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東亞列國:和縱新局 (Balance in FluxEast Asian Power Dynamics)

May 19, 2018

以下是2018.5.19淡江大學國際會議的主題演講。
This is a keynote delivered at the annual international conference organized by the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies. (more notes in English follow those in Chinese)
題目是 東亞列國:和縱新局 (Balance in FluxEast Asian Power Dynamics)
感謝淡大戰略所李大中所長邀請。
中斌原先願意以英文提報。李所長考量提升收聽效果,以及與會外賓皆懂中文,傾向用中文。中斌遵照辦理。

敬請賜教。
林中斌 2018.5.23

●The topic was "Balance in Flux East Asian Power Dynamics".
●The keynote began by challenging two mainstream views.
1. North Korea turns to the U.S. to foil China
2. China is increasingly isolated in East Asia
●Recent foreign policy adjustments of China's neighbors have suggested a re-evaluation of these mainstream views.
●Two factors are offered to explain the new trend.
●One is President Donald Trump's "America First" policy and his policy unpredictability.
●The second is Beijing's grand strategy of "Dominating East Asia without War" characterized by "extra-military emphasis" and "struggle without breaking" 
(Beijing's grand strategy was first presented October 4, 2004 at the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, Hilton Scottsdale Resort and Villas, Scottsdale, Arizona. See Chong-Pin Lin, " Win with Wisdom: when wrestling with a giant"
以智取勝 Taipei: Global Defense Magazine 2005 p.v)
(For "Struggle without Breaking", see Chong-Pin Lin, "Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions with China: Struggle without Breaking" Asian Survey Vol.55 Number 3, May-June 2015 pp.478-500)

Chong-Pin Lin May 23, 2018

 

 

 

 

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Keith Bradsher, ”China takes a victory lap”  

Mark Lander and Ana Swanson, “Infighting stalls drive for trade agreement”

 

2018.5.23 ,國際紐約時報登載兩篇調查。

--中方這圈貿易談判"賽跑"贏了(China takes a victory lap)

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/business/china-trade-trump.html accessed May 24, 2018

-- 美方內鬥阻礙了達成貿易協定(Infighting stalls drive for trade agreement)

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/us/politics/trump-trade-china.html accessed May 24, 2018

-- 要點是川普先硬後軟。因為他同時想要川金會,和逼迫北京讓步的美中貿易協定。於是他拿不定主意,猶豫了。

-- 中方戰略前後一致。

-- 美方內鬥嚴重。商務部長Steven Mnuchin的聲明幾小時後被自己人貿易代表Robert Lighthizer 公開推翻。

--中方內部一條鞕。中方政策決定加快。以前需一天的,現在只要一小時。

-- 最後雙方聲明沒有數字。讓中方過了。

林中斌 試摘譯 2018.5.24

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談判桌大翻轉 美國衰老 陸年輕

旺報 2018.05.23 P.A6

風水百年轉。

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Thomas Friedman, "Is the U.S. Becoming Like China"

International New York Times May 11, 2018 p.11

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/opinion/us-china-more-alike.html

 

"世界是平的"作者在紐約時報發表短文"美國變得像中國了嗎?"

*"...in both Beijing and Washington, self-censorship, and biting one's tongue, is more rife than ever-- but for different reasons. In Beijing it's so you won't get arrested. In Washington it's so you won't get into a fight. In both cases, the net results are fewer people talking truth across ideological lines."

"在北京和華府,言論自我省察以及有話不敢說比過去都嚴重,只是原因不同。在北京是為了怕被逮捕。在華府是為了怕和人爭鬥。但最後結果都一樣:願意和政治看法不同的人對話的愈來愈少了。"

*“In the 466 days since he took the oath of office, President Trump has made 3,001 false or misleading claims, according to The Fact Checker’s database that analyzes, categorizes and tracks every suspect statement uttered by the president. That’s an average of nearly 6.5 claims a day.

I suspect President Xi has a far higher truth batting average in his public statements than President Trump.”

"川普上任466天以來,發表過3,001件錯話或謊言, 平均每天6.5件。"

*"I suspect President Xi has a far higher truth batting average in his public statements than President Trump."

"我懷疑習主席公開發言裡說實話的成分高於川普總統。"

*"But Trump clearly wants us to act like China: 'Don't show me your values. Show me your money and arms purchases."

●川普明顯的要美國學中國:別跟我說你的價值和信念是什麼。給我看你的錢,告訴我你要買什麼武器。

*Trump, who was surely not 100 percent joking when he said in March of President Xi: “President for life. … I think it’s great. Maybe we’ll want to give that a shot someday.”

●川普顯然不是在開玩笑,當他今年三月談到習主席時曾說: "元首終身職...我認為太好了。也許哪天我們也該試試看。"

林中斌 試摘譯 2018.5.16

The U.S. and China: More Alike Than We’d Like?

By Thomas L. Friedman Opinion Columnist May 8, 2018

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/opinion/us-china-more-alike.html

accessed May 16, 2018

Image

A billboard in Beijing noted achievements of President Xi Jinping.CreditKyodo News, via Getty Images

It is impossible to visit China these days and not compare and contrast the drama playing out in Beijing politics with the drama playing out in Washington politics. While the differences are many, I am sorry to report that some of the parallels are getting too close for comfort.

Let’s start with the fact that the anti-corruption crackdown by President Xi Jinping has created a climate of fear in China these days — whether about interacting with foreigners or saying the wrong thing or behaving too extravagantly so as to attract the state “anti-corruption” detectives.

But because “corruption” has not been clearly defined — and can be used to get rid of anyone for any reason — people don’t know where the line is, so they’re extra cautious. That’s why during a week in Beijing the most frequent expression I heard was, “Youre not quoting me on this, right?”

But if the Chinese are afraid to talk to one another, in America we’ve forgotten how to talk to one another.

In Washington these days it is not uncommon for people to be invited to a dinner or a public gathering and think to themselves: “I hope none of them will be there.” And the them people are talking about is not someone of a different faith or race — which would be awful enough — but it’s someone just from a different political party.

In other words, in both Beijing and Washington, self-censorship, and biting one’s tongue, is more rife than ever — but for different reasons. In Beijing it’s so you won’t get arrested. In Washington it’s so you won’t get into a fight. In both cases, though, the net results are fewer people talking truth across ideological lines.

At the same time, in China today, if you’re a Communist Party official or senior bureaucrat, you have to toe the ruling party’s line or you could be quickly purged or imprisoned. In America today, if you’re a Republican Party congressman or senator, you, too, have to toe the ruling party’s line or you could be quickly purged or primaried — or get a tweet in the back from the president.

But there is one difference: In China’s ruling Communist Party, it’s never safe to criticize the president. In America’s ruling Republican Party, you can criticize the president, or vote your conscience, if you’re dying, retiring or whispering.

Or, as a dying Senator John McCain observed in his new book: “This is my last term. … I’m freer than colleagues who will face the voters again. I can speak my mind without fearing the consequences much. And I can vote my conscience without worry.”

 

The Chinese government will not hesitate to put out propaganda to support the government or defend China’s interests, whether the facts are true or not. Ditto Donald Trump and his White House. Last week The Washington Post reported: “In the 466 days since he took the oath of office, President Trump has made 3,001 false or misleading claims, according to The Fact Checker’s database that analyzes, categorizes and tracks every suspect statement uttered by the president. That’s an average of nearly 6.5 claims a day.”

I suspect President Xi has a far higher truth batting average in his public statements than President Trump.

The fawning and lack of skepticism with which China Central Television covers Xi, though, is indistinguishable from the fawning and lack of skepticism by “Fox & Friends” and Sean Hannity when discussing Trump.

That probably partially explains why more and more Chinese do not think that we are as “exceptional” a nation as we think we are — and they are now ready to say so: loudly. I was struck by how many officials and experts at a Tsinghua University seminar I attended were so willing to baldly state that their top-down, one-party system of governance and state-directed capitalism was superior to our multiparty, democratic, free-market system.

And the two big pieces of evidence they always cited was that they never went through the kind of 2008 economic meltdown that we did, and their system never put up a leader as undisciplined, dishonest and unstable as Donald Trump (at least not since Mao).

On this I often pushed back on my Chinese interlocutors to be humbler and warier of what the future may hold. Their one-party, one-man decision-making system can make big decisions fast. But it can also make big wrong decisions fast. For instance, Bloomberg News reported in February: “In 2008, China’s total debt was about 141 percent of its gross domestic product. By mid-2017 that number had risen to 256 percent. Countries that take on such a large amount of debt in such a short period typically face a hard landing.”

But Xi and the Chinese Communist Party at least stimulated their economy in order to avoid a real economic crisis — for themselves and the world. Trump and his Republican Party just added $1.5 trillion to America’s debt to pay for tax cuts for businesses and individuals at a time when our economy was already on the rise. Trump did so knowing that he would be here to take credit for any boom — and be long gone when we have to do the belt-tightening necessary so that interest on the debt doesn’t devour all nondefense spending and lead to a bust.

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One contrast, Chinese are ready to sacrifice to make China great again. Trump wants to make America great again without asking us to do anything hard — just cut taxes and regulations for rich people and corporations and keep pumping fossil fuels, and not invest in public goods like education and infrastructure, which have been the real engines of China’s resurgence.

Chinese foreign policy has always been transactional, saying to neighbors, “Give us access to your markets and we will build you infrastructure that we can both use — then we will be allies.” U.S. foreign policy, while it has always had its cynical, transactional side, particularly in the Cold War, has tended more toward, “Share our values and then we can be allies.”

But Trump clearly wants us to act more like China: “Don’t show me your values. Show me your money and your arms purchases. Don’t think of me as your ally. Think of me as your landlord. Pay for our protection and we can be friends.”

Fortunately, for now, one big difference remains: While Xi has cowed his news media, Trump, despite all his efforts to discredit our free press, has actually ended up invigorating it. Fox aside, it’s feistier than ever. And while institutions and the rule of law in China have always been a weak restraint on its leaders, institutions built over 250 years in America have continued to restrain Trump — for now.

But they will have to hold for at least another two and a half years, and that will not be easy with a president like Trump, who was surely not 100 percent joking when he said in March of President Xi: “President for life. … I think it’s great. Maybe we’ll want to give that a shot someday.”

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國防部前副部長多年失聰 「奇蹟」復原竟是這原因(動畫)

https://tw.appledaily.com/new/realtime/20180514/1352749/

國防部前副部長、兩岸專家林中斌是政壇耆宿,但鮮少人知,原來他左耳早在10多前已失聰,且去年10月去踏青時淋雨後,竟連右耳也聽力也大減,原本已準備戴助聽器,今年1月到亞東醫院檢查,僅抽出積水,雙耳聽力竟奇蹟復原,感嘆「聽到老婆正常講話,還覺得太大聲」,並在臉書寫下這段經歷,分享他波折的「失聰復得記」。
 
《蘋果》日前赴林中斌家,76歲的他除精神奕奕,對於《蘋果》以正常音量訪問,且兩人相距1公尺以上,他仍聽得萬分清楚,實在很難想像他在數月前幾乎全聾。
 
林中斌表示,他的左耳聽力從20多前開始退化,10多年前已失聰,這些年都靠右耳聽人講話,想不到去年10月他去宜蘭桃源谷步道,途中淋了一些雨、有點感冒,幾天後右耳聽力竟也急速衰退,嚴重影響他生活,不但聽話困難,還有主持會議、媒體受訪等活動,讓他非常頭大,一度認為是時候戴助聽器了。
 
林中斌曾赴住家附近的醫學中心給醫師檢查,但1個多月內4次就診,最後被醫師宣告「內耳神經老化、受損」,後半輩子都得戴助聽器,讓他一度確信自己聽力已一去不回。
 
今年1月時,林中斌在一名學生力勸下,前往亞東醫院給人工耳蝸中心主任陳光超看診,當時他心中已不抱任何希望,但陳聽了他的敘述後,做了一系列的檢查診斷,便說「來抽個水吧」,想不到雙耳抽出積水後,除右耳外,連10多年來幾乎全聾的左耳也能聽見聲音,讓他直呼:「實在太神奇!」
 
陳光超表示,50歲以上成人一半以上聽力會退化5成,但林中斌雙耳則是因中耳積水導致暫時性聽力喪失,原因是中耳有積水時,負責接收聲音的毛細胞「就像泡在水中」,震動會減少,耳膜、三塊聽小骨接受到的聲音訊號也大打折扣,進而影響聽力,這只要抽除積水,聽力即可回復。
 
至於他院醫師為何未確診,陳光超解釋,中耳積水通常呈現偏黃的琥珀色,但林中斌的耳內積水透明,才會多次檢查仍無法發現;感冒、中耳炎等都可能讓耳咽管阻塞,產生中耳積水,而年長者因聽力已退化,一旦中耳積水,影響聽力的情形會更嚴重,建議家中若有長輩突然聽不清,要懷疑有可能只是中耳積水,正確處理便能改善。
 
北榮耳鼻喉頭頸醫學部主任蕭安穗則提醒,中耳積水要小心也可能是鼻咽癌,因患者的腫瘤若塞住耳咽管、導致中耳積水;陳光超說,如果僅有單側中耳積水,確實最好連鼻咽部位也一併檢查。(黃仲丘/台北報導)

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林泉忠,台日關係的中國因素

自由時報2018513

王輝生,力挺安倍 台灣竟輸中國

自由時報2018513

陳君碩,防尼克森震撼重演 安倍向陸示好

旺報201687

 

2018.5.13 自由時報評論已不諱言中日關係加溫,臺日關係相反。

*自從中日關係於去年下半年開始出現明顯和緩勢頭後,(日本)這些強化與台灣政治關係的舉措就不再出現。

*...因此在東京有求於中國的氣氛下,難以期待日本會在此期間進一步提升與台灣關係。(林泉忠博士教授)

*有史以來對台灣最友善的安倍首相,...政權岌岌可危...中國頻頻向日本伸出橄欖枝...李克強於選前...適時來訪,給正身處冰雪中的安倍送上溫暖的炭火...(王輝生理事長)

*"安倍與北京改善關係是一種未雨綢繆" (2016.8.7 林中斌)

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林蒼生, “清富,順自然的企業家

聯合報 2018513

*應該把精力放在優點的延伸 ,而非缺點的糾正。

*靜靜祈禱然後思考的習慣,是很重要的日常功課。

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Robert E. Rubin , “Philosophy Pays Off” 

International New York Time May 2, 2018

*作者羅拔特.魯賓是柯林頓總統的財政部長。之前在高盛董事及副董事長。
*這是他回憶在哈佛大學最寶貴的心得:哲學。
*一共兩重點,來自一位他的教授(雖然從未正式見面)的授課,和在校園咖啡館的討論。
*柏拉圖:要證明任何念頭徹底的真實無疑是不可能的。
*魯賓演譯出的結論:重要決定都是根據可能率。比較好,比較不好等等。
*存在主義:"現在"固然重要,但在時空的整體,"此時此地"是微不足道的。
林中斌試摘譯 2018.5.12

Robert E. Rubin: Philosophy Prepared Me for a Career in Finance and Government
By Robert E. Rubin

Mr. Rubin was secretary of the Treasury from 1995 to 1999.

April 30, 2018

When I arrived at Harvard in 1956 as a freshman, I felt overwhelmed academically. Unlike many of my classmates who had gone to rigorous private schools, I graduated from a Florida public school that in those days rarely sent kids to elite colleges in the North. Even after four years of high school French, I couldn’t pass the exam to get out of the entry-level class at Harvard. In math, I was relegated to the remedial course.

The dean tried to reassure us at orientation by noting that only 2 percent of the class would fail out. I thought my classmates were lucky: I’d somehow manage to fill the quota all by myself.

My tenuous feeling about being at Harvard would never fully dissipate. But to my surprise, and that of my advisers, my grades were quite good at the end of the year. The upside of entering Harvard with less academic preparation than many of my classmates was that it forced me to rethink much of what I thought I knew.

So, too, did Raphael Demos. Professor Demos, an authority on Greek philosophy, was Harvard’s Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy and Civil Policy. But to me, when I took a class with him my sophomore year, he was a genial little man with white hair and an exceptional talent for engaging students from the lecture hall stage, using an overturned wastebasket as his lectern.

Professor Demos would use Plato and other great philosophers to demonstrate that proving any proposition to be true in the final and ultimate sense was impossible. His approach to critical thinking planted a seed in me that grew during my years at Harvard and throughout my life. The approach appealed to what was probably my natural but latent tendency toward questioning and skepticism.

I concluded that you can’t prove anything in absolute terms, from which I extrapolated that all significant decisions are about probabilities. Internalizing the core tenet of Professor Demos’s teaching — weighing risk and analyzing odds and trade-offs — was central to everything I did professionally in the decades ahead in finance and government.

At the same time that I was processing Professor Demos’s class, one of the big ideas floating around coffeehouses in Cambridge, Mass., was existential philosophy. In time, I arrived at my own interpretation of that way of thinking. To me, existentialism is an internalized sense of perspective. I came to believe that on one hand, the present matters a great deal, but on the other hand, in the totality of space and time, the here and now becomes insignificant.

I’m asked from time to time which undergraduate courses best prepared me for working at Goldman Sachs and in the government. People assume I’ll list courses in economics or finance, but I always answer that the key was Professor Demos’s philosophy course and the conversations about existentialism in coffee shops around campus. For me, embracing these two perspectives brought me a sense of calm in what were incredibly stressful situations.

There was a point in the early 1980s when the Goldman Sachs arbitrage department, which I led, lost more money in one month than it had made in almost any one year, driven by severe declines in the equity markets. Given the vicissitudes of markets, there was no way to tell whether we’d reached the nadir and recovery was around the corner — or whether we were about to go over a cliff. Despite the immense pressure, and the emotional state of the markets, I drew on an existential perspective, and my colleagues and I made careful, probabilistic decisions to adjust our portfolio, and we weathered the storm.

During my time in the Clinton White House, my colleagues and I tackled similarly complex situations. One extraordinarily complicated issue was the 1995 budget battle, which transformed into a debt-limit crisis and two government shutdowns. Compounding the severity of this policy debate for me was the experience of being personally vilified. Despite the complexity of the issues and the emotions involved, we managed to keep our balance and stand our ground. The Republican-controlled Congress eventually raised the debt limit, as we had advocated.

In both of those situations — one on Wall Street, the other in Washington — I drew from Professor Demos’s philosophy class and the existentialist lessons from the coffeehouses, which shaped my thinking on how to make decisions and helped me build a durable sense of remove and perspective.

Despite having such a profound impact on my way of thinking, I never actually met Professor Demos. I was just one of a hundred or so young faces sitting in a lecture hall, taking in his every word. If I had the chance, I would thank him for challenging me all those many years ago. He crystallized for me the power of critical thinking: asking questions, recognizing that there are no provable certainties and analyzing the probabilities. And that, coupled with my coffeehouse lessons, was the best preparation one could have — not just for a career but also for life.

Robert E. Rubin, secretary of the Treasury from 1995 to 1999, is senior counselor to Centerview Partners.

 

 

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Will China's New Trade/Debt
Diplomacy Strategy Reshape

The World?

accessed April 27, 2018

以下是《 國際經濟》雜誌今年年初邀稿下所提出之淺見。

敬請賜正。

林中斌 2018.4.27

Will China’s New Trade/Debt Diplomacy Strategy Reshape the World?

Chong-Pin Lin

Word count 492 word limit500 Due date February 16, 2018

Three factors suggest that China’s new strategy may succeed.

First, economy, rather than military might or political ideology, takes command in the 21st century. In democracies, economic performance has long swayed the voters in elections. Since the former Soviet Union, notorious for its anti-democratic governance, collapsed in 1991 due to its unsustainable economy, political leaders of all governments, democratic or otherwise, have equated the economic viability of their countries to their own political future. That explained the 2017 turn-about of British Prime Minister Theresa May from suspension to approval on the Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor project. It was heavily financed by China, which caused a political backlash May must face but eventually overcame. The same applies to Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena on the Hambandota Port project which, launched by his predecessor in cooperation with China, was first suspended in 2015 and then approved in 2017 for a 99-year lease to Beijing for $292 million due to the country’s mounting debt to China. The Port has potentials of becoming a naval base for China, which raised security concerns of India, Japan and the U.S. Given time, economic benefits offered by China to a recipient country may just overtake political and security reservations.

Second, China’s skillful blend of the hard and the soft prongs in foreign policy makes its “debt diplomacy” more effective than expected. With the “Belt Road Initiative” under the way, Beijing’s unsaid goal seems to be dominating “Eurasiafrica”— the landmass cluster of Europe, Asia and Africa -- without war. When China was poor, it was prone to warfighting. As China began to rise, it has become averse to bloody conflict. The People’s Republic fought five wars from its founding in 1949 to 1979 when Deng Xiaoping launched the modernization drive. From 1979 to 2018, China has fought no war except the 1988 clash with Vietnam over the Johnson Reef in the South China Sea.

China’s grand strategy in the new century is to deploy “extra-military” instruments -- such as economic, diplomatic, and cultural ones – on the front, with the rapidly advancing military capabilities on the back, which allows China to quietly expand its influence far and wide while encountering minimum resistance. The extra-military approach transcends ,but not excludes, the military ones. The idea is reminiscent of Teddy Roosevelt’s adage, “Hold a big stick and speak softly”.

Third, China’s internal economic obstacles are rooted in flawed policy, which in turn has stemmed from its problematic officialdom. Clean officials tended to be incompetent, while competent officials, corrupt. At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, China’s President Xi Jinping emerged the strongest leader since Mao Zedong. After five years of persistent and pervasive anti-corruption campaign, Xi has appointed clean and competent officials in key positions. The Harvard educated Liu He, touted as “the brain' behind Xi’s economic overhaul”, has disagreed with Premier Li Keqiang’s conservative approach may succeed in reining in China’s soaring debt without creating a collapse in the market.

Chong-Pin Lin is a former deputy defense minister of Taiwan and co-author of a recent book Sunlight Through the CloudsCracking the Taiwan-U.S.-China Complex in Chinese.

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China vs US 中美貿易戰?

Zou Yue CGTN April 2018

accessed April 23, 2018

China vs US? 中美貿易戰?

Zou Yue CGTN April 2018

* 這段對中美貿易戰精短的評論似乎不偏任何一方。

-- This succinct and lively commentary on the prospect of U.S -China trade war appears to take no side.

* 結果發現是北京環球電視網(CGTV)

-- It turns out to be from China's Global TV Network.

* 幾乎無暇的英語發音、典型西方式社會科學的兩面並呈的論法、還有引用西方熟知的伊索寓言巧妙的掩蓋了評論的來源。

-- The skillful pro-and-con argument, the almost accent-free English, and the reference to an Aesop fable familiar to the West can easily mask its origin in Beijing.

林中斌 2018.4.23

Chong-Pin Lin April 23, 2018

https://news.cgtn.com/news/3249544f336b7a6333566d54/share_p.html

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The Failures of Anti-Trumpism

反川普運動的失敗

accessed April 16, 2018

The Failures of Anti-Trumpism/反川普運動的失敗

As things stand now, Trump will not only finish his term but also will win the re-election in 2020.

Chong-Pin Lin April 17, 2018

看來

★川普不僅會做完這一任總統,

★還可能連任。

林中斌 2018.4.16

The Failures of Anti-Trumpism

反川普的名政論家大衛●布魯克斯在411"國際紐約時報"上承認反川普運動失敗。

● 我們沒有說服選民:川普民調40%,比去年此時高,並未掉下。

● 我們撼不動他:他的權力比一年以前更大,不是更小。不順他心的閣員,都已被請走了。

●我們沒有限縮他的影響力:89%共和黨對他看法正面,59%對他正面看法多於對黨的正面看法。

●在民主黨主導的州裡,共和黨員也不願意批評川普。

布魯克斯至今未遇過他原來的支持者對他有失望的。

● 反川普的人自以為是驕傲的態度,令人受不了。

● 選民可以忍受他許多荒誕的行為,因為他們認為川普和他們同一邊。

● 我們愈聚焦川普的個性,選民愈會當川普代表人民為對抗華府的英雄。

林中斌試行簡譯 2018.4.16

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"DARPA wants to connect human brains and machine"

accessed April 16, 2018

"DARPA wants to connect human brains and machine"

Defense News March 26, 2018

 

-- 下世代非侵入性神經科技 (Next-generation Nonsurgical Neurotechnology):用意念操控機器的技術將要使用在武器上了。

-- 正確名稱是N3次方。但臉書文字輸入系統不支持如此表達。

林中斌 2018.4.16

 

 

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“A Silk Road Through Ice”

冰絲路:北極的一帶一路

accessed April 27, 2018

冰絲路 Ice Silk Road

●從北極看地球,北京的一帶一路更為全面。

2010年北京已經由駐挪威大使表達參與北極事務的興趣。

2014年中坤集團富豪在挪威北極圈內購買荒地。

2018年一月底,北京發表「北極政策白皮書」。

A silk road through ice

https://goo.gl/8w9rcN

WHEN the occupants of “Snowpanda House” in Ahtari zoo, Finland, were first allowed to play in the open air in mid-February, they bounded out and rolled in the white stuff. Xi Jinping, China’s president, had said the furry animals would act as “messengers of friendship” when he promised them to Finland during a visit last year en route to America. On the same trip Mr Xi used a refuelling stop in Alaska to butter up his hosts there, too. The American north was “a mythical, almost mystical place”, a local spokesperson quoted him as saying—a bit “like a Shangri-La”.

 

Mr Xi has been showing a growing interest in Arctic countries. In 2014 he revealed in a speech that China itself wanted to become a “polar great power”. Last year he met leaders from seven of the eight members of the Arctic Council, a group of northern countries that admitted China and four other Asian states as observers in 2013. In January the Chinese government published its first policy document outlining its Arctic strategy. The paper referred to China as “a near-Arctic nation” (never mind that its most northerly settlement is no closer to the Arctic than Berlin is). It also linked China’s Arctic plans with Mr Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, a scheme for building infrastructure abroad to improve links between Asia, Africa and Europe.

 

China’s ambitions are fuelled by a wide range of interests. It wants access to the Arctic for its researchers so they can work out how melting ice affects weather patterns, among other things. Their findings could help China devise responses to its problems with air pollution and water scarcity. China is also keen to tap into the Arctic resources that will become easier to exploit as the ice cap retreats. They include fish, minerals, oil and gas. The region could hold a quarter of the world’s as-yet-undiscovered hydrocarbons, according to the United States Geological Survey. Chinese firms are interested in mining zinc, uranium and rare earths in Greenland.

 

As the ice melts, it may become more feasible for cargo ships to sail through Arctic waters. China is excited by this possibility (its media speak of an “ice silk road”). In the coming decades such routes could cut several thousand kilometres off journeys between Shanghai and Europe. Sending ships through the Arctic could also help to revive port cities in China’s north-eastern rustbelt, notes Anne-Marie Brady, the author of a recent book, “China as a Polar Great Power”. China is thinking of building ports and other infrastructure in the Arctic to facilitate shipping. State-linked firms in China talk of building an Arctic railway across Finland.

 

Chinese analysts believe that using Arctic routes would help China strategically, too. It could reduce the need to ship goods through the Malacca Strait, a choke-point connecting the Pacific and Indian oceans. Much of China’s global shipping passes through the strait. It worries endlessly about the strait’s vulnerability to blockade—for example, should war break out with America.

 

There are no heated territorial disputes in the Arctic, but there are sensitivities, including Canada’s claim to the North-West Passage, a trans-Arctic waterway that America regards as international—ie, belonging to no single state. China does not want to be seen as a clumsy interloper. One point of the policy document was to allay fears that China might muscle its way into the Arctic as it has in the South China Sea. The paper stresses that China will play by international rules and co-operate with the Arctic Council (its members include polar great-powers to reckon with: America and Russia).

 

Plenty of non-Arctic countries, including European ones, have similar dreams. But China is “by far the outlier” in terms of the amount of money it has pledged or already poured into the region, says Marc Lanteigne of Massey University in New Zealand. Its biggest investments have been in Russia, including a gas plant that began operating in Siberia in December. Russia was once deeply cynical about China’s intentions. But since the crisis in Ukraine it has had to look east for investment in its Arctic regions.

 

The interest shown by Chinese firms could be good news for many Arctic communities. Few other investors have shown themselves willing to stomach the high costs and slow pay-offs involved in developing the far north. But Chinese involvement attracts criticism, too. Greens who would rather see the Arctic kept pristine fear that Chinese money could encourage projects that cause pollution. No one wants to see the kind of problems that have afflicted some Chinese investments in Africa, where the outsiders stand accused of loading locals with debt while disregarding environmental and labour laws. The relative stability of the Arctic will attract Chinese firms looking for places to park their money where conflict is unlikely.

 

The main concern of Arctic countries is that China’s ambitions will result in a gradual rewiring of the region’s politics in ways that give China more influence in determining how the Arctic is managed. Greenland is a place to watch. Political elites there favour independence from Denmark but resist taking the plunge because the island’s economy is so dependent on Danish support. The prospect of Chinese investment could change that. Should Greenland become independent, China could use its clout there to help further its own interests at meetings of Arctic states, in the same way that it uses its influence over Cambodia and Laos to prevent the Association of South-East Asian Nations from criticising Chinese behaviour in their neighbourhood.

 

For all the reassuring language of China’s official statements on the Arctic, it is possible that its calculations may change as its Arctic investments grow. China’s diplomats may begin to chafe at their limited say in how the Arctic is run. At present, like other observers, China may not speak or vote at meetings of the Arctic Council, which is by far the most prominent of several regional forums. Aki Tonami at the University of Tsukuba in Japan says China’s policy paper devotes less space to the Arctic Council than might be expected, given the organisation’s importance. In the years to come China may prefer to deal with Arctic issues bilaterally or in settings such as the UN where it feels it has a bigger say, reckons Adam MacDonald of Dalhousie University in Canada. Or China could start pushing for a restructuring of the Arctic Council in ways that give non-Arctic states a more prominent role.

 

But tinkering with the Arctic’s administrative structure would be risky. Many countries believe the existing one has done a good job of promoting good-neighbourliness. That it is taking longer than expected for the economic benefits of a melting Arctic to become readily accessible may also help explain why countries in the region have not been bickering more: there have been few spoils to divvy up.

 

It might be easier to work out how to accommodate the evolving interests of non-Arctic countries were America—the region’s most powerful country—to show more interest. Andrew Holland of the American Security Project, a think-tank, believes the United States will pay limited attention to Arctic debates while Donald Trump remains president. China’s route to the pole is widening.

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"Adapting as America Declines"

New York Times April 22, 2018

accessed April 25, 2018

"Adapting as America Declines" New York Times April 22, 2018

"美國隨衰退應主動調整自己的大戰略" 紐約時報 2018422

 

-- "美國應該承認它不能管全世界所有爭端或不能解除所有安全威脅並不等同美國投降。那反而是個智慧的決定。"

-- 作者是華府名智庫CATO Institutee副總裁Christopher Preble. CATOlibertarian (右派自由主義)主張之重鎮。

-- "美國生產力在二戰末期是世界的50%1985年,是22.5%。今日是15.1%202313.7%,根據IMF"

-- "美國軍事花費已經超過下面7國軍事花費總合。自從2001至今,每年平均美金$561billion 。如果要維持目前美軍的優勢,2019-2023每年要花費美金$756.9billion"

-- 錢從那兒來?

林中斌試行摘譯 2018.4.25

 

這篇意味(implies)以下兩點拙見

-- 作者所呈之議論是"調適派"的方向: 即調整美國以適應中國的崛起。只是他沒說出來。

-- 美國仍將舉足輕重頗有一段時間(50?)

林中斌 2018.4.25

Adapting to American Decline

By Christopher A. Preble

https://goo.gl/NU6QuB

 

The news that Mike Pompeo, the C.I.A. director, met in secret with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, over the Easter weekend has renewed hope that one of the world’s most dangerous standoffs might be resolved without war. On Saturday, in fact, Mr. Kim announced that he would halt nuclear tests. Mr. Pompeo’s trip was surprising for many reasons: he went personally, it was kept a secret and it was revealed at a time when others were questioning his fitness to become secretary of state.

 

But it says something about America’s place in world affairs that at least one aspect of the trip was no surprise at all: that Americans are deeply, centrally involved in a dispute involving two sovereign countries thousands of miles away from Washington.

 

Of course, there’s a good historical reason. Under American tutelage, South Korea eventually evolved from a desperately poor autocracy to one of the wealthiest democracies on the planet. American taxpayers continue to spend billions of dollars a year to help maintain regional security. A similar process played out in other parts of Asia and in Europe, where the American security umbrella, including tens of thousands of military personnel, provided room for those countries’ leaders to build strong democracies and economies.

 

American leaders argued that such policies served the cause of global peace and security. They also reasoned that the substantial costs would be tolerable. And, so long as American productivity and workers’ wages were rising, it seemed that Uncle Sam could ensure a decent standard of living at home and security around the world.

 

It is becoming harder, though, for America to maintain this global posture. Eventually, it may become impossible, in part because we helped create the conditions that allowed other countries to prosper and grow. There may come a time, not too far in the future, when Americans would be surprised to hear that they are responsible for keeping peace on the Korean Peninsula.

 

Americans should be debating how to manage that transition in a way that avoids destabilizing the rest of the world. Unfortunately, if the current administration’s maneuvers between the two Koreas are any indication, this is the last thing on the minds of policymakers.

 

There is no question that America’s share of global wealth is shrinking. By some estimates, the United States accounted for roughly 50 percent of global output at the end of World War II. By 1985, its share stood at 22.5 percent. It has fallen to 15.1 percent today, and the International Monetary Fund projects that it will slip to 13.7 percent by 2023.

 

The proliferation of various technologies — from crude explosives to advanced robotics — has made it easier for even relatively small and weak countries and nonstate actors to challenge the big and powerful United States. These days any truly determined country, even a very poor one like North Korea, can develop nuclear weapons to deter attacks.

 

Yet Americans may be the last people to recognize the changing shape of global power. It’s not that senior national security officials don’t understand that they have a problem. The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy, for example, speaks of “an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield” and worrisome “trends” that “will challenge our ability to deter aggression.”

 

Its answer? Try harder.

 

The document predicts that America’s allies will lose faith and the country’s global influence will wane unless taxpayers commit to “devoting additional resources in a sustained effort to solidify our competitive advantage.”

 

The problem is, the United States already spends more on its military than the next seven or eight nations combined. Total annual expenditures, including for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have averaged $561 billion since 2001. So, how much more must Americans spend to maintain a military edge sufficient to deter attacks against others?

 

About $196 billion more, on average, over the next five years. The Trump administration projects spending $3.78 trillion from 2019 to 2023, or $756.9 billion a year. Some doubt that even that will be enough.

 

Ideally, this additional spending will discourage others from challenging us. Even if it did, however, that would require Americans to accept less domestic spending, higher taxes or both in order to allow others to underspend on their militaries.

 

But what worked before might not work in the future. America’s insistence upon maintaining primacy at all costs may stimulate greater resistance from the likes of China and Russia. And the risk that the United States gets drawn into wars that it need not fight and cannot win will remain high, no matter how much we spend. We are faced with the prospect, then, of frequent uses of force — like the missile strike against suspected Syrian chemical weapons sites this month that even supporters admitted was unlikely, by itself, to accomplish much.

 

There are, however, alternatives to simply spending more and trying harder. Of course, the easy, and unpalatable, options would hand over the reins of global leadership to China, or simply have American forces withdraw quickly and let the chips fall where they may.

 

Instead, America should seek a new arrangement that asks the beneficiaries of today’s relatively peaceful and prosperous world order to make a meaningful contribution to maintaining it. The American security umbrella will stay aloft — and American military power will remain formidable — but others will need to do more.

 

Rather than treating allies like reckless teenagers who can’t be trusted without Uncle Sam’s constant supervision, or feckless weaklings that will jump at the chance to capitulate to rapacious neighbors, Washington should empower mature, like-minded states to deal with local challenges before they become regional or global crises.

 

Some countries, in fact, are already moving in this direction. South Korea has undertaken its own bilateral negotiations with North Korea. Unsettled by Donald Trump’s threats to renege on American security commitments, or offended by his attempt to extract tribute in exchange for American protection, these countries’ leaders are thinking seriously about different security arrangements. As Constanze Stelzenmüller explained in a recent paper for the Brookings Institution, Europeans, in particular, have an “existential” interest in “preserving an international order that safeguards peace and globalization.”

 

Of course, one purported advantage of an American-funded global security order is that it supposedly allows Washington to call the shots — and, naturally, some worry that its allies would show less deference and be less willing to comply with Washington’s dictates if they were less dependent upon American power. But that already happens: In fact, some allies have been known to act recklessly when they believe that America has their back. Look at the ruinous war that Saudi Arabia is waging in Yemen, one of the world’s poorest countries. Greater independence could induce greater caution.

 

And the benefits flow both ways. If Washington was slightly less confident that it could call the tune and expect others to dance, that might help America to avoid costly mistakes. Would the United States have invaded Iraq if it didn’t believe that other countries would help clean up after?

 

Transitioning to a world with many capable actors won’t be easy. It will require a deft hand to unwind defense arrangements, and patience as others find their way. Given their own domestic spending priorities and continued uncertainty about whether the United States will recommit to the old model, most American allies are likely to take a wait-and-see attitude. A gentle nudge might be needed to move them from comfortable adolescence to empowered adulthood.

 

The columnist Charles Krauthammer once cast decline as a choice, as though, by mere force of will, the United States could remain atop the international order forever.

 

On the other hand, it was Mr. Krauthammer who in 1990 spoke of America’s unipolar “moment” — a temporary state of affairs, occasioned by a unique set of circumstances that defined the first few years of the post-Cold War world. That world no longer exists. Wishing it back into existence won’t make it so.

 

The United States is the most important country in the world and will remain so for many years by virtue of its strong economy and prodigious military capabilities. But admitting that the United States is incapable of effectively adjudicating every territorial dispute or of thwarting every security threat in every part of the world is hardly tantamount to surrender. It is, rather, a wise admission of the limits of American power and an acknowledgment of the need to share the burdens, and the responsibilities, of dealing with a complex world. It is about seizing the opportunity to make changes that benefit us and others.

 

The alternative is a renewed commitment to discourage self-reliance among allies. That will be an undertaking far more onerous than any the United States has attempted since World War II — and one that is unlikely to work.

 

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金習會的潛因

★這篇花了10(4/14/10)才定稿。第11天刊出。

★資料太多,如何篩選?

要寫的淺見不少,如何取捨?

有價值也有爭議的訊息,如何處理?

★是學習的機會。

原來不知道金正恩啟動朝鮮經濟改革備受元老阻礙,必須秘密推動。

原來不知道金正恩經改斐然有成,倫敦經濟學人看好朝鮮將成亞洲最快成長的經濟體。

 

敬請賜正。

林中斌 2018.4.11

金習會的潛因

林中斌

名人堂稿件

日期:20180401/5/10 本文字數:1100 目標字數:1100

 

金正恩再度震撼全球。

之前,他頻繁試爆核彈,成功試射可轟美國本土的洲際飛彈。他曾罵中國 “千年宿敵”(今年一月底)及 “妨礙統一的無恥國家”。三月廿七日,他竟然笑容滿面在北京握住習近平的手宣布支持「朝鮮半島無核化」。

頓時,朝鮮上空的核戰烏雲豁然散去。同時,專家們迅速修正北京被兩韓二月以來熱絡互動邊緣化的看法。

金習會雖意外,其來也有自。

●金炫核武以救經濟:陪伴金成長的御廚藤本健二回憶:幼年的金同情窮苦國民,主張向中國學習改革開放提升經濟。一三年四月脫北者張振成在《紐約時報》透露:北韓農村改革已有成,地下經濟蓬勃。同年五月,南韓國民大學俄籍教授Andrei Lankov出書The Real North Korea說金氏王朝雖獨裁卻極端理性,長於製造危機以獲取外交讓步和經濟利益。一六年四月, 藤本又見金氏,轉述他坦言無意發動戰爭,但美國對他粗暴,他才不斷發射飛彈想證實北韓不是好欺負的。核武是金保障朝鮮生存和提升經濟的籌碼。

●北京轉挺兩韓統一:之前態度模糊的北京在習上台後開始轉變。考量可能有三:兩韓統一將削弱美國駐軍東北亞的正當性。因為一九五○年六月北韓侵入南韓引發美軍介入以至於今。一四年底在首爾,中國國防大學鹿音上校表示,中國希望看到兩韓統一,「這符合中國的利益…可避免來自外部(指美國?)的威脅。」此外,北京支持兩韓統一可免除與它主張兩岸統一之矛盾。再者,統一韓國更依重中國,因經濟將被北韓拖累十年(兩德統一經驗)。有別於美國,北京挺半島統一,有利它斡旋兩韓。

●中朝密洽半島非核:表面上,雙方關係緊繃,其實不全然。去年十一月十九日金氏甚至拒見習近平特使宋濤。但金氏在金習會前數月已開始鋪陳見習的條件。核爆共六次的朝鮮在去年九月三日後嘎然而止。金氏去年密集試射飛彈十六次,二月至八月每月一至三次,而中共舉行十九的十月前後,他停止飛彈試射三個月整,直至十一月廿八日再射一次後也全停。金習會前,他已「禁核」近四個月。去年九月十一日,北京在國際壓力下參與聯合國制裁朝鮮的決議,但設法減輕懲罰力度。之後,北京極可能啟動自己軟硬兩手的制金措施,一方面保證捍衛朝鮮主權領土的完整、促進其經貿發展、二方面要求朝鮮不必立即放棄核武但要保持克制,否則將針對朝鮮領導及相關家族成員實施懲罰應對措施(有爭議但符合北京思維的外洩密件)。中朝雙方在今年二月前應已獲共識:朝鮮克制核武發展,北京支持兩韓統一。

 

合理的推測是:

●去年十二月十五日,南韓總統文在寅訪華見習近平時談及他與朝鮮互動之意願。文不說習也會問,因為文祖籍朝鮮,他政治導師盧武鉉致力與朝鮮和解。習應告文,中國支持兩韓統一。

●今年二月平昌冬季奧運,兩韓友好互動。全球反應熱烈,而北京出奇安靜。因為南北韓已各自私下照會中國。

 

作者為前華府喬治大學外交學院講座教授,曾任國防部副部長

 

 

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金正恩要求見習近平

 

-- 金習會是金採取主動的。這與金自2017.9.3金正日最後一次核爆後便努力以自我克制的行為鋪陳見習之條件是一致的。
-- 金正恩26日在北京對習近平致答詞:"...欣然接收朝方訪華建議..."(請見所貼的剪報)
--
之前主流看法:"北京在南北韓二月熱烈互動後被邊緣化,於是主動邀金訪中"是誤判。
-- 以下剪報來自 江迅,"美朝峰會北京角色"亞洲週刊 2018.4.1522

林中斌 2018.4.12

 

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十九大後習近平對台:軟手為攻,硬手為守,意在「改變台灣民意」

林中斌口述 辜樹仁整理 March 30, 2018

https://opinion.cw.com.tw/blog/profile/70/article/6740

accessed March 30, 2018

這是三月初向天下雜誌口述的淺見,並經天下資深研究員辜樹仁先生潤色後的文字。敬請賜教。

林中斌 2018.4.1

談到中共對台工作,「兩手策略」是自2004年胡錦濤時期至今日習近平主政不變的方式。2005130日《自由時報》登載在下所說:北京對台「對官方更硬、對民間更軟」。之後,「軟的更軟,硬的更硬」說法開始流行。

2008年馬英九就任台灣總統,北京兩手策略調為「軟多於硬」。2016年蔡英文就任總統,北京停止與台北官方互動,其兩手策略轉為「硬多於軟」。去年10月十九大後,北京兩手策略一度是軟硬同時加強,但是今年春年節前修改為「軟手為主,硬手為輔」。這方式挾帶北京原有思維「軟手促統,硬手防獨」,將成為此後北京對台策略的特色:「軟手為攻,硬手為守」。

時至今日,北京考量的是硬手效用已經飽和,再多反而適得其反;而軟手效用開始在台灣民調中浮現,方興未艾,大有可為。未來,硬的一手不會消失,但成為底線;而軟的一手力度會提昇,方式多樣化,手腕更靈活。軟手可以在阻力最小的方式下達到北京統一的目的,而硬手不能。大約在2006年後,北京已意識到「買台灣比打台灣便宜」。習近平所瞄準最後目標應該是:「心靈契合」式兩岸的整合。

多樣化的軟手策略

軟手多樣化到什麼程度?舉例來說,一位導遊朋友今年2月告訴我,從去年12月開始,在台北、宜蘭與桃園都出現穿著制服的中國大陸小學生團隊。他們來台灣不僅觀光,也和台灣的小學生交流。

如果對岸計畫性地送小學生來交流,那就有趣了。他們推動兩岸學生交流,已經從大學生做到中學生,又再向下擴展到小學生。如果來台交流的是小學五年級的兒童,到了2049年中華人民共和國建國百年,他們就是40歲出頭的中壯年,有可能是政府,或是其他領域的中階領導幹部。他們的「老朋友」在台灣也漸露頭角。北京在兩岸工作上,想得何其長遠!

 

其他的軟手段,台灣的媒體都有報導。例如吸引台灣年輕學者到中國大陸的大學任教。去年10月,福建省就傳出計畫在3年內引進1,000名台灣的大學教師到福建任教。12月,還宣稱要提供首次登陸到福建的台灣人每人3,000人民幣補貼,到福建的台灣創業團隊則提供百萬人民幣獎勵金。

 

再早些,還有中國國務院在2015年宣布的「大眾創業、萬眾創新」計畫,成立400億人民幣規模的國家級創業基金,以及在各省市設立青創基地,其中一部份是要吸引740萬台灣年輕人到中國大陸創業。2016年底,已有入駐台資1,200家,6,000台灣青年在當地就業。

 

這計畫,很可能是在2014年台灣發生太陽花學運後,北京檢討對台工作之後做出的決定。

 

另外還有開放台灣人出任中國大陸的公職。將來可能會在已開放12個省市台灣居民可在大專院校和公立醫院等事業單位就業的基礎上,全面開放31個省市。

 

十九大時,習近平宣佈要提供台灣人「與大陸同胞同等的待遇」,和「分享大陸發展的機遇」。到了228日,國台辦就宣佈了「31項惠台措施」,提供赴大陸工作投資的台灣人在31個領域中的發展機會和同等待遇。

這些都是北京對台工作中軟的那一手。在十九大以後,快速推出。

台灣民意已經出現改變徵兆

那麼,北京對台「軟手為主」的目的何在?很清楚,就是要改變台灣的基本盤:民意。因為台灣是民主政體,若民意改變不斷擴大,政府目前保守的兩岸政策不調整也很難。若人民選擇赴對岸就業求學,政府若禁止也不易。

 

近來台灣內部的民調顯示:我們長期對兩岸關係的民意趨勢,已經開始逆轉,雖然尚未到達臨界點,但是不容忽視。

 

在《天下雜誌》今年12日公佈的國情調查中,回答自己是「台灣人」的比例,雖然仍遠高於其他身份認同,但卻創2014年以來的新低,從59.4%下降到56.4%。回答自己是「台灣人,也是中國人」的比例,從2015年的28.2%上升到今年的34.1%,同樣是2014年以來的新高。

 

在統獨傾向方面,回答「在一定條件下統一」的比例,創近10年來新高,達到13.8%,比前一年增加5.6%。回答「台灣獨立,但與大陸維持和平關係」及「不管如何台灣盡快獨立」,則從上一次調查的37.2%降到32%。

 

去年1120日《聯合報》的民調結果類似。主張「永遠維持現狀」的比例,從47%上升到49%,仍是主流。但主張急獨和緩獨的比例,卻從去年31%大幅下降到24%,創2010年以來最低。緩統和急統比例,則從去年17%,上升到20%。

 

《遠見雜誌》今年212日發表的民調結果顯示,贊成獨立的比例創10年新低,支持統一的比例,則是10年新高。

 

還有一些更發人深省的民調,是由前民進黨官員游盈隆博士成立的「台灣民意基金會」所做的。去年1231日,他公佈的領導人「感情溫度計」民調(請問您對他/她有無好感?)結果顯示:中共總書記習近平的分數51.5%,竟然比自家總統蔡英文的46.9%高近5個百分點。

 

台灣民意基金會所做其他的民調,在綠營中也引起震撼。去年814日公布的民調顯示,台灣人認同和20165月調查比較,下降了8.8個百分點到72%,中國人認同上升2.5個百分點,雙重認同也上升了4.5個百分點。今年319日公布民調結果顯示:支持台灣獨立的人從2016年的51.2%,一路下滑到20183月的38.3%,減少了12.9個百分點。

 

另外一項未獲廣泛注意的改變是,過去親綠的媒體或學者,常批評他們眼中的統媒民調,認為有偏見。但對近數月的民調,他們沒批評,反而重視且憂心。這是嶄新的現象。這裡舉兩個例子:

 

《自由時報》20171122日社論中,有幾句話是該報前所未有的論調。例如「……本國的民主自由人權,無助於企業對外開拓……」,不同於過去認為民主自由戰勝一切的看法。此外,「令人遺憾是,當台灣人民以融入普世價值為榮之際,先進國家卻已琵琶別抱中國的市場與工廠……」。最後一段,「……本土政權執政,台灣人認同反顯衰退……」。

 

《自由時報》去年116日,美國伊利諾州立大學教授、北美台灣人教授協會會長李中志的投書,比較西班牙加泰隆尼亞地區去年的獨立運動和台灣面臨的困境,有幾句話值得咀嚼。例如,「……台灣的國族論述已漸漸被維持現狀的『政治正確』與『兩岸一家親』的鹹濕口水淹沒……可能讓我們對台灣人的認同其實尚未鞏固的事實,失去警覺……純粹的台灣人認同自2014年達到高點以來,3年之間已經掉了4個百分點,而雙重認同則增加了4個百分點,這不是警訊嗎?」顯示綠營菁英已經正視最近民意的變化。

 

還有最後一句,「加獨不只是一齣鬧劇,它還是一面鏡子,如果漸漸地多數的台灣人希望成為中國的自治區,那麼也只能這樣了。」這是以前在《自由時報》從沒看過的論調。

 

我們正在看到一個台灣人民對兩岸看法快速演變的學習曲線,台灣民意正在朝向現實方向演變。我曾說過,台灣內部因為學習曲線還未走完,所以很難形成內部共識。現在出現變化了。

 

這個變化趨勢,北京可能早就掌握。

 

中國大陸一所成立於1980年初期的台灣研究機構,我曾經問它的創辦人:「您如何對每次台灣總統選舉結果都掌握如此精準?」他告訴我,他們在台灣廣結善緣,而且長期隔海峽打電話用閩南語和國語對台灣做民調。習近平上台兩年後,就開始零星的試點推出對台灣軟手策略,效果如何?北京應透過這台灣研究機構早已掌握到。

 

過去半年,台灣自己民調公佈兩岸指標的逆轉,進一步讓北京驗證他們之前探試性的小規模軟手策略是有效的。料想中,他們在十九大之前應已著手規劃大規模、全方位、多樣化的軟手策略。雖然今年2月才推出「31項惠台措施」,其內部決策和規劃早應已開始,而於十九大之後全力推動。

 

北京目前對台兩手策略的特徵為何?

軟手措施完全操之在北京,其目的在「促統」。其作法擺脫了胡錦濤時代透過台灣官員施惠給台灣果農、漁民等對象的作法,也免除了養肥兩岸「買辦」人士而台灣人民無感的弊病。吸引交往台灣未來主人翁(青少年兒童),並爭取他們的認同;禮遇在台灣受挫的族群,如軍公教人員等;優惠台灣高科技創業青年;僑外辦積極協助海外遇險遭難的台灣人民;主動以海上力量支援受他國驅趕的台灣漁船。

 

硬手措施以無言的行動施壓台灣,避免誇張式恫嚇,北京甚至可否認施壓意圖,讓台灣「啞子吃黃蓮」般的感受追求獨立的困難。其「防獨」目的是舊的,但做法是新的。例如:

 

.軍機軍艦繞台,北京說是例行性演練,不針對任何一方。

 

.去年6月北京與巴拿馬建交,北京可說是被動接受巴國等待已久的請求。

 

.北京官員儀式性的反獨申明,是延續多年的例行性操作。

 

.杯葛台灣國際場合活動空間,和限縮台灣與非邦交國交往的措施,自2016年蔡總統就任後已明顯加強,但不是十九大後新的做法。前者有2017後封殺台灣參與世界衛生大會。後者包括最近客委會到模里西斯舉辦美食展遭打壓,中華民國駐巴布亞紐幾內亞商務代表團被迫改名、外交車牌被收回。

 

.針對性攻台軍事演習雖然曾於20157月遠離台海,在內陸朱日和訓練基地舉行。但蔡總統就任後此類演習未曾舉行。

 

北京對台策略在十九大後一度軟硬同時加強。但到了今年農曆春節前,硬的一手在媒體上轉為低調。軍機軍艦繞台,並未停止,但解放軍發言人不提。

 

中南海應已經曉得,硬手效用已達飽和,其邊際效用開始遞減,而且施壓蔡英文承認「九二共識」沒用。

 

中南海高層感激蔡英文?重批獨,少批蔡

何以見得?

 

2016321日蔡英文就任總統前,有立委透露,國安單位研判北京對台灣將是「重批獨,少批蔡」。從2016年到現在,北京應已了解,蔡英文並非自草根基層崛起的本土政治人物,她在派系林立的民進黨裡不能夠一言九鼎。她在兩岸關係上謀求穩定的言行,已經是她的最大的政治極限。超過極限等於政治自殺。北京應該已感受到蔡英文的確沒有給他們製造麻煩。

 

2017106日,澳門的《新華澳報》兩岸問題資深記者林昶在評論中寫道,「……就在蔡英文上台後的這段時間內,習近平要面對的困難不少,包括內部的軍改、打貪,應對幾隻能量極大的大老虎;對外的南海仲裁、釣魚島、朝核等問題。蔡英文實行『不挑釁、不刺激、零意外』,沒有給對岸增添麻煩,使得北京高層可以中精力處理各種問題……直到現在,包括習近平在內的高層,尚未有直接點名批評蔡英文……」林昶曾私下對我說,習近平對蔡英文,「甚至是感激的」。

 

所謂沒添麻煩,包括了20172月,美國國防部長表示釣魚台適用《美日安保條約》,17日當時外交部長李大維公開說,「釣魚台是中華民國的領土。」這是重視台灣和日本關係的民進黨政府從未表達過的立場。322日,前陸委會主委張小月在立法院答詢時表示,根據大法官會議解釋:「兩岸協議非國際協定。」原屬國民黨政府的李大維和張小月都是蔡英文力排眾議任命的閣員,他們敏感性的發言不可能沒有蔡授權。

 

325日,台日斷交後最高層日本官員總務副大臣赤間二郎(相當於台灣內政部副部長)訪台,但蔡英文迴避接見。對於是否允許達賴喇嘛訪台,總統府也很低調。這些點點滴滴的事例,就是林昶所說的蔡英文「不挑釁、不刺激、零意外」。

 

當然,中南海之下,國台辦、某些涉台學者、退休將領,有時會論調強硬。但這些論調不代表中南海高層的長遠戰略思維,而是作為戰術上遏抑台獨與內部宣傳的作用。

 

北京目前的企圖已很明顯,就是耕耘民主台灣的基本盤:用軟的一手,改變台灣的民意。在台灣這邊,從蔡英文今年春節後調整外交、國安與兩岸人事佈局也可看出,兩岸政策應該會轉向務實。

 

蔡政府調整國安兩岸人事 政策更趨務實?

最重要的是陳明通教授接任陸委會主委。陳水扁執政前,他已去過中國大陸30多次,和對岸涉台學者來往頻繁。我們20002004年在陸委會共事。他曾私下對我表示:未來兩岸最終整合的趨勢很難阻擋。他沒說的是:台灣應該在此大勢之下,爭取最好的地位與安排。

 

另外,外交經驗豐富的李大維調任國安會秘書長,比之前外交部長任內更接近蔡英文總統,讓她更能掌握國際局勢。國際新局勢是什麼?淺見是,整個東亞的權力重心正在向北京轉移。原因是川普總統強調「美國優先」,其實是美國國內優先,盟友如日本已感到要未雨綢繆了。這對中國大陸有利。

 

最明顯的就是美國盟友菲律賓和2011年歐巴馬總統訪問後親美的緬甸,現在都明顯倒向北京。過去幾年在南海爭議上批評過北京的新加坡,20179月總理李顯龍訪問北京後,又回到了和過去一樣在中美之間維持平衡的地位。南韓新總統上任後,積極和北京改善關係,修補美軍部署薩德飛彈後的緊張關係。

 

甚至,最挺美的日本首相安倍晉三,原來杯葛「一帶一路」,也在去年6月後改口表示,日本可以對「一帶一路」戰略有所貢獻。在南亞,印度總理莫迪去年8月下令在中印邊境與中國部隊對峙的駐軍往後撤,隨後以鴿派女性內政部長接替撤換鷹派國防部長,還指示邊防部隊官兵要學會5060句中文。新國防部長在去年108日甚至親自到中印邊境向解放軍合什祝福。

 

這些東亞權力重心轉移的跡象,蔡英文身邊關注國際局勢的專人,應已向她匯報。從1999年李登輝時代規劃「兩國論」的國安會諮詢委員蔡英文,到現在身為總統的近廿年間,我相信她的國際、兩岸、戰略的視野已大為不同。

 

蔡總統應會同意陳明通主委的認知,就是要在不可抗拒的大趨勢下,給台灣謀求最好的地位與待遇,儘管這些想法都不方便公開講。

 

如果這個假設是正確的,兩岸關係的未來,並不悲觀。甚至如果蔡英文成功連任總統,蔡習會很有可能會發生。

 

台灣更該注意北京的「超軍事手段」 而不是軍事威脅

最後我想強調的是,我們關注兩岸趨勢,切勿忽略北京的「超軍事手段」,也就是前面所說的各種意在改變台灣民意的軟手策略。如果我們只注意北京軍機、軍艦繞台等心理威脅,對台灣長遠的安全幸福沒太大幫助。因為北京沒必要採取代價極高的下策用軍事奪取台灣。它有豐富資源支持經濟、文化、外交等「超軍事手段」達到「不戰統台」的目的。此外,國際趨勢也對北京有利。

 

我們應該多花時間思考如何因應對北京來勢洶洶、而且操之在他的軟手策略。否則,我政府在民主制度下,將如何避免與民意相左,而落於被動?

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The two sides of the mountain

Economist p.39-40 December 23, 2017

https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21732851-maldives-nepal-and-sri-lanka-are-no-longer-meek-they-used-be-india-faces-growing

China has expanded its influence in India’s neighbors including Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and Bhutan in recent years with economic and diplomatic (extra-military) instrument.

This fits the pattern I have characterized since 2004; “dominating East Asia/Eurasia without war”.

北京近年來加強與印度鄰居的關係,包掛斯里蘭卡、尼泊爾、馬爾地夫和不丹。所用的都是超軍事工具

這趨勢正是在下自從2004年起便描寫的北京大戰略:「不戰而主東亞」(現在甚至可稱「不戰而主歐亞」)

China is competing fiercely with India for influence in the subcontinent

 

EARLIER in December Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, said his country "disapproves" of spheres of influence in international affairs. He was speaking in Delhi, India's capital, a fact that underscored a point China is making increasingly clear by other, less diplomatic means: the thing it really disapproves of is India maintaining a sphere of influence.

 

Separated from the rest of Asia by the world's biggest mountains, India is the elephant on its own subcontinent. Leaving aside perennially hostile Pakistan, it has effortlessly dominated smaller neighbours much in the way that America does in the Caribbean: they may grumble and resent their sometimes clumsy big brother, but they have learned to stay out of its way. Lately, however, China's increasingly bold advances are challenging India's sway.

 

Consider the past few weeks. On December 9th Sri Lanka granted a 99-year lease of a strategic port on its southern coast to a company controlled by the Chinese government. The same week an alliance of two communist parties swept parliamentary polls in Nepal; they had campaigned for closer ties with China and more distant ones with India. At the end of November, after a hasty "emergency" session of parliament with no opposition members present, the Maldives became the second South Asian country after Pakistan to ratify a free-trade agreement with China. The low-lying archipelago in the Indian Ocean, which sits beside trade routes along which an estimated 60,000 ships pass every year, has also leased an island to one Chinese firm and awarded big infrastructure projects to others.

 

India has faced challenges in its traditional sphere before, says Tanvi Madan of the Brookings Institution, an American think-tank. What is different is the scale and speed of China's incursion. Until 2011, for instance, China did not even have an embassy in the Maldivian capital, Male. But after a state visit to the island republic by Xi Jinping, China's president, in 2014--the first by a Chinese leader--military, diplomatic and economic ties have strengthened rapidly. China now holds some 75% of the Maldives' debt, reckons Mohamed Nasheed, an exiled former president.

 

Atoll costs

 

Following the Maldives' sudden free-trade deal with China, India's foreign ministry could only drily intone, "It is our expectation that as a close and friendly neighbour, [the] Maldives will be sensitive to our concerns, in keeping with its 'India First' policy." Rather than reaffirm its commitment to upholding Indian interests, however, the Maldivian government abruptly suspended three local councillors for the sin of meeting with the Indian ambassador without seeking prior permission. In the past the Maldives, with its 400,000 people, would not have dared snub its neighbour of 1.3bn so blatantly. The affront is all the more glaring given that a muscular foreign policy is one of the electoral planks of India's prime minister, Narendra Modi, whose party just won a hard-fought election in his home state of Gujarat.

 

In Nepal, too, the Chinese dragon has advanced swiftly. As long ago as the 1950s its rulers had reached out to China in a bid to counterbalance India, which controlled nearly all access to the landlocked kingdom--as it was then--and was pressing the royal family to allow some democracy. "But all it took to manage Nepal then was a few boxes of whisky," says Constantino Xavier of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, another think-tank.

 

Decades later, when Nepal's king again made overtures to China, India mounted an 18-month economic blockade that ultimately persuaded him not only to shun his northern neighbour but also to allow multiparty elections. When Nepalese Maoists, briefly in government in 2008 following a ten-year civil war, went to China seeking aid, they came away empty-handed. "They were told a mountain has two sides; know which one you are on," says Mr Xavier. In other words, Nepal should recognise Indian dominance.

 

Nepal, now a republic, issued a new constitution in 2015. India saw it as unfair to lowland regions that lie along its border, and so again showed its muscle. But rather than crumple in the face of a new blockade (which was imposed by Nepalese protesters but tacitly backed by India, which still controls nearly all road access), Nepal's wobbly government held its ground. To assert its independence it signed several deals with China. In the just-completed elections this policy paid off handsomely for Nepal's communists, who were able to promise giant Chinese investments in hydropower, roads and the country's first railway. This will run not downhill from Kathmandu, the Nepalese capital, to India, but over the mountains to China.

 

Nepal's ties to India remain extremely strong. Millions of Nepalese work there; it is Nepal's biggest trading partner; and the two countries' armies have historically been tightly bound. But whereas India has counted on this legacy to sustain its influence, China has busied itself with funding scholarships, think-tanks and junkets to China for Nepalese journalists and academics. Back in the 1960s, a Nepalese delegation met Mao Zedong, recalls Mr Xavier. "He told them that only in 50 years, when a train reached from Tibet to Kathmandu, could China match India's influence."

 

India has met China's push with consternation, and the occasional pushback. Quite literally so: over the summer Indian troops crossed onto territory claimed by another small country in India's orbit, Bhutan, to block a road-building incursion by Chinese forces. The intervention did stop China, but has tested India's relations with a country that relies heavily on Indian aid and is such a close ally that it has yet to establish diplomatic relations with its only other neighbour, China. This may have been the intention. China has long been quietly offering to resolve its border disputes with Bhutan through an exchange of territory. India has blocked the idea, for fear that it would strengthen China at a point of military vulnerability for India.

 

In that particular contest India may be a match for China, in determination if not in strength. India's foreign-policy establishment is well aware of its other weaknesses in relation to its northern neighbour and has worked hard to address them. It used to rely on the sheer immensity and harshness of the Himalayas to act as a barrier, and deliberately built no roads that a Chinese invader might use. That has changed: India is furiously struggling to catch up with China's burgeoning and impressive border infrastructure.

 

But retaining an Indian "sphere of influence" remains a tricky task. Aside from the fact that India's economy is only a fifth of China's in size, and that its messy democracy makes policymaking slow and cumbersome, India suffers important institutional constraints. Its entire corps of diplomats amounts to just 770 professionals, compared, for example, with America's 13,500 foreign-service officers. Indian aid to its neighbours has suffered from poor delivery through inefficient public-sector companies. And until recently India has shied away from working with other countries that are equally concerned by China's expansionism. All of this is changing, however. The Indian elephant may be slow to learn, but it is hard to budge.

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西哈努克港市是第二個澳門

亞洲週刊 梁東屏 December 31, 2017

http://www.yzzk.com/cfm/blogger3.cfm?id=1513741210284&author=%E6%A2%81%E6%9D%B1%E5%B1%8F

 

This is another gain of China’s extra-military strategy

這是北京超軍事手段的另一項收穫

西哈努克港市是第二個澳門

20171230日 第3152

中國承諾在柬埔寨投資七十億美元,並大舉開發第二大城市西哈努克港市,要將之建設成「第二個澳門」。中國在柬投資額是美國的三十倍。

 

西哈努克港市:中國發揮巨大影響力

 

在柬埔寨總理洪森的示意下,該國最高法院十一月解散了力量最強大的反對黨「救國黨」。這個舉動引起包括美國在內的西方國家一片撻伐,美國及歐盟都揚言可能對柬埔寨進行制裁,美國也已經發布對柬國高層人員的旅行禁令。只不過柬國並不以為意,洪森甚至高調揚言歡迎美國制裁,因為「美國的援助只是在幫助反對人士進行叛國」,而且「我們有中國的援助,根本就不需要美國」。

 

洪森講的並非氣話,因為他說過那些話之後就去中國訪問了,結果獲得中方七十億美元的投資承諾,為柬埔寨興建高速公路、首都金邊市近郊的衛星城市以及多項教育、娛樂、金融計劃。

 

中國對柬埔寨的投資,具體展現在該國第二大城西哈努克港市。這個曾經一度破敗的城市現在已經開始翻身,迅速發展成為柬埔寨的新經濟中心,甚至於被稱做有望發展成「第二個澳門」。有不少前往投資的中國人都表示西哈努克市就像二十年前的中國,有龐大的商機。

 

西哈努克市是柬國在上世紀六十年代從叢林開發建成,以前任國王西哈努克為名,是柬埔寨第一大港口城市,擁有全國唯一的深水港。西哈努克市曾是柬埔寨精英階層的遊憩樂園,但在紅高棉大屠殺以及七十與八十年代的衝突爆發後逐漸沒落,之後更因為價廉而成為西方背包客青睞的旅遊目的地。

 

然而在中國提出「一帶一路」倡議後,發展商以西哈努克是一帶一路沿線「第一個停靠港」為賣點,當地政府也積極吸引中國投資者而突飛猛進。

 

西哈努克省長永明(Yun Min)曾任軍區司令員,也是洪森的親信,他多次訪問中國,邀請中國投資者前往,並承諾為他們提供保護。他告訴路透社:「我們希望有更多中國人來這裏,我估計西哈努克市的房地產有一半都被中國人租去了,這使得我們大有獲利。」

 

如今,這個人口約二十五萬的城市居住著成千上萬的中國人。市內隨處可見以中文書寫的標誌,當地超級市場也出售大量中國製造的貨品,柬國當地的貨品可能只剩啤酒及瓶裝水了。而且,未來應該還會有更多中國人湧入。

 

從前十分寧靜的獨立海灘,僅僅幾個月內就出現了許多水泥大樓,很多都是賭場、酒店及高級公寓。該市新的藍灣公寓項目負責人形容,西哈努克是「第二個澳門」。這項耗資兩億美元的公寓項目樓高三十八層,至少有七百個單位,當中約百分之二十已售出,售價從十二萬五千美元至五十萬美元不等。

 

當地還不斷有新的高樓大廈建成,未來還將出現更多賭場、酒店以及數以千計的住宅單位。西哈努克國際機場也將擴建,目前百分之七十的國際航線都飛往中國。中國也計劃建造一條從西哈努克至金邊的四線道高速公路,當地鐵路也將在一帶一路計劃下獲得改善。

 

從西哈努克港驅車,很快就能來到西哈努克港經濟特區,這裏現有的一百一十家企業中有百分之九十是中資企業,它們都享有進出口免稅及公司稅假期優惠。

 

美國學者索法爾.埃爾指出,中國在柬埔寨的投資還在持續與擴大。他說:「我們說的是超越其他任何人的訂單規模。他們正在憑藉龐大的數量與規模,擠出其他投資者。」

 

雖然中國目前的投資重點是在西哈努克市,但不可因此而忽略了它對柬國的整體投資。舉例來說,中國到達柬埔寨的遊客居於全球之冠,今年的頭七個月內,共有六十三萬五千人到訪,是到訪總人數的五分之一。柬國希望到二零二零年,每年能有兩百萬中國遊客到訪。

 

中國在二零一二年至一六年對柬投資為四十億美元,是美國的三十倍。去年的對柬投資為兩億六千五百萬美元,是日本的兩倍,美國的四倍。柬國的全國電力幾乎都由中國水壩供電,三分之一的外銷成衣廠是中資。不過,柬國的五十八億美元外債,其中半數是欠中國。

 

柬國也欠中國不少「政治債」。洪森政府早前逮捕反對黨救國黨領袖並解散該黨,為明年大選清除障礙,引起西方國家一致譴責,中國卻對柬埔寨採取行動維持國內秩序的做法表示支持。柬埔寨則投桃報李,在區域議題上支持中方,協助中國在東南亞擴大影響力。中國公司在柬國所擁有的特許,也讓它們控制了三分之一以上的柬國海岸線。

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川金峰會 (紐約時報2018.4.2)

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