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Jeffrey Sachs, " China is not the source of our problems-- corporate greed is"

CNN May 27, 2019

Accessed June 3, 2019

 

Wise, sanguine, and clear-sighted.
這是篇美國哥倫比亞大學教授對中美貿易戰的分析:思路清晰而充滿智慧。
Excellent analysis that transcends the confine of ego, time, and space.
他超越了自我的侷限,眼前的侷限,和美國為中心的侷限。
This manifests the real greatness of America: the national ability to self-reflect.
他展示了美國真正的偉大:不斷自我反省的能力。

Chong-Pin Lin May 28, 2019
林中斌試摘要
感謝淡大戰略所林祐生翻譯
敬請賜正 2019.5.28

●China is being made a scapegoat for rising inequality in the United States. 
*中國不過是美國國內日益升高不平等的替罪羔羊

●We should understand that China is merely trying to make up for lost time after a very long period of geopolitical setbacks and related economic failures.
*我們應將此理解為中國不過是在彌補過去很長一段時間地緣政治上的挫折以及相應的經濟失敗(指的應該是19世紀40年代開始的一連串政治和經濟挫折)

●In 1839, Britain attacked China because it refused to allow British traders to continue providing Chinese people with addictive opium. Britain prevailed,
*1839年的鴉片戰爭肇因於中國拒絕英國商人繼續向中國輸入高度成癮性的鴉片,且英國取得了勝利。

●Toward the end of the 19th century, China lost a war to the newly industrializing Japan, and was subjected to yet more one-sided demands by Europe and the United States for trade. These humiliations led to another rebellion, followed by yet another defeat, at the hands of foreign powers.
*19世紀末期,中國在軍事衝突中敗給新興工業化國家日本,並遭到歐美列強們要求了更多的單邊貿易要求。這些恥辱導致了另一波國內暴動,最終遭到數個列強共同鎮壓(八國聯軍)

●China has roughly followed the same development strategy as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore before it. From an economic standpoint, it is not doing anything particularly unusual for a country that is playing catch up.The constant US refrain that China "steals" technologies is highly simplistic.
*中國基本上跟隨了日本、南韓、台灣以及新加坡的發展腳步。就以經濟學的角度來看,中國做為一個追趕中的國家,其實並沒有做出任何不尋常的舉動。美國不斷力圖阻止中國剽竊科技是過度簡化問題。

●Countries that are lagging behind upgrade their technologies in many ways, through study, imitation, purchases, mergers, foreign investments, extensive use of off-patent knowledge and, yes, copying. 
*科技落後的國家以多種方式追趕,包括了學習、模仿、購買、併購、引入外資、廣泛應用非專利知識,以及抄襲。

●And with any fast-changing technologies, there are always running battles over intellectual property. That's true even among US companies today -- this kind of competition is simply a part of the global economic system. Technology leaders know they shouldn't count on keeping their lead through protection, but through continued innovation.
*對任何變化快速的科技而言,知識產權的戰爭是不會停止的。即使是今日美國國內的公司之間也存在這樣的競爭關係,實際上知識產權的競爭是全球經濟體系的一部分。這些科技領先者們知道他們不應指望倚靠保護舊有的知識產權,而是投入更多創新

●The United States relentlessly adopted British technologies in the early 19th century. And when any country wants to close a technology gap, it recruits know-how from abroad. The US ballistic missile program, as it is well known, was built with the help of former Nazi rocket scientists recruited to the United States after World War II.
*19世紀工業革命正火熱時,美國人毫不留情的採用了英國人的先進技術。當任何國家試圖縮小科技差距時,往往會招聘國外專業人才。例如大家所熟知的,二戰後美國的彈道飛彈技術大力得益於一批歸順的納粹科學家。

●If China were a less populous Asian country, say like South Korea, with a little more than 50 million people, it would simply be hailed by the United States as a great development success story. 
*如果中國是個人口較少,像韓國一樣約莫5000多萬人口的國家,中國將會被美國頌讚為經濟發展成功的案例。

●Trade with China provides the United States with low-cost consumer goods and increasingly high-quality products. It also causes job losses in sectors such as manufacturing that compete directly with China. That is how trade works. To accuse China of unfairness in this is wrong -- plenty of American companies have reaped the benefits of manufacturing in China or exporting goods there. And US consumers enjoy higher living standards as a result of China's low-cost goods.
*和中國的貿易使美國人能以低廉的價格購買品質逐漸攀升的消費性商品。與此同時,也造成了大量失業,尤其是製造業這種直接與中國競爭的產業,而這正是貿易的運作方式。單單的指控中國是個錯誤,實際上許多美國公司受益於中國製造並出口到美國的商品。

●Yet under American capitalism, which has long strayed from the cooperative spirit of the New Deal era, today's winners flat-out reject sharing their winnings. As a result of this lack of sharing, American politics are fraught with conflicts over trade. Greed comprehensively dominates Washington policies.
*但是受到美國資本主義的影響,贏家們不願意面對新時代的合作精神,也就是向別人分享自己的勝利果實。這樣的結果就是美國的政治充滿著因貿易而起的衝突。貪婪正全面性的支配著華盛頓的政治。

●The real battle is not with China but with America's own giant companies, many of which are raking in fortunes while failing to pay their own workers decent wages.
*真正的戰鬥不應該是對著中國,而是美國自身內部的巨型企業們,這些巨型企業之中有許多財務狀況不佳,甚至連支付員工正常的薪水都有問題。

●Trump is lashing out against China, ostensibly believing that it will once again bow to a Western power. It is willfully trying to crush successful companies like Huawei by changing the rules of international trade abruptly and unilaterally.
*川普大力的抨擊中國,至少表面上看來他相信北京終究會向華盛頓的力量屈服。他故意以一些單邊的手段突襲,改變國際貿易的規則,試圖摧毀一些像華為這般成功的公司

●A trade war with China won't solve our economic problems. Instead we need homegrown solutions: affordable health care, better schools, modernized infrastructure, higher minimum wages and a crackdown on corporate greed.
*貿易戰並不會解決美中之間的經濟問題。自強才是解決問題的方法,包括了:合理負擔的健保、更好的教育、將基礎建設現代化、更高的最低收入限制,以及打擊企業的貪婪。

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美中貿易戰的背後

《聯合報》2019519A12

accessed May 20, 2019

佳文推薦。
資料豐富,涵蓋全面,見解精到。
林中斌 2019.5.19

全文聯結:https://udn.com/news/story/11321/3821265

美中貿易戰終於開打。目前任何人都難預測未來走向,但了解雙方背後的動因及侷限,或許有助釐清情勢。

作為發動者美國,動因最少有四項。第一當然是川普總統本人。四十三歲的他在一九九○年生平第一次政治專訪時就對「花花公子」雜誌讀者強調,「美國老被別國當成笑柄」,「一定要對外國硬起來」,「要把進口的每一輛賓士車、所有日本產品課上重稅」。到了二○一六年,高關稅匡正貿易逆差,更貫穿他整個選戰主軸。此外,「最大施壓」及「懸崖邊緣」也一直是他經商與從政時的典型談判風格。

第二,川普與他的鷹派策士都對現行國際秩序深感不滿,認為美國吃了大虧,而別的國家「搭便車」占太多便宜。所以除了廢除好幾個多邊協議(如氣候變遷、跨太平洋夥伴關係等),也已經或即將與加、墨、歐盟、日、韓等盟國重談貿易協定。中國大陸只是其中一齣大戲。

第三,目前美國兩黨及行政與國會非常難得地一致認為,中國大陸國力已經上升到必須出手壓抑,以免危及美國領導地位地步。部分人還不滿中共政治制度隨著經濟發展而更趨集權。少數人甚至拉高到「種族」或「文明」挑戰的層級。華府此共識一定讓談判代表在面對北京時底氣十足。

第四,在美國國內,關稅戰的正當性最夠,而且成本最低。大陸每年出口美國五千多億美元,而進口只有一千多億。所以美國打關稅戰,子彈充足又不太怕報復。藉關稅不但可以直攻中共的「製造二○二五」產業,還可以打開大陸服務業的龐大市場,何樂而不為?反之,如改打「操縱人民幣」,連許多政學界人士都不認可。如打「網路偷竊」,證據也嫌不足。所以除非大陸的報復重創美國經濟或波及其他利益,關稅戰仍可能持續。

但美國面臨的侷限也不少。首先,華府菁英圈子固然反中,但走出華府,一般人感受的還是「你中有我,我中有你」;而貿易戰必然兩敗俱傷。川普開打後的最新民調就顯示,四十五趴美國人認為美中貿易戰「長期會傷害美國經濟」,超過認為會「幫助美國經濟」的卅四趴。他或許更會警惕,四十二趴美國民眾認為民主黨拜登參議員較會處理對中關係,超過他自己的卅八趴。

第二,華府反中菁英迄今只有招式(如貿易戰),卻沒有章法。這一方面因為華府政學媒界一直忙於圍繞著川普進行激烈內鬥,一方面涉外菁英的士氣又普遍低落。川普上任後把國務院預算砍掉三分之一,中高階層官員大量辭職且常遇缺不補,連新進外交官都銳減二分之一。他的「美國優先」更導致盟友離心離德。其他國家如作壁上觀,美國單打獨鬥的效果自會打折。

更糟的是,美國多個智庫及專文已清楚表示,面對中共台海軍力,美國已經喪失過去每一項優勢。過去可以橫行無阻的航空母艦,現在不敢進入台灣周圍最少一千海里的海域。過去共軍找不到、瞄不準、穿不透(防禦體系)、或打不到美國航母,現在都可做到。過去不必擔心的衛星、通訊、後勤等,現在全都不安全。

換句話說,美國對中國大陸打關稅戰確實「心」「力」俱足。但要全面戰略對抗,或組建反中聯盟,或馳援「台灣民族主義」,恐怕都力有未逮。

或許正因看到美國的侷限,被動防守的北京迄今反應是硬中有軟。硬的是,不允許美國藉貿易談判改變大陸的政經體制;針對新增的高關稅宣布報復性的高關稅;針對南海及台灣則寸步不讓;針對川普自毀外交長城,則加緊外交出擊。

軟的是,只就事論事,不批評川普本人,習近平本人不出面講話;不承認進入美國所說的「競爭」階段,仍號稱堅持過去四十年的「交往」政策;關稅開徵日期壓到六月一日,以保留轉圜餘地。

綜上以觀,美國以攻為守,大陸以守為攻。台灣除了妥善因應高關稅的間接衝擊,也要迎接兩強打打談談的持久戰,尤其不應一廂情願地以為美國會因貿易戰而力挺「台灣民族主義」。(作者為台北論壇董事長、國安會前秘書長)

 

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“Electronic Manufacturing: The Great Chain of China”

Economist October 13,2018 pp61&62

accessed October 29, 2018

20181013 The great chain of China1.jpg20181013 The great chain of China2.jpg20181013 The great chain of China3.jpg

‧世界上一半手機在中國生產,中國工廠安裝世界上2/5的半導體,頻果最大的的200家供應商之中,357家在中國,只有63家在美國 (Of the production facilities operated by Apple’s top 200 suppliers, 357 are in China. Just 63 are in America.)

‧美國增加入口關稅使許多公司移回美國生產。但效果有限。因為美國缺乏低薪作重複動作的人力。

‧美國對中國電子產品加進口關稅使許多外國電子公司移出中國。但外流有限因為中國這方面強項太:越南基本建設比不上中國;印度官僚制度缺乏效率使得建造工廠和僱用幾千人太麻煩。

林中斌 試摘譯 2018.10.29

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F-35有毛病美國全面停飛

《中廣新聞網》2018年 10月12日

accessed October 01,2018

https://tw.news.yahoo.com/f-35%E6%9C%89%E6%AF%9B%E7%97%85-%E7%BE%8E%E5%9C%8B%E5%85%A8%E9%9D%A2%E5%81%9C%E9%A3%9B-000609531.html

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造價30億最貴戰機-F35首次墜毀

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-----美軍剛剛在2018927日首次駕駛出任務的F-35 戰機(阿富汗轟炸神學士),次日於928日在美國境內南卡羅來納州墜毀。

----20181011日,美國宣佈F-35全面停飛檢查

----F-35四個月前,曾被以色列空軍駕駛出任務兩次。

----2006F-35首次試飛。其實延宕多年。

----2013313日,在下曾試 撰文登載於聯合報(請見貼圖)

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原稿奉上如下:

F35: 全能戰機或敗家驕子?
林中斌
名人堂稿件
2013.3.10修正稿 本文字數:1190 目標字數:1200

  三月一日美國啟動「預算減支」,衝擊政府運作幅度之大,史無前例。因行政資源緊縮,安撿人員不足,於是早上七點飛機出國要清晨一點到機場!
  全球首富如何落此窘境?請看美國研發最新戰機過程便知一二。
  F35是全世界最優良的戰鬥機:隱形、短跑起飛垂直降落、可在航空母起降。駕駛艙前無眼花撩亂的按鍵,只有單一卻萬能的觸控銀幕。F35可用於空戰纏鬥,空中對地面攻擊,偵察等,似乎無所不能。它是戰機飛行員的終極夢想。
  ○一年九一一恐怖攻擊後,美國開始研發。原訂成本兩千三百億美元,兩千八百架,一年交貨。現在成本已翻兩翻:四千億美元,架數降低至兩千四百架,交貨時間延至一九年後。它成了人類有史以來最昂貴的武器計畫。
  F35原來構想是用於與大國作戰,而不是用於打窮國叛軍。它的前身F22戰機性能極佳,花大錢研發,佈署在中東,卻從未派上一次用場,因為對手沒戰機。八百億美元造了一九五架,全白花了!如今,故事重演,但錢浪費更多。已有人說:「F35可能飛一次任務的機會都沒有。」
  此外,F35瑕疵一籮筐:航程不夠長、攜帶的武器不夠支持地面作戰、空戰時轉彎靈活性不足、降落航母所用尾鉤位置不對容易失誤、閃電擊中會爆炸、駕駛會缺氧而死(已發生)。目前,每三架試飛的只有一架未來半年可起用。此外,垂直降落尚未試過,炸彈飛彈武器也尚未發射過。更妙的是,它已研發了十年了,但其作戰軟體還在電腦設計中,因為藍圖每天要改十次,一週要改七天!
  未來,由於「預算減支」和建造問題,F35不排除交貨時間再拖,成本再增加。
  原先美國八個盟友參與投資,並預購F35。其中至少加拿大、澳洲、義大利現已考慮減買,其他國延遲下單。
F35計畫的失敗有以下五原因:
一、心態驕縱:美國太自信,認為錢多,F35各設計只求最頂尖,毫無節制。
二、選票壓力:建造F35提供十三萬員工就業機會,遍及全國五十州中四十五州。國會議員為選民謀職,極力推動 F35計畫。
三、球員裁判: 國會裡F35監督會中四十八位委員,許多又坐在國防部F35計畫委員會中,口袋裡收了不少製造商的競選捐款。如何能客觀審查?
四、集體決策:F35同時要滿足空軍、陸戰隊、海軍需要。結果顧此失彼,反而都不滿足,成了四不像:航程縮短、飛行時間受限、帶彈量減少。
五、構想過時:F35最初構想注重匿蹤,以保護空軍飛行員安全。但後來無人飛機崛起,人員飛行已無必要。而且感測器和電腦計算不斷進步,使偵破隱形戰機的能力與日俱進,隱形價值不斷降低。
  一九六一年,艾森豪總統下任演說特別警告要小心防範「軍工複雜勾結集團」(military-industrial complex)不斷花費國家財源的危險。
  去年秋天,權威期刊Aviation Week & Space Technology社論說:「F35計畫已經失敗了。」但美國防部內有人說:「F35計畫太大,失敗不起 (too big to fail)!」
  誰是美國最大敵人?一年六月美國最高職位軍人參謀聯席會主席Mike Mullen上將說:「我們最大的安全威脅是國債。」今年二月底,美國鷹派眾議員Justin Amash主張裁減F35計畫:「我們把國家搞破產了,陷大家於危險中。」他這所憂心的正是三月一日「預算減支」。

 

林中斌曾任國防部副部長,現為退休國際關係和戰略教授。



 

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Leadership in Turbulent Times

accessed Sep 11, 2018

 

這篇書評涵蓋美國四位領導國家度過激盪危機的總統的生平。對受挫折的年輕朋友,在下摘述幾點,敬請卓參

青年時期遭受的打擊和挫折對四位總統是必修之課。

●我們多知道林肯的最愛早死,他陷入嚴重憂鬱症,想自殺。

"Abraham Lincoln as a young man withstood a depression so severe that his friends moved all the sharp objects from his room."

●我(們或許)不知道老羅斯褔的愛妻和慈母在24小時內雙雙逝去!!老羅斯褔功業之外,出版國42本書,包括歷史、製革、賞鳥、環保等等。在他後來文武全才的一生中,再也絕口不提其亡妻!!

●小羅斯福樂觀燦爛地笑容後,終身為小兒痲痹症所苦。

 

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潛艦國造?核四2.0

accessed Sep 12, 2018

 

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大逆轉"、美國教授遭北大解聘"

accessed Sep 12, 2018

 

兩則報導呈現此趨勢之兩面

 

1.大逆轉 陸留美人才83%海歸

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2.美國教授遭北大解聘驅逐 臨行之言 字字扎心!
連結https://www.secretchina.com/news/b5/2018/09/12/870651.html

美國教授.jpg

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Jennifer Schuessler, “Calligraphy? Chicken scratch? Both, actually”

The New York Times International Edition,

July 19, 2018

accessed July 24, 2018

http://iht.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx

 

書法表露人格。中西皆然。
左邊是7歲的小女孩一絲不苟的書信。她將統治日不落的大帝國。右邊是加速帝俄朝廷崩潰的"瘋僧"

Compare the handwritings. On the left is the tidy letter of a seven-year-old girl who would become queen ruling an empire that saw no setting sun. On the right is that of the "mad monk" who corrupted the Tsarist Russian court before it collapsed in 1917. (Queen Victoria vs Rasputin)

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We are living in a golden age of both fretting about handwriting and fetishizing it. Polemicists lament that cursive is going the way of the dodo. Meanwhile, oldschool devotees of pen and paper post their work on social media with hashtags like #snailmail and #penpal.

“The Magic of Handwriting,” an exhibition at the Morgan Library & Museum in New York, might seem at first glance to be part of this nostalgia. Instead, it simply luxuriates in the humble, intimate and sometimes very messy traces that some of the great figures of history have left behind.

The show features some 140 items from the encyclopedic holdings of the Brazilian collector Pedro Corrêa do Lago, who got his start at the age of 11, when he wrote to prominent figures to ask for their autographs. Today, he owns roughly 100,000 letters, notes, receipts, manuscripts, signed photographs and other pieces documenting notable lives in the arts, politics, science and other fields.

During an interview at the museum, the loquacious Mr. Corrêa do Lago, 60, called his collection “a symbolic snapshot of Western culture over the past 500 years.” He also sees it as it the product a kind of madness. “It became an absolutely crazy project that drowned all the money I made,” he said, with a laugh. “I should be in a straitjacket.”

Here is a sampling of items from the exhibition, and the sometimes quirky, sidelong glances they offer at their creators.

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台灣每人每年吃肉60公斤

accessed July 23, 2018

 

*南韓吃掉51.5公斤,中國人49.8公斤。
*戰鬥民族俄羅斯人每年吃掉60.9公斤。
*這些數字尚不包括海鮮。
*臺灣有全世界密度最高的吃到飽餐廳。
*臺灣運動在教育中不受重視。運動風氣長年落後,雖然近來上升,但與歐美日本對岸相比,嚴重落後。
減肥大賺錢。
*感謝彭啟明博士獨立研究發現的數據。


林中斌 2018.7.23

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China’s Economic Outlook in Six Charts

IMF July 26, 2018
accessed August 10, 2018

 

《中國經濟前景的6張圖表》
今年726日,國際貨幣基金會發表 "中國經濟前景的6張圖表"
其中第二張圖表(下面附圖在下移為首張)標題是:
質量和數量
中國目前處於歷史的轉捩點。幾十年高速度成長之後,聚焦在高品質的成長。即使中國經濟成長減緩,到2030年可能將超過美國稱為世界上最大的經濟體。

全文請見
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/07/25/na072618-chinas-economic-outlook-in-six-charts

感謝Frank Liu 提供資訊

林中斌 2018.8.23

p.s. : Why did IMF seem to differ in tone from Trump's White House which has avoided affirming the prospect of China's rise? Is it because, unlike World Bank which is led by an American, IMF is headed by a European? These days, the Europeans are not totally pleased by the U.S. President.

China’s Economic Outlook in Six Charts
July 26, 2018

2. A focus on high-quality growth. China is at an historic juncture. After decades of high-speed growth, the government is now focusing on high-quality growth….Even with a gradual slowdown in growth, China could become the world’s largest economy by 2030.

 

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"With Ships and Missiles, China Is Ready to Challenge U.S. Navy in Pacific"

New York Times, Aug 29, 2018

 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/world/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-pacific.html

accessed September 10, 2018


這是一篇紐約時報對中國海軍驚人大躍進的報導。涵蓋面廣,資料的來源引據確實。是目前最完整的解放軍海軍現代化報告。

●2017 軍艦與潛艦總數:
中國 317:美國 283
2017
年,中國海軍已成全球最大。
今年3月,美國印太艦隊司令Philip S. Davidson上將說:"除了正式開戰之外,中國現在已可在各種狀況下控制南海。...未來即使開戰,美國沒有把握打贏中國"

“China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States,” the new commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Philip S. Davidson, acknowledged in written remarks submitted during his Senate confirmation process in March.....
“There is no guarantee that the United States would win a future conflict with China,” he concluded.

蘭德公司的專家Lyle Morris說:"中國在西沙南沙部署飛彈使得美國必須部署軍艦在它們射程以外,但中國飛彈射程愈來越遠,使得美國這招變為不可能。"

Lyle Morris, an analyst with the RAND Corporation, said that China’s deployment of missiles in the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands “will dramatically change how the U.S. military operates” across Asia and the Pacific.

The best American response, he added, would be “to find new and innovative methods” of deploying ships outside their range. Given the longer range of the ballistic missiles, however, that is not possible “in most contingencies” the American Navy would be likely to face in Asia.

過去10年,中國建造100多艘軍艦,此數目甚至超過許多國家的海軍總數。
The carriers attract the most attention but China’s naval expansion has been far broader. The Chinese Navy — officially the People’s Liberation Army Navy — has built more than 100 warships and submarines in the last decade alone, more than the entire naval fleets of all but a handful of nations.

 

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東亞列國:和縱新局 (Balance in FluxEast Asian Power Dynamics)

May 19, 2018

以下是2018.5.19淡江大學國際會議的主題演講。
This is a keynote delivered at the annual international conference organized by the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies. (more notes in English follow those in Chinese)
題目是 東亞列國:和縱新局 (Balance in FluxEast Asian Power Dynamics)
感謝淡大戰略所李大中所長邀請。
中斌原先願意以英文提報。李所長考量提升收聽效果,以及與會外賓皆懂中文,傾向用中文。中斌遵照辦理。

敬請賜教。
林中斌 2018.5.23

●The topic was "Balance in Flux East Asian Power Dynamics".
●The keynote began by challenging two mainstream views.
1. North Korea turns to the U.S. to foil China
2. China is increasingly isolated in East Asia
●Recent foreign policy adjustments of China's neighbors have suggested a re-evaluation of these mainstream views.
●Two factors are offered to explain the new trend.
●One is President Donald Trump's "America First" policy and his policy unpredictability.
●The second is Beijing's grand strategy of "Dominating East Asia without War" characterized by "extra-military emphasis" and "struggle without breaking" 
(Beijing's grand strategy was first presented October 4, 2004 at the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, Hilton Scottsdale Resort and Villas, Scottsdale, Arizona. See Chong-Pin Lin, " Win with Wisdom: when wrestling with a giant"
以智取勝 Taipei: Global Defense Magazine 2005 p.v)
(For "Struggle without Breaking", see Chong-Pin Lin, "Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions with China: Struggle without Breaking" Asian Survey Vol.55 Number 3, May-June 2015 pp.478-500)

Chong-Pin Lin May 23, 2018

 

 

 

 

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Keith Bradsher, ”China takes a victory lap”  

Mark Lander and Ana Swanson, “Infighting stalls drive for trade agreement”

 

2018.5.23 ,國際紐約時報登載兩篇調查。

--中方這圈貿易談判"賽跑"贏了(China takes a victory lap)

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/business/china-trade-trump.html accessed May 24, 2018

-- 美方內鬥阻礙了達成貿易協定(Infighting stalls drive for trade agreement)

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/us/politics/trump-trade-china.html accessed May 24, 2018

-- 要點是川普先硬後軟。因為他同時想要川金會,和逼迫北京讓步的美中貿易協定。於是他拿不定主意,猶豫了。

-- 中方戰略前後一致。

-- 美方內鬥嚴重。商務部長Steven Mnuchin的聲明幾小時後被自己人貿易代表Robert Lighthizer 公開推翻。

--中方內部一條鞕。中方政策決定加快。以前需一天的,現在只要一小時。

-- 最後雙方聲明沒有數字。讓中方過了。

林中斌 試摘譯 2018.5.24

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談判桌大翻轉 美國衰老 陸年輕

旺報 2018.05.23 P.A6

風水百年轉。

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Thomas Friedman, "Is the U.S. Becoming Like China"

International New York Times May 11, 2018 p.11

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/opinion/us-china-more-alike.html

 

"世界是平的"作者在紐約時報發表短文"美國變得像中國了嗎?"

*"...in both Beijing and Washington, self-censorship, and biting one's tongue, is more rife than ever-- but for different reasons. In Beijing it's so you won't get arrested. In Washington it's so you won't get into a fight. In both cases, the net results are fewer people talking truth across ideological lines."

"在北京和華府,言論自我省察以及有話不敢說比過去都嚴重,只是原因不同。在北京是為了怕被逮捕。在華府是為了怕和人爭鬥。但最後結果都一樣:願意和政治看法不同的人對話的愈來愈少了。"

*“In the 466 days since he took the oath of office, President Trump has made 3,001 false or misleading claims, according to The Fact Checker’s database that analyzes, categorizes and tracks every suspect statement uttered by the president. That’s an average of nearly 6.5 claims a day.

I suspect President Xi has a far higher truth batting average in his public statements than President Trump.”

"川普上任466天以來,發表過3,001件錯話或謊言, 平均每天6.5件。"

*"I suspect President Xi has a far higher truth batting average in his public statements than President Trump."

"我懷疑習主席公開發言裡說實話的成分高於川普總統。"

*"But Trump clearly wants us to act like China: 'Don't show me your values. Show me your money and arms purchases."

●川普明顯的要美國學中國:別跟我說你的價值和信念是什麼。給我看你的錢,告訴我你要買什麼武器。

*Trump, who was surely not 100 percent joking when he said in March of President Xi: “President for life. … I think it’s great. Maybe we’ll want to give that a shot someday.”

●川普顯然不是在開玩笑,當他今年三月談到習主席時曾說: "元首終身職...我認為太好了。也許哪天我們也該試試看。"

林中斌 試摘譯 2018.5.16

The U.S. and China: More Alike Than We’d Like?

By Thomas L. Friedman Opinion Columnist May 8, 2018

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/opinion/us-china-more-alike.html

accessed May 16, 2018

Image

A billboard in Beijing noted achievements of President Xi Jinping.CreditKyodo News, via Getty Images

It is impossible to visit China these days and not compare and contrast the drama playing out in Beijing politics with the drama playing out in Washington politics. While the differences are many, I am sorry to report that some of the parallels are getting too close for comfort.

Let’s start with the fact that the anti-corruption crackdown by President Xi Jinping has created a climate of fear in China these days — whether about interacting with foreigners or saying the wrong thing or behaving too extravagantly so as to attract the state “anti-corruption” detectives.

But because “corruption” has not been clearly defined — and can be used to get rid of anyone for any reason — people don’t know where the line is, so they’re extra cautious. That’s why during a week in Beijing the most frequent expression I heard was, “Youre not quoting me on this, right?”

But if the Chinese are afraid to talk to one another, in America we’ve forgotten how to talk to one another.

In Washington these days it is not uncommon for people to be invited to a dinner or a public gathering and think to themselves: “I hope none of them will be there.” And the them people are talking about is not someone of a different faith or race — which would be awful enough — but it’s someone just from a different political party.

In other words, in both Beijing and Washington, self-censorship, and biting one’s tongue, is more rife than ever — but for different reasons. In Beijing it’s so you won’t get arrested. In Washington it’s so you won’t get into a fight. In both cases, though, the net results are fewer people talking truth across ideological lines.

At the same time, in China today, if you’re a Communist Party official or senior bureaucrat, you have to toe the ruling party’s line or you could be quickly purged or imprisoned. In America today, if you’re a Republican Party congressman or senator, you, too, have to toe the ruling party’s line or you could be quickly purged or primaried — or get a tweet in the back from the president.

But there is one difference: In China’s ruling Communist Party, it’s never safe to criticize the president. In America’s ruling Republican Party, you can criticize the president, or vote your conscience, if you’re dying, retiring or whispering.

Or, as a dying Senator John McCain observed in his new book: “This is my last term. … I’m freer than colleagues who will face the voters again. I can speak my mind without fearing the consequences much. And I can vote my conscience without worry.”

 

The Chinese government will not hesitate to put out propaganda to support the government or defend China’s interests, whether the facts are true or not. Ditto Donald Trump and his White House. Last week The Washington Post reported: “In the 466 days since he took the oath of office, President Trump has made 3,001 false or misleading claims, according to The Fact Checker’s database that analyzes, categorizes and tracks every suspect statement uttered by the president. That’s an average of nearly 6.5 claims a day.”

I suspect President Xi has a far higher truth batting average in his public statements than President Trump.

The fawning and lack of skepticism with which China Central Television covers Xi, though, is indistinguishable from the fawning and lack of skepticism by “Fox & Friends” and Sean Hannity when discussing Trump.

That probably partially explains why more and more Chinese do not think that we are as “exceptional” a nation as we think we are — and they are now ready to say so: loudly. I was struck by how many officials and experts at a Tsinghua University seminar I attended were so willing to baldly state that their top-down, one-party system of governance and state-directed capitalism was superior to our multiparty, democratic, free-market system.

And the two big pieces of evidence they always cited was that they never went through the kind of 2008 economic meltdown that we did, and their system never put up a leader as undisciplined, dishonest and unstable as Donald Trump (at least not since Mao).

On this I often pushed back on my Chinese interlocutors to be humbler and warier of what the future may hold. Their one-party, one-man decision-making system can make big decisions fast. But it can also make big wrong decisions fast. For instance, Bloomberg News reported in February: “In 2008, China’s total debt was about 141 percent of its gross domestic product. By mid-2017 that number had risen to 256 percent. Countries that take on such a large amount of debt in such a short period typically face a hard landing.”

But Xi and the Chinese Communist Party at least stimulated their economy in order to avoid a real economic crisis — for themselves and the world. Trump and his Republican Party just added $1.5 trillion to America’s debt to pay for tax cuts for businesses and individuals at a time when our economy was already on the rise. Trump did so knowing that he would be here to take credit for any boom — and be long gone when we have to do the belt-tightening necessary so that interest on the debt doesn’t devour all nondefense spending and lead to a bust.

156Comments

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One contrast, Chinese are ready to sacrifice to make China great again. Trump wants to make America great again without asking us to do anything hard — just cut taxes and regulations for rich people and corporations and keep pumping fossil fuels, and not invest in public goods like education and infrastructure, which have been the real engines of China’s resurgence.

Chinese foreign policy has always been transactional, saying to neighbors, “Give us access to your markets and we will build you infrastructure that we can both use — then we will be allies.” U.S. foreign policy, while it has always had its cynical, transactional side, particularly in the Cold War, has tended more toward, “Share our values and then we can be allies.”

But Trump clearly wants us to act more like China: “Don’t show me your values. Show me your money and your arms purchases. Don’t think of me as your ally. Think of me as your landlord. Pay for our protection and we can be friends.”

Fortunately, for now, one big difference remains: While Xi has cowed his news media, Trump, despite all his efforts to discredit our free press, has actually ended up invigorating it. Fox aside, it’s feistier than ever. And while institutions and the rule of law in China have always been a weak restraint on its leaders, institutions built over 250 years in America have continued to restrain Trump — for now.

But they will have to hold for at least another two and a half years, and that will not be easy with a president like Trump, who was surely not 100 percent joking when he said in March of President Xi: “President for life. … I think it’s great. Maybe we’ll want to give that a shot someday.”

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook and Twitter (@NYTopinion), and sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter.

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國防部前副部長多年失聰 「奇蹟」復原竟是這原因(動畫)

https://tw.appledaily.com/new/realtime/20180514/1352749/

國防部前副部長、兩岸專家林中斌是政壇耆宿,但鮮少人知,原來他左耳早在10多前已失聰,且去年10月去踏青時淋雨後,竟連右耳也聽力也大減,原本已準備戴助聽器,今年1月到亞東醫院檢查,僅抽出積水,雙耳聽力竟奇蹟復原,感嘆「聽到老婆正常講話,還覺得太大聲」,並在臉書寫下這段經歷,分享他波折的「失聰復得記」。
 
《蘋果》日前赴林中斌家,76歲的他除精神奕奕,對於《蘋果》以正常音量訪問,且兩人相距1公尺以上,他仍聽得萬分清楚,實在很難想像他在數月前幾乎全聾。
 
林中斌表示,他的左耳聽力從20多前開始退化,10多年前已失聰,這些年都靠右耳聽人講話,想不到去年10月他去宜蘭桃源谷步道,途中淋了一些雨、有點感冒,幾天後右耳聽力竟也急速衰退,嚴重影響他生活,不但聽話困難,還有主持會議、媒體受訪等活動,讓他非常頭大,一度認為是時候戴助聽器了。
 
林中斌曾赴住家附近的醫學中心給醫師檢查,但1個多月內4次就診,最後被醫師宣告「內耳神經老化、受損」,後半輩子都得戴助聽器,讓他一度確信自己聽力已一去不回。
 
今年1月時,林中斌在一名學生力勸下,前往亞東醫院給人工耳蝸中心主任陳光超看診,當時他心中已不抱任何希望,但陳聽了他的敘述後,做了一系列的檢查診斷,便說「來抽個水吧」,想不到雙耳抽出積水後,除右耳外,連10多年來幾乎全聾的左耳也能聽見聲音,讓他直呼:「實在太神奇!」
 
陳光超表示,50歲以上成人一半以上聽力會退化5成,但林中斌雙耳則是因中耳積水導致暫時性聽力喪失,原因是中耳有積水時,負責接收聲音的毛細胞「就像泡在水中」,震動會減少,耳膜、三塊聽小骨接受到的聲音訊號也大打折扣,進而影響聽力,這只要抽除積水,聽力即可回復。
 
至於他院醫師為何未確診,陳光超解釋,中耳積水通常呈現偏黃的琥珀色,但林中斌的耳內積水透明,才會多次檢查仍無法發現;感冒、中耳炎等都可能讓耳咽管阻塞,產生中耳積水,而年長者因聽力已退化,一旦中耳積水,影響聽力的情形會更嚴重,建議家中若有長輩突然聽不清,要懷疑有可能只是中耳積水,正確處理便能改善。
 
北榮耳鼻喉頭頸醫學部主任蕭安穗則提醒,中耳積水要小心也可能是鼻咽癌,因患者的腫瘤若塞住耳咽管、導致中耳積水;陳光超說,如果僅有單側中耳積水,確實最好連鼻咽部位也一併檢查。(黃仲丘/台北報導)

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林泉忠,台日關係的中國因素

自由時報2018513

王輝生,力挺安倍 台灣竟輸中國

自由時報2018513

陳君碩,防尼克森震撼重演 安倍向陸示好

旺報201687

 

2018.5.13 自由時報評論已不諱言中日關係加溫,臺日關係相反。

*自從中日關係於去年下半年開始出現明顯和緩勢頭後,(日本)這些強化與台灣政治關係的舉措就不再出現。

*...因此在東京有求於中國的氣氛下,難以期待日本會在此期間進一步提升與台灣關係。(林泉忠博士教授)

*有史以來對台灣最友善的安倍首相,...政權岌岌可危...中國頻頻向日本伸出橄欖枝...李克強於選前...適時來訪,給正身處冰雪中的安倍送上溫暖的炭火...(王輝生理事長)

*"安倍與北京改善關係是一種未雨綢繆" (2016.8.7 林中斌)

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林蒼生, “清富,順自然的企業家

聯合報 2018513

*應該把精力放在優點的延伸 ,而非缺點的糾正。

*靜靜祈禱然後思考的習慣,是很重要的日常功課。

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Robert E. Rubin , “Philosophy Pays Off” 

International New York Time May 2, 2018

*作者羅拔特.魯賓是柯林頓總統的財政部長。之前在高盛董事及副董事長。
*這是他回憶在哈佛大學最寶貴的心得:哲學。
*一共兩重點,來自一位他的教授(雖然從未正式見面)的授課,和在校園咖啡館的討論。
*柏拉圖:要證明任何念頭徹底的真實無疑是不可能的。
*魯賓演譯出的結論:重要決定都是根據可能率。比較好,比較不好等等。
*存在主義:"現在"固然重要,但在時空的整體,"此時此地"是微不足道的。
林中斌試摘譯 2018.5.12

Robert E. Rubin: Philosophy Prepared Me for a Career in Finance and Government
By Robert E. Rubin

Mr. Rubin was secretary of the Treasury from 1995 to 1999.

April 30, 2018

When I arrived at Harvard in 1956 as a freshman, I felt overwhelmed academically. Unlike many of my classmates who had gone to rigorous private schools, I graduated from a Florida public school that in those days rarely sent kids to elite colleges in the North. Even after four years of high school French, I couldn’t pass the exam to get out of the entry-level class at Harvard. In math, I was relegated to the remedial course.

The dean tried to reassure us at orientation by noting that only 2 percent of the class would fail out. I thought my classmates were lucky: I’d somehow manage to fill the quota all by myself.

My tenuous feeling about being at Harvard would never fully dissipate. But to my surprise, and that of my advisers, my grades were quite good at the end of the year. The upside of entering Harvard with less academic preparation than many of my classmates was that it forced me to rethink much of what I thought I knew.

So, too, did Raphael Demos. Professor Demos, an authority on Greek philosophy, was Harvard’s Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy and Civil Policy. But to me, when I took a class with him my sophomore year, he was a genial little man with white hair and an exceptional talent for engaging students from the lecture hall stage, using an overturned wastebasket as his lectern.

Professor Demos would use Plato and other great philosophers to demonstrate that proving any proposition to be true in the final and ultimate sense was impossible. His approach to critical thinking planted a seed in me that grew during my years at Harvard and throughout my life. The approach appealed to what was probably my natural but latent tendency toward questioning and skepticism.

I concluded that you can’t prove anything in absolute terms, from which I extrapolated that all significant decisions are about probabilities. Internalizing the core tenet of Professor Demos’s teaching — weighing risk and analyzing odds and trade-offs — was central to everything I did professionally in the decades ahead in finance and government.

At the same time that I was processing Professor Demos’s class, one of the big ideas floating around coffeehouses in Cambridge, Mass., was existential philosophy. In time, I arrived at my own interpretation of that way of thinking. To me, existentialism is an internalized sense of perspective. I came to believe that on one hand, the present matters a great deal, but on the other hand, in the totality of space and time, the here and now becomes insignificant.

I’m asked from time to time which undergraduate courses best prepared me for working at Goldman Sachs and in the government. People assume I’ll list courses in economics or finance, but I always answer that the key was Professor Demos’s philosophy course and the conversations about existentialism in coffee shops around campus. For me, embracing these two perspectives brought me a sense of calm in what were incredibly stressful situations.

There was a point in the early 1980s when the Goldman Sachs arbitrage department, which I led, lost more money in one month than it had made in almost any one year, driven by severe declines in the equity markets. Given the vicissitudes of markets, there was no way to tell whether we’d reached the nadir and recovery was around the corner — or whether we were about to go over a cliff. Despite the immense pressure, and the emotional state of the markets, I drew on an existential perspective, and my colleagues and I made careful, probabilistic decisions to adjust our portfolio, and we weathered the storm.

During my time in the Clinton White House, my colleagues and I tackled similarly complex situations. One extraordinarily complicated issue was the 1995 budget battle, which transformed into a debt-limit crisis and two government shutdowns. Compounding the severity of this policy debate for me was the experience of being personally vilified. Despite the complexity of the issues and the emotions involved, we managed to keep our balance and stand our ground. The Republican-controlled Congress eventually raised the debt limit, as we had advocated.

In both of those situations — one on Wall Street, the other in Washington — I drew from Professor Demos’s philosophy class and the existentialist lessons from the coffeehouses, which shaped my thinking on how to make decisions and helped me build a durable sense of remove and perspective.

Despite having such a profound impact on my way of thinking, I never actually met Professor Demos. I was just one of a hundred or so young faces sitting in a lecture hall, taking in his every word. If I had the chance, I would thank him for challenging me all those many years ago. He crystallized for me the power of critical thinking: asking questions, recognizing that there are no provable certainties and analyzing the probabilities. And that, coupled with my coffeehouse lessons, was the best preparation one could have — not just for a career but also for life.

Robert E. Rubin, secretary of the Treasury from 1995 to 1999, is senior counselor to Centerview Partners.

 

 

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Will China's New Trade/Debt
Diplomacy Strategy Reshape

The World?

accessed April 27, 2018

以下是《 國際經濟》雜誌今年年初邀稿下所提出之淺見。

敬請賜正。

林中斌 2018.4.27

Will China’s New Trade/Debt Diplomacy Strategy Reshape the World?

Chong-Pin Lin

Word count 492 word limit500 Due date February 16, 2018

Three factors suggest that China’s new strategy may succeed.

First, economy, rather than military might or political ideology, takes command in the 21st century. In democracies, economic performance has long swayed the voters in elections. Since the former Soviet Union, notorious for its anti-democratic governance, collapsed in 1991 due to its unsustainable economy, political leaders of all governments, democratic or otherwise, have equated the economic viability of their countries to their own political future. That explained the 2017 turn-about of British Prime Minister Theresa May from suspension to approval on the Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor project. It was heavily financed by China, which caused a political backlash May must face but eventually overcame. The same applies to Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena on the Hambandota Port project which, launched by his predecessor in cooperation with China, was first suspended in 2015 and then approved in 2017 for a 99-year lease to Beijing for $292 million due to the country’s mounting debt to China. The Port has potentials of becoming a naval base for China, which raised security concerns of India, Japan and the U.S. Given time, economic benefits offered by China to a recipient country may just overtake political and security reservations.

Second, China’s skillful blend of the hard and the soft prongs in foreign policy makes its “debt diplomacy” more effective than expected. With the “Belt Road Initiative” under the way, Beijing’s unsaid goal seems to be dominating “Eurasiafrica”— the landmass cluster of Europe, Asia and Africa -- without war. When China was poor, it was prone to warfighting. As China began to rise, it has become averse to bloody conflict. The People’s Republic fought five wars from its founding in 1949 to 1979 when Deng Xiaoping launched the modernization drive. From 1979 to 2018, China has fought no war except the 1988 clash with Vietnam over the Johnson Reef in the South China Sea.

China’s grand strategy in the new century is to deploy “extra-military” instruments -- such as economic, diplomatic, and cultural ones – on the front, with the rapidly advancing military capabilities on the back, which allows China to quietly expand its influence far and wide while encountering minimum resistance. The extra-military approach transcends ,but not excludes, the military ones. The idea is reminiscent of Teddy Roosevelt’s adage, “Hold a big stick and speak softly”.

Third, China’s internal economic obstacles are rooted in flawed policy, which in turn has stemmed from its problematic officialdom. Clean officials tended to be incompetent, while competent officials, corrupt. At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, China’s President Xi Jinping emerged the strongest leader since Mao Zedong. After five years of persistent and pervasive anti-corruption campaign, Xi has appointed clean and competent officials in key positions. The Harvard educated Liu He, touted as “the brain' behind Xi’s economic overhaul”, has disagreed with Premier Li Keqiang’s conservative approach may succeed in reining in China’s soaring debt without creating a collapse in the market.

Chong-Pin Lin is a former deputy defense minister of Taiwan and co-author of a recent book Sunlight Through the CloudsCracking the Taiwan-U.S.-China Complex in Chinese.

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