late June 1989 when Jiang was summoned from Shanghai to Beijng to succeed the deposed Zhao Ziyang as the Secretary General of the Party[32]. In April 1995, Chen resigned as his trusted assistant involved in corruption charges pressed by Jiang’s people committed suicide. The third was that Jiang started to recruit en masse the so-called “Shanghai clique”（上海幫） to Beijing. The most notable case was Fudan University professor Wang Huning（王滬寧）who arrived in April to serve in the CCP Central Policy Research Institute as the head of the Political Section, which was a promotion over three bureaucratic levels[33]. Such moves raised the eyebrows of Beijing’s political establishment.

Forces Challenging Jiang: As Jiang was gathering political momentum, those who considered him unworthy of being China’s next leader, did not rest idle. The first was Qiao Shi, the most senior member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, who in the fall of 1994, started to receive increasing number of foreign visitors and journalists with the repeated appeal for the rule of law and the reiterated opposition against the cultivation of personal cult in China. It was obvious enough that the unnamed target of Qiao’s statements was none other than Jiang. The second was the circulation in January 1995 in Beijing of the first issue of the un-authored critiques of reforms, the “Ten-thousand word letter”（萬言書）. These letters, allegedly written by the ultra-conservative CCP veteran Deng Liqun（鄧力群）, were never complimentary of Jiang. The third was the simmering discontent among the military top brass toward Jiang, the first operating “purebred” civilian Chairman of the Central Military Committee to stay on who never proved his fortitude through the crucibles of war[34]. Since the spring of 1994, rumors spread periodically that People’s Liberation Army generals signed mass petitions to urge Deng and Jiang to get tough with Washington and Taipei. Such military disquiet grew to a new height after Lee’s Cornell speech, and turned into pressure on Jiang.

In early May 1995, the Republican-controlled US Congress passed resolutions with almost unanimity[35] that President Bill Clinton of the Democratic Party should grant visa to President Lee Tenghui to visit his alma mater the Cornell University in June. Clinton did just that on May 18, and on June 9, Lee gave a speech at Cornell[36]. Seven days later, ARATS sent a letter to SEF to suspend all cross-strait consultations and cancel the previously forthcoming second Koo-Wang meeting (see Appnedix II, letter from ARATS to SEF June 16, 1995). On July 21, Beijing launched the first of the three rounds of military exercises intimidating Taiwan in the Strait[37].

Beijing accused Taipei of “having taken a series of actions damaging the cross-strait relations”.[38] Many observers attributed Lee’s “provocative speech” at Cornell, in which he mentioned 17 times “the Republic of China” to the outbreak of the Strait crisis. Granted, Lee’s trip to Cornell had some impact on Bejing’s strong reactions. This view, however, ignores the trepidation within the Beijing leadership, and the impaired Beijing-Washington relationship at the time. .

In fact, Jiang had been advised the latest by March 1995 that Lee was to visit the US. In that month, Lee’s confidant Su Zhicheng（蘇志誠）secretly met with Jiang’s counterpart, Zeng Qinhong（曾慶紅）in Macao when Su told Zeng of Lee’s forthcoming trip to the US. Zeng’s reaction was nonplused as if he had already known it: “You have your position, and we have ours. When it happens, we will criticize you publicly as usual”.[39] Su would later claim that Jiang had been advised beforehand “the meaning and the activities of Lee’s US trip, and the orientation of his speech” through such “secret communication channel”[40]. In February 1995, at least one US official in Washington had advised Yang Jiechi（楊潔篪）, then serving at the PRC embassy as Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission, that the White House might not eventually be able to resist the congressional pressure to grant President Lee Tenghui a visa.[41]

As late as the end of May 1995, when Lee’s trip to the US was widely known, Beijing proceeded with the preparation for the “second Koo-Wang Talks” in July. ARATS Secretary General Tang Shubei（唐樹備）, shown with beaming smiles on TV screens in Taiwan, came to Taipei and departed with an agreement to hold another preparatory meeting in June[42]. In light of the above, Beijing’s decision on June 16 to break the cross-strait consultations was dramatically sudden[43]. Such abrupt turn of Beijing’s position indicated weakness rather strength of its leadership. In fact, Jiang newly ensconced as the de facto first among peers only nine months earlier, had not yet consolidated his command. Fundamentally inclined toward cross-strait engagement, Jiang by mid-July could no longer resist the internal hard-line pressure for cross-strait contention during the period of a quasi-succession crisis[44].

.

Case Four: Deflation, Falungong, and embassy bombing in 1999 constituted the backdrop for the Strait crisis following Taipei’s “two-state theory”

Beijing in 1999 saw compounded difficulties both in domestic conditions and foreign relations. Economically, GDP growth fell to 7.1% official figure, the lowest point in a continuous slide since 1992.[45] Deflation worsened. In one year, consumer price index growth dropped from -0.60% in 1998 to –1.29% in 1999; and retail price index growth sank from –2.60% to –2.99%.[46] That was the worst deflation, or at least the lowest price index change, since 1967 in PRC history.[47]

Economic slowdown increased the number of the unemployed and exacerbated the deteriorating social stability. Unauthorized demonstrations grew in number: from 60,000 in 1998 to 110,000 in 1999 according to Beijing’s official statistics[48]. The variety of participants expanded. They now included not only the laid-off workers from the state-owned enterprises, but also the disgruntled farmers, teachers, cadres, and even religious activists.

On April 25, Zhongnanhai leadership compound in Beijing was surrounded from dawn to dust by at one point 21,000 members of the Falungong cult.[49] That was the largest protest movement in the capital since the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Jiang Zemin was appalled by their ability to mobilize without the knowledge of the Public Security Ministry, and their broad membership penetrating the PLA, the Party, and the government—supposedly the three most reliable organs of the state. He then avowed to crash this “evil” organization. The nation was embroiled since late July in an anti-Falungong campaign whose battle-cry reverberated throughout the state-controlled media.

Premier Zhu underwent personally a most taxing and trying time in 1999, which also connoted simmering tensions within the ruling hierarchy[50]. To begin with, Zhu had no lack of political enemies because of his fearless crusade against the overblown bureaucracy, the corrupt officials, and the inefficient state-owned enterprises. First, Zhu was blamed for the 1998 national economy not reaching the 8% GNP growth promised by him in March 1998 when he took the premiership. Second, his failed trip to the US in April 1999 to obtain an agreement on WTO invited much criticism from the CCP elders and hardliners, as he had appeared first to make “undue” concessions only to end up “losing face”.[51] Third, after the PRC embassy in Belgrade was bombed on May 8, 1999 by US forces “by mistake” as claimed by Washington, the general reactions in China were incredulity and outrage against the Americans. Such widespread sentiments conveniently vented toward Zhu by thinking that his conciliations toward Washington in the previous month only emboldened the US to further humiliate the PRC. During this period, Jiang and other leaders were seen to distance themselves from Zhu. And the rumors that Zhu requested to resign were spreading.

The Beijing leadership had already found themselves in a state of frustrations bordering on paranoia before President Lee Tenghui in Taipei remarked on July 9, 1999 during an interview with Deutchewelle that “a special state-to-state relationship” best described the cross-strait status. Beijing reacted so vehemently that made some seasoned observers think that a crisis more serious than that in March 1996 was coming[52]. The PLA troops launched intimidating exercises with fighters skirting and even invading Taiwan’s aerial territories. Beijing turned on its propaganda machine in full-blast to lambaste Lee and his government. Thus, daunting PRC domestic conditions aggravated by troublesome relationship with the US once again constituted unwittingly heated oil for the spark from Taipei to ignite yet another cross-strait crisis.

RECENT PERIODS OF BEIJING’S TAIWAN TACTICS

Since July 1999, six distinct periods have marked Beijing’s tactical operations toward Taiwan. Excluding the last one, their lengths were 75, 180, 134, 235, and 123 days each, illustrating how quickly Beijing could change its Taiwan tactics.

EA. Military Intimidations and Verbal Threats (July 9 - September 21, 1999): 75days

After the then ROC President Lee Teng-hui remarked that the “special state-to-state relationship” best described the status across the Taiwan Strait on July 9,1999, Beijing reacted strongly with military maneuvers posturing an invasion of off-shore islands. Such saber-rattling was accompanied with vitriolic accusations against Lee and ominous warnings to Taiwanese.

EB. Verbal Threats (September 21, 1999 - March 18, 2000): 180 days

A devastating earthquake that struck Taiwan on September 21 notably reduced Beijing’s militant behavior across the Strait. Some say the natural tragedy provided an exit for Beijing as negative international responses to Beijing’s military intimidations on Taiwan exceeded Beijing’s expectation. For instance, the European Union on July 20 declared its concerns for relations across the Taiwan Strait and urged for “resolving the question of Taiwan peacefully through constructive dialogue”.[53] Others argue that Beijing did not want to hurt the feelings of “Taiwanese compatriots” suffering a horrendous natural disaster. However, Beijing’s verbal threats against Taiwanese independence continued as Taiwan’s presidential election was approaching. A few days before the event on March 18, 2000, Beijing’s threats peaked in Premier Zhu Rongji’s contrived grimace on TV, hence caricaturized among international China watchers as “acting Marlon Brando in ‘Godfather I’”[54]. Some opine that it helped candidate Chen to become President Chen with a 2.4% margin in total votes.

EC. Passivity and Poise (March 20 – July, 2000): 134 days

The victory of Chen, who had advocated Taiwanese independence, apparently embarrassed Beijing. Instead of launching an “immediate war” as previously threatened by its semi-official scholars, Beijing reacted in a static and reserved mode. Outwardly, Beijing repeated its official comment: “We will listen to Chen’s words, and watch his deeds”. Internally, at least three high-level meetings were held on Taiwan between March 18 and April 19 to arrive at a 32-word (in Chinese) operational decree: “Unify our thoughts, insist on our principles, observe coolly and calmly, oppose independence and promote unification, promote peace through war, avoid haste and anxiety, maintain pressure, and negotiate on two fronts”.[55] In late May, international observers even noticed some confusion in Beijing’s messages to Taiwanese, as “government paper offers carrot” while “army publication wields stick”[56]. That in a way reflected Beijing’s arduous soul-searching during a four-month period of extensive reviews to find where went wrong and intensive planning on what to do next.

D. Two-pronged Campaign (July 2000 - May 2001):235 days

Sometime in July 2000, PRC Deputy Premier Qian Qichen in internal meetings proposed, along with other flexible measures on Taiwan, a further relaxed definition of “one China”, although such revised version would not become public until later[57]. On August 24, when he received a journalist delegation from Taipei, Qian replaced in the tripartite definition of one China the segment “Taiwan is (an inseparable) part of one China” with a revision “Both the Mainland and Taiwan together belong to one China”[58]. Verbally massaging its official position, Beijing began a well-coordinated, full-scaled two-pronged campaign on Taiwan. One soft prong aimed at winning “the hearts of Taiwanese people”, and one hard prong sought to put “appropriate (read indirect) pressure” on Taipei to accept Beijing’s precondition on resumption of cross-strait talks, and eventually Beijing’s terms on unification.

The soft prong included the following elements:

 Softening of rhetoric without concrete change of behavior;

n   Escalated efforts to invite opinion leaders from Taiwan such as legislators (parliamentarians), former high-ranking officials (mostly from the now opposition party KMT), elected local officials (some even belonging to the ruling party DPP), scholars, and media luminaries;

n   Mentioning and partially implementing preferential treatments for Taiwanese investors on the Mainland; and

n   Allowing dramatically increased number of Mainland visitors to Taiwan since July 2000.

Meanwhile, the hard prong comprised the following elements:

n   Continuing to conduct military exercises with no reduction of frequency, size, or degree of sophistication. These exercises were held, however away from the sensitive areas of the Taiwan Strait, and announced by Beijing officially in a reserved manner with selectivity. Beijing ceased publicizing the PLA exercises through the notoriously sensationalizing Hong Kong media, as previously practiced;

n   Continuing strangulation of Taipei’s international living-space with a new twist: launching a diplomatic war on Africa, Taipei’s diplomatic bastion where it had many full recognitions;

n   Mobilizing Chinese overseas globally by forming organizations and staging conferences under the banner of “opposing independence and promoting unification”; and

n   Escalating Beijing’s pressure on Washington not to include Taiwan in the theater missile defense program, and not to transfer arms to Taiwan. Beijing was linking more than ever arms transfer to Taiwan with Washington’s frequent complaint on Beijing’s arms proliferation to Pakistan and the Middle East.

E.   Hard-prong Primacy (May-August, 2001): 123 days

In May 2001, Beijing for the first time since September 21, 1999 reverted back to using Hong Kong media for disclosing its military exercises with Taiwan as the supposed target. This occurred during a period of uncertainty and even brewing potential hostility between Beijing and Washington. In fact, the two were perceived to be “on the brink of a new cold war”[59]. The climax occurred on April 1 when a PLA fighter crashed after colliding with an American EP-3 reconnaissance plane, which landed in emergency on the Hainan Island. Despite Beijing’s initial tough rhetoric, the episode was concluded in 11 days when the US crew was released,[60] although the bitter aftertastes lingered in both Beijing and Washington.

Perhaps Beijing found that the Taiwan public did not pay much attention to the Hong Kong-enhanced military intimidations. In July 2001, Beijing escalated the intensity of the psychological campaign. Reports from Hong Kong now pointed out that one objective of these PLA exercises was to seize the Penghu or Pesdcadoras islands as a springboard to finally liberate Taiwan; and the other was to paralyze invading aircraft carriers. Although the owner of the carriers was left unmentioned, the message for Taiwan and the US was clear enough. On August 17, the US dispatched two aircraft carriers with a dozen other ships and 140 carrier-based naval planes to the South China Sea in a one-day joint exercise without naming the hypothetical rival[61]. In less than one week, Beijing welcomed US aircraft carrier Constellation and six other American warships to visit Hong Kong for rest and recreation. Curiously, request for such kind of port call to Hong Kong from the US was turned down in late May[62]. Around the same time, Hong-Kong media ceased reporting on PLA exercises aiming at Taiwan and aircraft carriers.

During this three-month period, Beijing basically maintained its two-pronged tactics on Taiwan with only a slight edge of the hard prong over the soft. This slight variation without fundamental alterations reflected more or less the same conditions of the three determinants as from the last period. The PRC domestic situation was passable. Beijing-Washington relationship after the April incident soon stabilized. After Washington and Beijing had started preliminary discussions on resuming the military exchanges in late June, Presidents Jiang and George W. Bush talked on the phone over the hotline one day following the July 4 National Day in the US. Taipei’s goodwill-no-provocation posture toward Beijing continued. In July, President Chen successfully concluded a conference of advisors on economic development, which reached a collection of consensus for promoting cross-strait exchanges. One was to relax restrictions on the Mainland-bound investment stipulated under the “patience without haste policy”（戒急用忍）enunciated in September 1996.

F. Soft-prong Primacy (August 2001 – Present): 300+ days

Around mid-August 2001, Beijing started to de-emphasize its military intimidation against Taiwan. At the same time, Beijing’s softened rhetoric and more flexible gesture toward Taipei began to come to the fore, even though its forward act of engagement was slower to arrive[63]. In this period, the soft-prong in Beijing’s Taiwan tactics ascended to primacy, while remnants of the hard-prong persisted. The latter included the growing deployment of M-9 missiles across the Strait[64]. Another notable example was the insolent behavior of PRC Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan（唐家璇）toward Taiwan representative and journalists at the October 2001 APEC meeting held in Shanghai.

The softening trend was accompanied by a domestic condition without imminent crisis, progressively stabilized Beijing-Washington relationship, fundamentally altered global balance of power, and new dynamics in Taiwan’s election.

The PRC economy in 2001 though slowed down from the previous year, its gross domestic product grew a respectable 7.3%, outpacing all other Asian nations and world powers amid a global downturn.[65] Social unrest continued, but was manageable. Falungong scattered underground. Granted, street demonstrations and workers’ protests occurred at gradually rising frequency and growing magnitude. None flared up beyond control after officials sent in security forces and paid some compensation fees[66]. Brewing political rivalry among top leaders was expected, but few disruptive signs were glaringly visible. And work on the power succession for the 16th Party Congress forthcoming in October 2002 proceeded on schedule. All things considered, it was passable, though not rosy. Domestic conditions were much better than, for instance, those preceding the July 1995-March 1996 and the August 1999 Strait crises.

The Beijing-Washington relationship, sunken by the April 1, 2001 EP-3 incident, returned to normalcy following two visits by US President G.W. Bush to Shanghai in October 2001 and Beijing in February 2002, as well as PRC Vice President Hu Jingtao’s US trip in April 2002. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on US, which fundamentally shifted the global balance of power to the chagrin of Beijing, required Beijing’s prudent handling[67].

On August 11, 2001, it was reported that Jiang Zemin had just urged his colleagues at the CCP Central Leadership Group on Taiwan Work to strive for an important breakthrough on resuming talks across the Taiwan Strait early next year.[68] On the same day, PRC Deputy Representative at the United Nations indicated that Beijing would not stop Taipei attending the “Special UN Session on Children” through the channel of non-governmental organization.[69] On August 29, Beijing’s Taiwanese Affairs Office Deputy Director Wang Zaixi（王在希） expressed willingness to accommodate Taiwan if Taipei’s relaxation of the “Patience without Haste” policy materializes.[70]

The post-911 developments around the world confirmed unequivocally the single superpower status of the US. Not only the first phase of the war in Afghanistan from mid-October to mid-December was quickly won despite the pessimistic forecasts of experts[71]. But also Russian President Putin reversed his previous slightly more eastward orientation to lean resolutely toward NATO and Washington. Moreover, the US influence continued to extend around China’s peripheries. The Bush administration’s support for Taiwan remained strong[72].

In this new international environment, Beijing conducted itself with aplomb and caution. It showed unprecedented restraint toward Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington in a series of events of potential conflict:■ Japan’s parliament passed a bill in October 2001 so as to send warships abroad; ■Taiwan’s Vice President Annette Lu made a lengthened transit visit in the US in January 2002; ■in the same month, the US was implicated, though not proven, to have planted bugs in Jiang’s airplane made in the US[73]; and ■Washington allowed Taiwan’s Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming （湯曜明） to attend a private conference in Florida in March 2002 breaking an unwritten convention practiced since 1979, while that did not derail PRC Vice President Hu Jingtao’s plan to visit the US in late April[74]. Beijing apparently decided that, in a world now clearly dominated by the US, the best was to promote an image of peace and stability for itself while quietly gearing up summit-diplomacy to break through the containment circle that seemed to close up incrementally. On April 10, President Jiang stopped over in Berlin during his globe-trotting travels to deliver a speech entitled “Let Us Jointly Create a Peaceful and Prosperous New Century”[75].

Shortly before the December 1 election in Taiwan, Beijing was relaxed about the forthcoming voting according to a semi-governmental think-tank in Mainland China. Scholars from the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University said that they did not expect DPP to pick up more than nine seats in the Legislature, bringing its total in the 225-seat chamber to 75[76]. The election turned out to increase DPP seats to 87, and to win DPP a plurality[77]. The result must have sufficiently shocked Beijing into adjusting its Taiwan tactics once again. Beijing started edging toward engaging the previously stigmatized DPP, and to further soften its posture toward Taiwan.

On December 6, Beijing’s State Council Taiwanese Affairs Office (SCTAO) Spokesman Zhang Minqing（張銘清）while commenting on Taiwan’s election did not mention the precondition hitherto attached to resumption of cross-strait talks that Taipei must publicly accept Beijing’s “one China principle”.[78] He said instead, “Beijing does not exclude interacting with DPP leaders.”[79] One day earlier, Mainalnd China’s Voice of the Strait radio station controlled by SCTAO broadcast an analysis entitled “Cross-strait Relations Under Severe Test” which contained the following passage:

“Since Chen Shuibian ascended the political stage (meaning became the president), the Mainland’s measure of ‘listening to his words and watching his deeds’ has caused mounting difficulty in maintaining such a posture. The Mainland should face the reality in Taiwan after the election, and should take agile and effective countermeasures. Otherwise, we will find ourselves stuck in a passive and reactionary mode for every step we take.”[80]

By early January 2002, western observers started to notice that Beijing had switched to a new tactic on Taiwan—“sweet talk”, as Beijing had just told opposition legislators from Taiwan that direct shipping, trade and mail links—the three links--across the Strait were possible without a formal acceptance by Taiwan of Beijing’s “one China Principle”.[81] This softening trend of Beijing’s Taiwan tactics reached a new height on January 24 when Deputy Premier Qian Qichen publicly stated: “We believe that the broad DPP membership should be distinguished from the extremely few diehard advocates for Taiwan independence. We welcome them (i.e. the former) to come over to sightsee and to visit in order to increase (their) understanding (of us)”[82](Italics inserted by the author). Although Beijing back in July 2000 had expressed welcome to “all political parties in Taiwan that do not advocate or support “splittism” of China to visit the Mainland”, this was the first time Beijing used the word “welcome” for DPP members[83]. To further elaborate on Qian’s statement, an anonymous senior official in Beijing expressed its willingness to open the “three links” with Taiwan without involving the governments of either side.[84]

On March 15, Premier Zhu Rongji in his concluding speech at the National People’s Congress downplayed the importance of the thorny Taiwan issue with an unusually short coverage of only 250 words. Even when asked by a journalist whether or not Beijing had adopted “new thinking” on Taiwan because no threatening languages, such as the non-renunciation of the use of force against Taiwan, were used in his speech, Zhu defended Beijing’s long-term official position but avoided mouthing the “one China principle” in his reply.[85] Indeed, since Taiwan’s December 1, 2001 election, Beijing began to replace consistently in its cross-strait rhetoric the more exclusive “one China principle” with the more inclusive “one country two systems”[86]. On May 21, Beijing’s State Council Taiwanese Affairs Office even proposed cross-strait negotiation on the “three links” through authorized businessmen without the “one China principle” as precondition[87].

This period was not totally devoid of Beijing’s hard-prong approaches on Taiwan. However, by and large, the soft prong of Beijing’s two-pronged campaign on Taiwan tactics during this period far outpaced the hard one.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The previous sections have explored Beijing’s changing tactics on Taiwan in the recent decade, a period when cross-strait interactions became an issue of growing global concerns. The discussions suggest the following:

n   Beijing’s Taiwan policy consists of two levels. While Beijing’s Taiwan strategy-- such as “one country two systems”, “peaceful unification”, and “non-renunciation of the use of force” -- remained unaltered in decades, Beijing’s Taiwan tactics change periodically, and sometimes abruptly.

n   The adjustment of Beijing’s Taiwan tactics depends on, in declining order of weight, PRC domestic conditions, the international environment, and the Taiwan dynamics. When these determinants are mostly favorable, meaning stable or predictable, Beijing’s Taiwan tactics tend to be more flexible. Conversely, when these determinants are unfavorable, meaning unstable or unpredictable, Beijing’s Taiwan tactics tend to less flexible. A few caveats warrant attention.

 Examinations of four major cross-strait episodes in the 1990s seem to corroborate the above hypothesis. They include the two culminations of cross-strait accommodations in April 1993 and October 1998, and the two crests of cross-strait tensions in March 1996 and August 1999.

A number of implications ensue:

n   Taiwan’s behavior is not the number one determinant of Beijing’s cross-strait tactics. Whatever Taipei says or does may complete Beijing’s checklist in deciding, for example, whether to resume cross-strait consultations. However, PRC domestic conditions and Beijing-Washington relationship seem to come before Taipei’s words and deeds in Zhongnanhai’s calculus.

n   Attributing the eruptions of cross-strait crisis in March 1996 and August 1999 solely to “provocations” from Taipei is an oversimplification.

n   It is useful not to underestimate the amazing agility of Beijing’s tactics toward Taiwan while keeping in mind the impressive persistence of Beijing’s long-term Taiwan strategy.

n   Beijing’s precondition for resumption of cross-strait talks--that Taipei accepts the "one-China principle” however defined by Beijing-- falls in the realm of tactics, not strategy.

n   Beijing’s policy toward key international actors, such as Washington and Tokyo, may also manifest high degree of tactical agility, while strategic goals are kept basically intact over a long period of time.

n   Governments in fine-tuning their approaches toward Beijing—to soften or to toughen, for instance—are advised to take into serious consideration PRC domestic conditions first, followed by Beijing’s relationship with Washington at the time.

n   Washington should maintain a stabilized, though not necessarily a perfectly harmonious, relationship with Beijing predicated on a balance between mutual interests and fundamental differences. Swing between engagement and containment should be minimized, if not totally avoided.

[1] The literal translation reads , “Do not indulge in impulse with consequences that are too late to regret for”. Wang Zhozhong(王綽中), “zhurongji jizhehui”(Zhu Rongi’s Press Conference), (Taipei)China Times March 16, 2000.

[2] Huang Jikuan(黃季寬), “Jiqing yanchu Zhu Rongi danxin Taidu yiyu yanbiao”(Worries for Taiwan Independence Surfaced in Zhu Rongi’s Agitated Performance), (Taipei)Central News Agency March 15, 2000.

[3] “Li Jiaquan cheng ‘yi Zhong’ yuanze bu rangbu jiang cai sizhong fangfa chuli liangan jushi” (Li Jiaquan said that we will not yield on the ‘one China’ principle and will take four measures in handling the cross-strait situation) (Hong Kong)Takungpao March 25, 2000.

[4] “Cohen Cites Russia, China, Weapons of Mass Destruction as Top Foreign Policy and Defense Challenges”, U.S. Department of State Washington File, October 2, 2000 (http://usinfo.state.gov/products/washfile.htm). The author asked Cohen for comment on the disparity between the impressions Beijing created between visitors from Washington and Taipei in July 2000, when Cohen visited the author in his MAC office on October 31, 2001. Cohen remarked, “Maybe they say different things to different people”.

[5] See, for example, He Shan(禾山) “Chen Shuibian yiri sanpi ‘dalure’”(Chen Shuibian Criticizes ‘Mainland Fever’ Thee Times a Day) (Hong Kong)China News Agency July 22, 2000.

[6] “Quanguo renda changwei gao Taiwan tongbao shu”(National People’s Congress Standing Committee Appeals to Taiwan Compatriots) (Beijing)Renmin Ribao January 1, 1979; “Ye Jianying’s Statement to Xinhua Journalists” Renmin Ribao, October 1, 1981.

[7] Deng Xiaoping said in January 1979, “If we promise that we will not use military force, then the Taiwan authority will not talk to us on peaceful unification. That will eventually lead to a situation that we must use military force to resolve the issue.” http://tts.mac.gov.tw/ttscgi/ttsweb?@7:29806:3:7:1

[8] Deng Xiaoping, “Zhongguo dalu he Taiwan heping tongyi di shexiang”(Conceptual Proposal on Peaceful Unification of Mainland China and Taiwan) Deng Xiaoping: Selected Works Volume 3, pp.30 & 31; Leng Rong(冷溶), “Deng Xiaoping tichu ‘yiguo liangzhi’ gouxiang di lanlong qumai”(The Origin and Development of How Deng Xiaoping Proposes the Concept of ‘One Country Two Systems’) (Beijing)Liaowang(overseas edition) July 20, 1992 p.4. For background, see Hui-Ling Chang(張惠玲), “Cong Xianggang moshi guancha yiguo liangzhi shijian zhi maodun yu kunjing”(Observation on the contradiction and dilemma encountered by the application of ‘one country two systems’ to Hong Kong) (Taipei)Gongdang Wentiyanjiu(Studies in Communism) 28:3(March 15, 2002)pp.14-24.

[9] 2001 World Development Indicators, CD-ROM Win*STARS Version 4.2,32 bit (Washington DC: The World Bank, April 2001)

[10] For China’s cyclic economy between 1978 and 1990, see Chong-Pin Lin, “China: the Coming Changes” The American Enterprise January/February 1991 p.21;

[11] 2001 World Development Indicators.

[12] James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, Inc. 1999) p.206; Hu Weizhen（胡為真）, Meiguo dui Hua ‘yige Zhongguo’ zhengce zhi gaibian (The Evolution of America’s ‘one China policy’)(Taipei: Shangwu Yinshuguan April 2001) p.135.

[13] Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China,an Investigative History (New York:The Century Foundation,1999). p367.

[14] “Sikaokeluo yixin jieshu Dalu fangwen” (Scowcroft and Company concluded their Mainland Visit) (Taipei)United Daily December 10, 1989, p.2.

[15] GATT is General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade. Elizabeth Perry, “China in 1992: An Experiment in Neo-Authoritarianism” Asian Survey January 1993, p.19.

[16] Major Events Across the Taiwan Straits (January 1912 to April 1998) (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, September 1998) pp. 3&4.

[17] Major Events Across the Taiwan Straits p.4

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] China’s consumer price index (CPI) grew at 8.62%,16.10%,and 25.02% respectively in 1992, 1993, and 1994 per statistics. China’s Statistical Bureau Yearbooks at http://www.stats.gov.cn/sjjw/ndsj/zgnj/mulu.html

[21] Other pessimistic views on the prospect of Zhu’s task abound. For example, “Zhu’s role in the economy could equally serve as a quagmire or trap for his political career…Zhu and his efforts were in substantial trouble” in David Bachman, “China in 1993: Dissolution, frenzy, and/or breakthrough?” Asian Survey January 1994 p.31.

[22] China’s CPI grew at 25.02%, 16.80%, and 8.80% respectively in 1994, 1995, and 1996. China’s Statistical Bureau Yearbooks.

[23] “In 1999, the last year for which Beijing issued labor-dispute statistics, the government recorded more than 120,000 ‘incidents’, a 29% increase over the previous year…Statistics show a jump from 8,150 labor disputes in 1992 to 120,000 in 1999”. Matthew Forney and Neil Gough, “Working Man Blues” Time April 1, 2002 p.27. The number of unauthorized demonstrations was 60,000 in year 1998, 110,000 in 1999, and 130,000 in 2000, according to an internal National Security Bureau report on December 21, 2001 in Taipei.

[24] Jiang’s trip was also the first state visit by a PRC leader in more than a decade. Mann, About Face, p.353.

[25] He Mingguo（何明國）, “Lianan jiaoliu shinian dashiji” (Chronology on Cross-strait Interactions in the Past Ten Years) United Daily October 30, 1997 p.4.

[26] Internal document, Mainland Affairs Council.

[27] “Qian Qichen zhaici chanming yige Zhongguo di yuanze” (Qian Qichen Once Again Enunciates the One China Principle) Xinhua January 26, 1998.

[28] “Xiao yuanzhang wanchang zai lifayuan disanjie diwu huiqi shizheng baogao”(Premier Vincent Siew’s Policy Report to the Fifth Session of the Third Term of theLegislative Yuan) Dalugongzu cankao ziliao (Reference Materials for Work on Mainland Affairs)(Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 1998?) p.74.

[29] For the preparatory events between SEF and ARATS leading to the October 1988 Koo-Wang meeting, see Major Events Across the Taiwan Straits on website ttp://www.mac.gov.tw/english/chronology.sce.htm pp.17-21.

[30] Yang Zhongmei(楊中美), Jiang Zemin zhuan (Biography of Jiang Zemin) (Taipei: China Times Pulbishing Company, 1996) p.9. .

[31] The proposal stressed cross-strait economic and cultural exchanges, and de-emphasized the use of force, and the political difference between Beijing and Taipei.

[32] Yang, Jiang Zemin zhuan, pp.306-316.

[33] Gao Xin（高新）, Jiang Zemin di muliao (Jiang Zemin;s Couonselors) (Brampton, Canada: Canada Mirror Books, 1996) p.281.

[34] Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping had commanded troops and were not purebred civilians. Hua Guofeng was civilian but did not stay on for long to operate as Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

[35] In early May 1995, the House of Representatives approved 396 to 0 a non-binding resolution to permit Lee to visit Cornell; a week later, the Senate voted 97 to one in favor of Lee’s visit. Mann, About Face, p.322.

[36] Ibid. pp.325 & 326.

[37] Major Events Across the Taiwan Strait p.7.

[38] Among other Beijing’s official statements, see Appendix II, Letter from ARATS to SEF June 16, 1995.

[39] Zou Jingwen（鄒景雯）, Lee Tenghui zhizheng gaobai lu (Lee Tenghui’s Disclosure on His Term as President)(Taipei: Risingsun Publishing Company Ltd., 2001) p.203.

[40] Zou Jingwen, Zhuanlue Su Zhicheng (Biography of Su Zhicheng)(Taipei: Sifang Shucheng, 2002) p.86.

[41] Personal communication in Monterey, California, July 21, 2001 with a US official who wished to remain anonymous.

[42] Tang visited Taipei on May 27-28 to attend the “First Preparatory Meeting for the Second Koo-Wang Talks” to be held in Beijing. Major Events Across the Taiwan Straits, p.7.

[43] The June 16, 1995 decision was so sudden that one academic advisor to Jiang who was flying from Beijing to Washington at the time was behind the news when he met for dinner Dr. H, his former Ph.D. classmate at George Washington University shortly after landing in DC. Personal communication with Dr. H, December 17, 1996 in DC.

[44] This view, that the author held since late 1996, was echoed by Su who called Jiang Zemin a “dove” in contrast to the “hawkish PLA”. See Zou, Zhuanlue Su Zhicheng, p.86.

[45] Beijing’s official economic growth figures have been questioned. According to Thomas Rawski, “China’s economy may actually have shrunk—minus 2.2 and minus 2.5 persent, respectively—in 1998 and 1999”. Melinda Liu, “Why China Cooks the Books” Newsweek April 1, 2002.

[46] National Bureau of Statistics of China at http://www.stats.gov.cn/sjjw/ndsj/zgnj/mulu.html

[47] 2001 World Development Indicators, CD-ROM Win*STARS Version 4.2,32 bit (Washington DC: The World Bank, April 2001)

[48] National Security Bureau(Taipei) internal report December 21, 2001.

[49] Zong Hairen（宗海仁）, Zhu Rongji zai 1999(Zhu Rongji in 1999) (Carle Place, New York: Mirror Books, 2001) p.47

[50] A helpful backgrounder, though by no means bonified official record, for the difficulties Zhu encountered and the nüanced tensions between Zhu and Jiang is Zong, , Zhu Rongji zai 1999..

[51] Tyler, A Great Wall,p.427; and Zong, Zhu Rongji zai 1999, p.96.

[52] This was the view expressed by some of the author’s colleagues in internal national security meetings in early August 1999.

[53] CFSP presidency Statement: Brussels (20/7/1999) – Press:232 Nr:10256/99.http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp

[54] Brando, in his role as the revered patriarch, put on an atypical threatening expression in a jovial moment with the kids toward the end of the film. Up to March 15, 2000, Zhu had made few statements on cross-strait affairs. It was rumored that the PLA and hardliners had criticized him for avoiding making a stand on the Taiwan issue before this event.

[55] “統一思想, 堅持原則, 冷靜觀察, 反獨促統, 以戰逼和, 不急不躁, 保持壓力, 兩面談判”, “Zhonggong duitai zhengce sanshier zi fangzhen” (Communist China’s Taiwan Directive Has 32 words) United Daily April 19, 2000, p.13.

[56] John Pomfret, “Beijing Sends Mixed Messages to Taiwanese” Washington Post May 30, 2000, p.A11.

[57] This revised version had earlier appeared in Wang Daohan’s comments. Qian’s position as Deputy Premier anointed the revision with greater officiality. See Tod Crowell, “Now, a Beijing Peace Offensive” Asiaweek, July 28, 2000.

[58] “Qian Qichen fuzongli huijian Taiwan Lianhebao fangwen tuan” (Deputy Premier Qian Qichen Met with United Daily Visiting Delegation) (Beijing)Xinhua August 25, 2000.

[59] John Keefe, “A Tale of ‘Two Very Sorries’ Redux” Far Eastern Economic Review March 21, 2002, p.30

[60] Ibid.

[61] Tyler Marchall, “7 US Warships MAKE A port Call in Hong Kong Port Call” International Herald Tribune August 21, 2001 pp.1 & 5.

[62] Xu Shangli（徐尚禮）, “Meijian shengqing fang gang bei ju” (US Warships’ Request to Visit Hong Kong Was Turned Down) China Times May 30, 2001 p.11.

[63] The National Committee on American Foreign Policy in New York reached a consensus in observing that “China has gone from posing recurrent threats and engaging in minima intercourse with Taiwan to undertaking a broad effort to engage Taiwan in economic and cultural relations”. “Summary of NCAFP Roundtable with the Shanghai Center for RimPac Strategic and International Studies” March 34-26, 2002.

[64] The count of the M-9 missiles deployed in Fujian Province continued to increase and reached 350 before Hu Jingtao visited the US in April 2002. Radio Free Asia May 1, 2002.

[65] “China Economy Slows in 2001, But Grows 7.3%” Asian Wall Street Journals December 31, 2001 p.2. Also see (Beijing) Remin Ribao December 31, 2001 p.1.

[66] For example,I n March 2002 alone, 500,000 workers at the Taching Oilfield, and 300,000 jobless workers in Liaoyang took to the streets. After Beijing sent in People’s Armed Police forces, and paid some compensation fees, these activities ceased to grow. See Erik Eckholm, “China Buys Labor Peace, Paying What’s Owed” International Herald Tribune April 15,2002 pp.1 & 4.

[67] To some extent, Beijing benefited by the 911 incident. Beijing was removed as the number one threat of the US, as portrayed by the Bush administration prior to 911. The replacement was Osama bin Laden and terrorism. Personal communication with a US senior official serving in the G.W. Bush administration, April 20, 2002.

[68] Lu Jian hui（盧健輝）, “Chuan Jiang Zemin yaoqiu lizheng mingnian lianghui futan” (Jiang Zemin Reportedly Demanded Efforts to Resume Talks betweem ARATS and SEF Next Year)(Hong Kong) Oriental Daily News August 11,2001

[69] Fu Yijie（傅依傑）, “Beijing Xuancheng bu zuzhi wo canyu ‘ertong debie lianda’” (Beijing Anounces Not to Block Us Attending the ‘Special UN Session on Children’” (Taipei) United Daily August 13, 2001 p.13.

[70] “Zhongguo guowuyuan Taiban fuzhuren WangZaixi: Tai songbang jieji yongren reng youdai guancha” (China’s State Council Taiwanese Affairs Office Deputy Director Wang Zaixi: Taiwan to Relax Patience without Haste policy Bears Watching)(Singapore) Lianhe Zaobao August 29, 2001

[71] A notable example of pessimistic oversight proven wrong: “There is no reasonable guarentee that they (the Northern Alliance forces) could dislodge the Taliban”, Milton Bearden, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires” Foreign Affairs November/December 2001, p.2001.

[72] During the press conference following the Bush-Jiang summit on February 22, 2002, Bush stressed the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and his support of the Taiwan’s Relations Act without mentioning the three communiqués between Washington and Beijing, which Jiang did. Zhang Zongzhi（張宗智）and He Jingping（賀靜萍）, “Buxi: xiangxin Taiwan wenti neng heping jiejue” (Bush: I Believe That the Taiwan Question Will Be Peacefully Resolved) United Daily February 22, 2002, p.1.

[73] See Charles Hutzler, “China Remains Silent on Bugging of Plane: Stance Suggests Beijing Seeks Better US Ties”, Asian Wall Street Journal January 21, 2002, pp. 1&7.

[74] Murray Hiebert and Susan Lawrence, “Crossing the Red Lines”, Far Eastern Economic Review April 4, 2002, p.21.

[75] “Gongtong chuangzao yige heping fanrong di xin shiji” (Let Us Jointly Create a Peaceful and Prosperous New Century)Remin Ribao April 11, 2002, p.1.

[76] “Beijing Relaxed About Taiwan Vote, Scholars Say” New York Times November 26, 2001.

[77] Jason Dean, “Taiwan’s Voters Oust KMT From Power” Asian Wall Street Journal December 3, 2001 p.3.

[78] Personal communication with Taipei’s Central News agency journalist Zeng (Leo)Chunliang （曾淳良） based on Zeng’s unpublished news report on December 7, 2001.

[79] Xu Shangli（徐尚禮）, “Zhang Mingqing ping daxuan”(Zhang Mingqing Comments on the Major Election) China Times December 6, 2002.

[80] “Voice of the Strait” December 6, excerpted in Xingzheng Yuan Daluweiyuanhui dalu dongtai jianbao(Mainland Dynamics Briefings Published by the Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan) December 7, 2001.

[81] Philip Bowering, “China Tries a New Tactic on Taiwan—Sweet Talk” International Herald Tribune January 9, 2002 p.7.

[82] Zhao Wei（趙衛） & Chen Binhua（陳斌華）, “Qian Qichen: huanying Minjindang chengyuan yi shidang shenfen lai dalu canguan fangwen” (Qian Qichen: We Welcome DPP members to Sightsee and Visit on the Mainland in Proper Capacity) (Beijing)Xinhua January 24, 2002. Also see “ Beijing:huanying Minjindang yuan fang dalu” (Beijing: We Welcome DPP Members to Visit the Mainland) (Hong Kong)Wenhuibao January 24, 2002 p.3

[83] Peng Sizhou, “Qian Qichen dengdai Guomindang di fangwentuan fu Dalu fangwen”(Qian Qichen Awaits Kuomingtang Delegation Travel to the Mainland for Visit”(Hong Kong) China News Agency July 13, 2000.

[84] John Pomfret, “China Moves to Open ‘3 Links’ with Taiwan: Policy Shift Signals Softer Stance by Beijing” Washington Post February 6, 2002 p.A14.

[85] He Jingping（賀靜萍）, “Zhu Rongji qiangyin tan Daidu”(Zhu Rongji Talked Tough on Taiwan Independence) United Daily March 16, 2002 p.13.

[86] As early as July 12, 2000, Qian Qichen during receiving Taiwan’s New Party delegates in Beijing avoided mentioning the “one China Principle” as precondition for resuming cross-strait talks. Chen Bangyu（陳邦鈺）, “Qian Qichen yu Xindang tan liangan santong” (Qian Qichen Talked to New Party on Cross-strait Three Links) (Taipei) tTmes.com.tw July 13, 2000.

[87] Zhang Shengdai（張聖岱）, “Guotaiban dianmin Wang Yung-ching tan santong”(Beijing’s State Council Taiwanese Affairs Office called upon Wang Yung-ching & Kao Chin-yen (as Taipei’s representatives) to negotiate (with Beijing) on the “three links”) United Daily May 22, 2002 p.1.