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川普可能連任

accessed January 4, 2018

川普可能連任
林中斌
名人堂稿件
日期:20180104 本文字數:1100 目標字數:1100

川普總統就任以來,爭議不斷。反對的民調去年三月中之後,超過五十趴,後接近六十趴,居高不下(RealClearPolitics民調平均值,以下同)。儘管如此,他卻可能連任。原因如下:
經濟亮麗:美國上月年終零售狂賣,破七年來紀錄。花錢者自高薪族下移至中低薪族。家庭收入兩年來持續升高,連最低廿趴收入的族群亦然(去年九月十四日國家統計局)。失業率從二年十趴持續下滑至去年十月四點一趴。至去年十一月止,消費者信心指數達十七年來最高。以上或可歸功於八年就任的歐巴馬總統。然而,有些亮點純屬川普表現。GDP成長,去年第二及第三季度,皆突破三趴,遠高於前年一點六趴。至去年十一月底,川普已增加一百七十萬工作。川普上任後,股市一年內打破歷史新高紀錄至少五十次,為廿年來首見。民主國家選舉得票主要靠經濟。川普行情看好。然而,大選還有三年,如何保證經濟不衰?
減稅達陣:去年十二月廿日,美國會兩院通過卅年來最大的稅改法案。川普前年十月對選民的許諾落實了。公司稅由卅五趴降到廿一趴。美國歷史上,每次減稅國庫歲入都增加,包括一九廿年代、甘迺迪及雷根總統時期。例如前者,減稅由七十趴到廿五趴,國家收入由廿一年至廿八年增加六十一趴。三年後大選時,美國經濟看好。
鐵票穩固: 去年一月廿日川普就任,支持度只卅九趴,打破歷任就職總統支持度最低紀錄。而他前年十一月當選時,所得全國票數少於希拉蕊三百萬。川普勝出,得利於美國「選舉人」制度。去年十二月十三日川普支持度為全年最低,也不過卅七趴,至卅一日,升至四十趴。換言之,川普基本票不多,卻穩固,現已上揚。三年後,只會多不會少。
對手乏人:美國民主黨在野一年,只會批評川普,卻無有力主張。而且,黨的政見自由貿易、健保、外交、華爾街--嚴重分裂。國會裡有希望三年後競選總統的民主黨人物,都將七十多歲。放眼望去,不見上升新星。
堵外得利:川普去年三月發佈限八伊斯蘭國人民入美的禁令,違反美國由移民建國的精神,一片譁然。因地方法院反對,禁令無法實行。但一波三折後,十二月四日最高法院通過裁決。禁令於是實施。同時,去年九月結算,美國墨西哥邊逮捕試圖非法入境的人數一年來下降廿四趴,達四十六年來最低。川普限制移民的政策大勝。執政有成,聲勢上漲。
通俄門疲:有跡象顯示,川普當選受益於俄羅斯駭客侵入希拉蕊電腦獲取不利後者資料,而為川普陣營所用。所謂「通俄門」爭議,已進入法律調查程序,可能導致彈劾總統的後果。但是,過程拖長,證據圍繞但無法套中川普。漸不耐煩的選民認為這是民主黨對川普的政治鬥爭,反而激發支持川普的情緒。

川普就任一年,彈劾可能持續下降,有利情勢持續上升。穩住權位的弱勢領袖,他不僅會完成四年任期,很可能成為兩任總統。


作者為前華府喬治大學外交學院講座教授,曾任國防部副部長,甫發表新書《撥雲見日:破解台美中三方困局》

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公視《即將到來的對華戰爭(下)

●2018年1月12日晚10-11時
公視蔡詩萍節目將播放
及與學者的討論。

 

●另位是傑出學者 林泉忠教授。東京大學博士,哈佛大學研究,沖繩大學任教10年,被中研院挖角聘回台灣。
在下部分,敬請賜教。

https://viewpoint.pts.org.tw/…/%E5%8D%B3%E5%B0%87%E5%88%B0…/

林中斌 2018.1.11

 

過去幾年,中國已成為世界第二大經濟強國,並且被美國領導階層視為「威脅」美國主宰地位的危機。中菲之間的南海主權爭議,最終成為中美關係的引爆點。核戰不是天方夜譚,而是美國國防部口中的「可能性」。而被緊緊包圍的中國,則宣布已將核武警戒層級調高的消息。

 

美國作為世界第一軍事強權,雖無帝國之名,卻有帝國之實,美國本土便有四千座基地,另有將近一千座基地遍佈各大洲,這個「島群帝國」遍布全球。目前共有約400座美軍基地將中國團團包圍,飛彈、轟炸機、戰艦與核武一應俱全。這些基地南起澳洲北境,一路在太平洋地區串連延伸至日韓等國,一直到阿富汗與印度等歐亞地區才終止。美國一位戰略專家說,這些基地形成一個「完美的鎖鏈」。

 

日本沖繩島上共有32座美軍建設,此刻他們的首要目標是中國。在韓國最南端的濟州島上,一座類美軍基地也剛竣工,此地距離上海只有四百英哩,未來將會有核子潛艇停泊此處,最新的神盾飛彈驅逐艦也會進駐。

 

然而,「完美的鎖鏈」纏縛下,卻有許多人選擇以和平的力量,抵抗這些以毀滅作為目標的軍事基地——沖繩當地居民這幾年來積極組織,以和平的方式對抗美國這個軍事巨人,他們以努力向大家證明,一般人民也有能力阻擋這種壓迫性的佔領行動,而且他們已經開始取得勝利。無獨有偶,近10年來,韓國濟州島上的抗爭與抗議,也風雨無阻地發聲,天主教的神父每天在基地大門外舉辦兩次彌撒,身後則是有全亞洲及全世界的人與他同在。這些聲音,讓廣島核爆與比基尼群島所遺留的教訓,顯得更加迫切。沖繩當地反抗行動的領袖,現年87歲的島袋女士說:「我們讓大家選擇,沉默或活下來」。

 

一百年前,帝國主義引發了第一次世界大戰;一百年後,現代世界仍以相似的邏輯在處理問題:船堅砲利、文攻武嚇,差別只是現在我們還多了核子武器。在這個毀滅性武器威力登峰造極的全球化時代,一場核子互射的意外,就可能帶來世界末日般的危機。這將是一場牽涉到所有人的戰爭,沒有人可以置身事外。

 

導演約翰・皮爾格以宏觀視角,拉出以核武危機為中心的兩個對張關係,一個是地緣政治上關於美利堅帝國與初崛起的中國間的權力遊戲;另一個對張關係,則關於我們每個人:一端是馬紹爾群島的核試爆歷史的受害者,而另一端則是沖繩、濟州島反對美國軍事基地的抵抗運動。歷史向前走,人民也可以不只是逆來順受的犧牲者,被動接受;更可以是擁有超級力量的行動者,積極改變。

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公視《即將到來的對華戰爭(上)》

201815日夜10時至11時,公視將播出由蔡詩萍主持的紀錄片
即將到來的對華戰爭(上) The Coming War on China
John Pilger / 90 / 2016

紀錄片開始前及後有蔡詩萍對在下之訪問。
敬請賜教。

林中斌 2018.1.4

另,公視也提供網路免費收看7天服務(從週六凌晨開始,因版權限制,僅限於台灣地區收看),在公視OTT影音平台,網址為https://www.ptsplus.tv/,在首頁最新上架欄位,或點選左方「紀錄片」,進入後拉到網頁最下方找到「主題之夜」。必須註冊為會員或以fb帳號登入才能觀看

 

《即將到來的對華戰爭》上集網址
http://viewpoint.pts.org.tw/…/%E5%8D%B3%E5%B0%87%E5%88%B0%…/

本片導演約翰・皮爾格(John Pilger)是一位優秀的戰地記者、作家與導演,自1962年開始從事調查報導以及紀錄片製作,迄今已有55年時間,其作品囊括各方主題,報導真相並倡導人權,經常點出主流媒體遺忘或刻意忽略的議題。本片《即將到來的對華戰爭》是他的第60部片,片中橫跨廣大地域範圍與長遠歷史縱深,重新檢討了西方主流媒體對於中美角力的觀點,呼籲各界對於核子戰爭一觸即發的警覺與審慎思考。

不過,本片故事的第一章,卻是從太平洋上,一個遙遠小島罕為人知的遭遇開始——馬紹爾群島位在美國與亞洲之間,二戰時,美國從日本手上奪走,長久以來是美國的戰略機密,是通往亞洲和中國的踏腳石。島上人民數千年來自給自足,有豐盛的漁產、麵包果與椰子,他們是航海高手,以星星導航。曾經,馬紹爾群島有著「最後的天堂」之美名。

這一切都在1946年改變了,美國占領馬紹爾群島,作為託管領地,並肩負保護當地居民健康與福祉的義務。惡夢開始,小島變成測試核武的實驗區,居民則成為實驗品。1954年,美國在比基尼環礁測試氫彈「喝采」,把整座島炸得灰飛煙滅,在浩瀚的海洋上留下一個大黑洞。比基尼島的居民從此沒有再回到島上。在那些塵封已久的舊紀錄影片中,記錄下當時經歷核彈試爆的倖存者,他們被稱為「順從的野蠻人」。其中大多數人後來都被診斷出甲狀腺癌或其他惡性腫瘤,卻幾乎沒有獲得任何賠償。

從馬紹爾群島的秘密,故事來到中國崛起,核子武器微妙牽起兩者間的關聯。馬紹爾群島只是核武試驗場,而最後經測試具有強大毀滅威力的核武成品,則得找個地方派上用場。21世紀的大國競技,是一種「永久戰爭」,美國每年挹注六千億美元的軍事開銷,對獨霸全球的美國軍工業來說,是一筆大生意。而投入數兆美元所發展的這些核武庫與太空作戰能力,必得有「用武之地」——這些錢需要一個敵人。

剛剛崛起的中國,正是完美的敵人。

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Assurex Keynote

 

I am honored to be the keynote speaker at the Assurex Asia-Pacific Regional Conference Wednesday morning at 9, Mandarin Oriental. Thanks to seasoned diplomat and art connoisseur Mr. 李文琦's recommendation.

My speech is entitled " China's Atypical Rise: Dominating East Asia without War".

Chong-Pin Lin January 12, 2018

 

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電影《最黑暗的時刻》"Darkest Hour"

極力推薦!!.在這瀰漫負能量的時節,看一場充滿正能量的電影吧!!
"Success is not final. Failure is not fatal. It's the courage to continue that counts" (Winston Churchill)
「成功不是最後的結果。失敗不是要命的結果。重要的是持續奮鬥的勇氣。」

林中斌 試譯邱吉爾名言 2018.1.8
(
請注意邱翁"頭韻"的使用:
1.final,failure,fatal. 2.courage, continue, counts)

 

Arresting and moving. What an inspirational film to watch in this age of platitude and bad faith. Gary Oldman may win more awards than the Golden Globe, even an Oscar for the best actor should not be totally surprising.

Chong-Pin Lin January 8, 2018

 

 

《最黑暗的時刻》(英語:Darkest Hour
https://zh.wikipedia.org/…/%E6%9C%80%E9%BB%91%E6%9A%97%E7%9… 
《最黑暗的時刻》(英語:Darkest Hour)是一部於2017年上映的英國戰爭電影,由喬·萊特執導,安東尼·麥卡騰編劇。主演蓋瑞·歐德曼飾演溫斯頓·邱吉爾,而其他演員還包含班·曼德森、克莉絲汀·史考特·湯瑪斯、莉莉·詹姆士、史蒂芬·迪蘭與羅蘭·匹克等人。該片主要講述英國首相溫斯頓·邱吉爾的事蹟。
該片的發展始於201525日,當時Working Title Films買下了由安東尼·麥卡騰撰寫、描寫第二次世界大戰早期的溫斯頓·邱吉爾的待售劇本《最黑暗的時刻》。主要攝影於201610月下旬開始,並於20171月殺青。
《最黑暗的時刻》於20171129日在英國發行,而美國則提早在1122日上映。此外,該片的首映禮在2017年多倫多國際影展上舉行。該片在上映後收穫普遍影評人的積極評價,主演歐德曼的演出尤其廣受讚譽,被外界認為是奧斯卡金像獎最佳男主角獎的有力競爭者。

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darkest_Hour_(film)
Darkest Hour is a 2017 British war drama film directed by Joe Wright and written by Anthony McCarten. It stars Gary Oldman as Winston Churchill, and follows his early days as Prime Minister, as Hitler closes in on Britain during World War II. The film also stars Ben Mendelsohn, Kristin Scott Thomas, Lily James, Stephen Dillane, and Ronald Pickup.
The film had its world premiere at the Telluride Film Festival on 1 September 2017,[4] and also screened at the Toronto International Film Festival.[5] It began a limited release in the United States on 22 November 2017, followed by general release on 22 December, and will be released on 12 January 2018 in the United Kingdom.[6] The film has grossed $35 million worldwide and was well-received by critics. Oldman's performance received positive reviews, with many critics noting it as one of the best of his career; he won the Golden Globe Award for Best Actor - Motion Picture Drama and was nominated for the Screen Actors Guild Award for Outstanding Performance by a Male Actor in a Leading Role for his work.[7]

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紅害不運動,續當東亞病夫

    ● 記得在華府喬治城大學教書時,很好奇: 為何功課好的學生,不分男女,運動都好,課外活動都忙?

        When I was teaching at Georgetown University, nicknamed "Harvard by the Potomac ", it intrigued me why good students were at the same time athletically and socially active. Here, statistics around the world  have indicated the Intetesting correlations.

Chong-Pin Lin January 8, 2018

林中斌 2018.1.8

 

 

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“Are We Alone in the Universe?” Winston Churchill’s Lost Extraterrestrial Essay Says No

 Brian Handwerk SMITHSONIAN.COM, FEBRUARY 16, 2017

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/winston-churchill-question-alien-life-180962198/

accessed January 8, 2018

邱吉爾即將出任首相之前,寫了一篇科學探討的文章,但死後才被發現,發表。天文學家高度肯定他嚴謹的思路。他認為有外星人。

Winston Churchill, British prime minister and one of history’s most influential statesmen, was undoubtedly a man with weighty questions on his mind. How best to save the British Empire? he must have mused. What will the postwar world look like? he surely wondered. But the legendary leader also focused his prodigious mind on less pragmatic questions. For instance: Is there life on other planets?

In fact, in 1939, Churchill penned a lengthy essay on this very topic, which was never published. Besides displaying a strong grasp of contemporary astrophysics and a scientific mind, he came to a breathtaking conclusion: We are probably not alone in the universe. The long-lost piece of Churchilliana has just floated up to the surface again, thanks to an article written by astrophysicist Mario Livio in this week’s edition of the journal Nature analyzing Churchill’s work. 

“With hundreds of thousands of nebulae, each containing thousands of millions of suns, the odds are enormous that there must be immense numbers which possess planets whose circumstances would not render life impossible,” Churchill concluded in his essay. He wrote these words on the eve of World War II—more than half a century before exoplanets were discovered.  

Until last year, Churchill’s thoughts on the problem of alien life had been all but lost to history. The reason: His 11-page typed draft was never published. Sometime in the late 1950s, Churchill revised the essay while visiting the seaside villa of publisher Emery Reves, but the text still didn’t see the light of day. It appears to have languished in the Reves house until Emery’s wife Wendy gave it to the U.S. National Churchill Museum during the 1980s.

Last year, the museum’s new director, Timothy Riley, unearthed the essay in the museum’s archives. When astrophysicist Mario Livio happened to visit the museum, Riley “thrust [the] typewritten essay” into his hands, Livio writes in Nature. Riley was eager to hear the perspective of an astrophysicist. And Livio, for his part, was floored. “Imagine my thrill that I may be the first scientist to examine this essay,” he writes in Nature.

Churchill did his homework, Livio reports. Though he probably didn’t pore over peer-reviewed scientific literature, the statesman seems to have read enough, and spoke with enough top scientists—including the physicist Frederick Lindemann, his friend and later his official scientific adviser—to have had a strong grasp of the major theories and ideas of his time. But that wasn’t what left the deepest impression on Livio.

“To me the most impressive part of the essay—other than the fact that he was interested in it at all, which is pretty remarkable—is really the way that he thinks,” Livio says. “He approached the problem just as a scientist today would. To answer his question ‘Are we alone in the universe?’ he started by defining life. Then he said, ‘OK, what does life require? What are the necessary conditions for life to exist?’”

Churchill identified liquid water, for example, as a primary requirement. While he acknowledged the possibility that forms of life could exist dependent on some other liquid, he concluded that “nothing in our present knowledge entitles us to make such an assumption.”  

“This is exactly what we still do today: Try to find life by following the water,” Livio says. “But next, Churchill asked ‘What does it take for liquid water to be there?’ And so he identified this thing that today we call the habitable zone.”

By breaking down the challenge into its component parts, Churchill ended up delving into the factors necessary to create what is now known as the “Goldilocks zone” around a star: that elusive region in which a life-sustaining planet could theoretically exist. In our own solar system, he concluded, only Mars and Venus could possibly harbor life outside of Earth. The other planets don’t have the right temperatures, Churchill noted, while the Moon and asteroids lack sufficient gravity to trap gasses and sustain atmospheres.

Turning his gaze beyond our own solar system raised even more possibilities for life, at least in Churchill’s mind. “The sun is merely one star in our galaxy, which contains several thousand millions of others,” he wrote. Planetary formation would be rather rare around those stars, he admitted, drawing on a then-popular theory of noted physicist and astronomer James Jeans. But what if that theory turned out to be incorrect? (In fact, it has now been disproven.)

“That’s what I find really fascinating,” Livio notes. “The healthy skepticism that he displayed is remarkable.”

Churchill suggested that different planetary formation theories may mean that many such planets may exist which “will be the right size to keep on their surface water and possibly an atmosphere of some sort.” Of that group, some may also be “at the proper distance from their parent sun to maintain a suitable temperature.”

The statesman even expected that some day, “possibly even in the not very distant future,” visitors might see for themselves whether there is life on the moon, or even Mars.

But what was Winston Churchill doing penning a lengthy essay on the probability of alien life in the first place? After all, it was the eve of a war that would decide the fate of the free world, and Churchill was about to become Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

Such an undertaking was actually quite typical for Churchill, notes Andrew Nahum, Keeper Emeritus at the Science Museum, London, because it reflects both his scientific curiosity and his recurring need to write for money. It was skill with the pen that often supported Churchill and his family’s lavish lifestyle (recall that he won the 1953 Nobel Prize for Literature, with a monetary award of 175,293 Swedish Kroner worth about $275,000 today).

“One recent biography is entitled No More Champagne: Churchill And His Money,” Nahum says. “That was a phrase he put into a note to his wife about austerity measures. But he didn’t know much about austerity. He liked luxury so he wrote like crazy, both books and articles that his agent circulated widely.”  

That’s not to say that Churchill was simply slinging copy about aliens for a paycheck. “He was profoundly interested in the sciences and he read very widely,” notes Nahum, who curated the 2015 Science Museum exhibition “Churchill’s Scientists.” Nahum relates the tale of how as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Churchill was once sent a book on quantum physics, and later admitted that it had occupied him for the better part of a day that should have been spent balancing the British budget.

He not only read scientific content voraciously, but wrote on the topic as well. In a 1924 issue of Nash’s Pall Mall Magazine, Churchill anticipated the power of atomic weapons. “Might not a bomb no bigger than an orange be found to possess secret power to destroy a whole block of buildings nay, to blast a township at a stroke?” he warned. In 1932, he anticipated the rise of test-tube meat in the magazine Popular Mechanics: “Fifty years hence, we shall escape the absurdity of growing a whole chicken in order to eat the breast or the wing, by growing these parts separately in a suitable medium,” he wrote.

In 1939 he authored three essays, tackling not just extraterrestrial life but the evolution of life on Earth and the popular biology of the human body. Two were published during 1942 by the Sunday Dispatch, Nahum discovered when reading Churchill’s papers at the University of Cambridge. It remains a mystery why his thoughts on alien life went unpublished.

In the rediscovered essay, Churchill admits that, because of the great distances between us and other planet-harboring stars, we may never know if his hunch that life is scattered among the vastness of the cosmos is correct. Yet even without proof, Churchill seems to have convinced himself that such a possibility was likely—perhaps by swapping his scientific mind for one more finely attuned to the human condition during the troubled 20th century.

“I, for one, am not so immensely impressed by the success we are making of our civilization here that I am prepared to think we are the only spot in this immense universe which contains living, thinking creatures,” he wrote, “or that we are the highest type of mental and physical development which has ever appeared in the vast compass of space and time.”

Seventy-five years after Churchill’s bold speculations, there’s still no proof that life exists on other worlds. But, as was often the case, his analysis of our own still seems prescient.

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川普改變了美國70年來的全球政策

TRUMP, THE INSURGENT,BREAKS WITH 70 YEARS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

 MARK LANDLER New York Times, DEC. 28, 2017

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-world-diplomacy.html

accessed January 5, 2018

"Trump ...attacks allies the U.S. has nurtured since WWII... ''
川普批罵美國自二次大戰以來培養的盟友

"He has assiduously cultivated President Xi Jinping of China and avoided criticizing President Vladimir Putin of Russia -- leaders of the two countries that his own national security strategy calls the greatest geopolitical threats to America.''
川普努力培養他和中國國家主席習近平的友誼,也儘量避免批評俄羅斯總統普丁。而這兩國正是他自己國安報告裡所說的美國面臨最大哼的地緣政治威脅。

"..another hallmark of Mr. Trump's foreign policy: how much it is driven by domestic politics."
另一個川普外交政策特色是內政決定外交。

"...his bark is worse than his bite ..." 
歐洲評論家認為川普的特點是叫狗不咬。

林中斌試摘譯 2018.1.5

WASHINGTON — President Trump was already revved up when he emerged from his limousine to visit NATO’s new headquarters in Brussels last May. He had just met France’s recently elected president, Emmanuel Macron, whom he greeted with a white-knuckle handshake and a complaint that Europeans do not pay their fair share of the alliance’s costs.

On the long walk through the NATO building’s cathedral-like atrium, the president’s anger grew. He looked at the polished floors and shimmering glass walls with a property developer’s eye. (“It’s all glass,” he said later. “One bomb could take it out.”) By the time he reached an outdoor plaza where he was to speak to the other NATO leaders, Mr. Trump was fuming, according to two aides who were with him that day.

He was there to dedicate the building, but instead he took a shot at it.

“I never asked once what the new NATO headquarters cost,” Mr. Trump told the leaders, his voice thick with sarcasm. “I refuse to do that. But it is beautiful.” His visceral reaction to the $1.2 billion building, more than anything else, colored his first encounter with the alliance, aides said.

Nearly a year into his presidency, Mr. Trump remains an erratic, idiosyncratic leader on the global stage, an insurgent who attacks allies the United States has nurtured since World War II and who can seem more at home with America’s adversaries. His Twitter posts, delivered without warning or consultation, often make a mockery of his administration’s policies and subvert the messages his emissaries are trying to deliver abroad.

Mr. Trump has pulled out of trade and climate change agreements and denounced the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. He has broken with decades of American policy in the Middle East by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. And he has taunted Kim Jong-un of North Korea as “short and fat,” fanning fears of war on the peninsula.

He has assiduously cultivated President Xi Jinping of China and avoided criticizing President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia — leaders of the two countries that his own national security strategy calls the greatest geopolitical threats to America.

Above all, Mr. Trump has transformed the world’s view of the United States from a reliable anchor of the liberal, rules-based international order into something more inward-looking and unpredictable. That is a seminal change from the role the country has played for 70 years, under presidents from both parties, and it has lasting implications for how other countries chart their futures.

Mr. Trump’s unorthodox approach “has moved a lot of us out of our comfort zone, me included,” the national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, said in an interview. A three-star Army general who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and wrote a well-regarded book about the White House’s strategic failure in Vietnam, General McMaster defined Trump foreign policy as “pragmatic realism” rather than isolationism.

“The consensus view has been that engagement overseas is an unmitigated good, regardless of the circumstances,” General McMaster said. “But there are problems that are maybe both intractable and of marginal interest to the American people, that do not justify investments of blood and treasure.”

Mr. Trump’s advisers argue that he has blown the cobwebs off decades of foreign policy doctrine and, as he approaches his first anniversary, that he has learned the realities of the world in which the United States must operate.

They point to gains in the Middle East, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is transforming Saudi Arabia; in Asia, where China is doing more to pressure a nuclear-armed North Korea; and even in Europe, where Mr. Trump’s criticism has prodded NATO members to ante up more for their defense.

The president takes credit for eradicating the caliphate built by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, though he mainly accelerated a battle plan developed by President Barack Obama. His aides say he has reversed Mr. Obama’s passive approach to Iran, in part by disavowing the nuclear deal.

While Mr. Trump has held more than 130 meetings and phone calls with foreign leaders since taking office, he has left the rest of the world still puzzling over how to handle an American president unlike any other. Foreign leaders have tested a variety of techniques to deal with him, from shameless pandering to keeping a studied distance.

“Most foreign leaders are still trying to get a handle on him,” said Richard N. Haass, a top State Department official in the George W. Bush administration who is now the president of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Everywhere I go, I’m still getting asked, ‘Help us understand this president, help us navigate this situation.’

“We’re beginning to see countries take matters into their own hands. They’re hedging against America’s unreliability.”

Difficulties With Merkel

Few countries have struggled more to adapt to Mr. Trump than Germany, and few leaders seem less personally in sync with him than its leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel, the physicist turned politician. After she won a fourth term, their relationship took on weighty symbolism: the great disrupter versus the last defender of the liberal world order.

In one of their first phone calls, the chancellor explained to the president why Ukraine was a vital part of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Mr. Trump, officials recalled, had little idea of Ukraine’s importance, its history of being bullied by Russia or what the United States and its allies had done to try to push back Mr. Putin.

German officials were alarmed by Mr. Trump’s lack of knowledge, but they got even more rattled when White House aides called to complain afterward that Ms. Merkel had been condescending toward the new president. The Germans were determined not to repeat that diplomatic gaffe when Ms. Merkel met Mr. Trump at the White House in March.

At first, things again went badly. Mr. Trump did not shake Ms. Merkel’s hand in the Oval Office, despite the requests of the assembled photographers. (The president said he did not hear them.)

Later, he told Ms. Merkel that he wanted to negotiate a new bilateral trade agreement with Germany. The problem with this idea was that Germany, as a member of the European Union, could not negotiate its own agreement with the United States.

Rather than exposing Mr. Trump’s ignorance, Ms. Merkel said the United States could, of course, negotiate a bilateral agreement, but that it would have to be with Germany and the other 27 members of the union because Brussels conducted such negotiations on behalf of its members.

“So it could be bilateral?” Mr. Trump asked Ms. Merkel, according to several people in the room. The chancellor nodded.

“That’s great,” Mr. Trump replied before turning to his commerce secretary, Wilbur Ross, and telling him, “Wilbur, we’ll negotiate a bilateral trade deal with Europe.”

Afterward, German officials expressed relief among themselves that Ms. Merkel had managed to get through the exchange without embarrassing the president or appearing to lecture him. Some White House officials, however, said they found the episode humiliating.

For Ms. Merkel and many other Germans, something elemental has changed across the Atlantic. “We Europeans must really take our destiny into our own hands,” she said in May. “The times in which we can fully count on others — they are somewhat over.”

Concerns on Statecraft

Mr. Trump gets along better with Mr. Macron, a 40-year-old former investment banker and fellow political insurgent who ran for the French presidency as the anti-Trump. Despite disagreeing with him on trade, immigration and climate change, Mr. Macron figured out early how to appeal to the president: He invited him to a military parade.

But Mr. Macron has discovered that being buddies with Mr. Trump can also be complicated. During the Bastille Day visit, officials recalled, Mr. Trump told Mr. Macron he was rethinking his decision to pull out of the Paris climate accord.

That prompted French diplomats to make a flurry of excited calls to the White House for clarification the following week, only to find out that American policy had not changed. White House officials say that Mr. Trump was merely reiterating that the United States would be open to rejoining the pact on more advantageous terms.

But the exchange captures Mr. Trump’s lack of nuance or detail, which leaves him open to being misunderstood in complex international talks.

There have been fewer misunderstandings with autocrats. Mr. Xi of China and King Salman of Saudi Arabia both won over Mr. Trump by giving him a lavish welcome when he visited. The Saudi monarch projected his image on the side of a hotel; Mr. Xi reopened a long-dormant theater inside the Forbidden City to present Mr. Trump and his wife, Melania, an evening of Chinese opera.

“Did you see the show?” Mr. Trump asked reporters on Air Force One after he left Beijing in November. “They say in the history of people coming to China, there’s been nothing like that. And I believe it.”

Later, chatting with his aides, Mr. Trump continued to marvel at the respect Mr. Xi had shown him. It was a show of respect for the American people, not just for the president, one adviser replied gently.

Then, of course, there is the strange case of Mr. Putin. The president spoke of his warm telephone calls with the Russian president, even as he introduced a national security strategy that acknowledged Russia’s efforts to weaken democracies by meddling in their elections.

Mr. Trump has had a bumpier time with friends. He told off Prime Minister Theresa May on Twitter, after she objected to his exploitation of anti-Muslim propaganda from a far-right group in Britain.

“Statecraft has been singularly absent from the treatment of some of his allies, particularly the U.K.,” said Peter Westmacott, a former British ambassador to the United States.

Mr. Trump’s feuds with Ms. May and other British officials have left him in a strange position: feted in Beijing and Riyadh but barely welcome in London, which Mr. Trump is expected to visit early next year, despite warnings that he will face angry protesters.

Aides to Mr. Trump argue that his outreach to autocrats has been vindicated. When Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited the White House in March, the president lavished attention on him. Since then, they say, Saudi Arabia has reopened cinemas and allowed women to drive.

But critics say Mr. Trump gives more than he gets. By backing the 32-year-old crown prince so wholeheartedly, the president cemented his status as heir to the House of Saud. The crown prince has since jailed his rivals as Saudi Arabia pursued a deadly intervention in Yemen’s civil war.

Mr. Trump granted an enormous concession to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he announced this month that the United States would formally recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. But he did not ask anything of Mr. Netanyahu in return.

That showed another hallmark of Mr. Trump’s foreign policy: how much it is driven by domestic politics. In this case, he was fulfilling a campaign promise to move the American Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. While evangelicals and some hard-line, pro-Israel American Jews exulted, the Palestinians seethed — leaving Mr. Trump’s dreams of brokering a peace accord between them and the Israelis in tatters.

With China, Mr. Trump’s cultivation of Mr. Xi probably persuaded him to put more economic pressure on its neighbor North Korea over its provocative behavior. But even the president has acknowledged, as recently as Thursday, that it is not enough. And in return for Mr. Xi’s efforts, Mr. Trump has largely shelved his trade agenda vis-à-vis Beijing.

“It was a big mistake to draw that linkage,” said Robert B. Zoellick, who served as United States trade representative under Mr. Bush. “The Chinese are playing him, and it’s not just the Chinese. The world sees his narcissism and strokes his ego, diverting him from applying disciplined pressure.”

Mr. Trump’s protectionist instincts could prove the most damaging in the long term, Mr. Zoellick said. Trade, unlike security, springs from deeply rooted convictions. Mr. Trump believes that multilateral accords — like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which he pulled out in his first week in office — are stacked against America.

“He views trade as zero-sum, win-lose,” Mr. Zoellick said.

Globalist vs. Nationalist

For some of Mr. Trump’s advisers, the key to understanding his statecraft is not how he deals with Mr. Xi or Ms. Merkel, but the ideological contest over America’s role that plays out daily between the West Wing and agencies like the State Department and the Pentagon.

“There’s a chasm that can’t be bridged between the globalists and the nationalists,” said Stephen K. Bannon, the president’s former chief strategist and the leader of the nationalist wing, who has kept Mr. Trump’s ear since leaving the White House last summer.

On the globalist side of the debate stand General McMaster; Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis; Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson; and Mr. Trump’s chief economic adviser, Gary D. Cohn. On the nationalist side, in addition to Mr. Bannon, stand Stephen Miller, the president’s top domestic adviser, and Robert Lighthizer, the chief trade negotiator. On many days, the nationalist group includes the commander in chief himself.

The globalists have curbed some of Mr. Trump’s most radical impulses. He has yet to rip up the Iran nuclear deal, though he has refused to recertify it. He has reaffirmed the United States’ support for NATO, despite his objections about those members he believes are freeloading. And he has ordered thousands of additional American troops into Afghanistan, even after promising during the campaign to stay away from nation-building.

This has prompted a few Europeans to hope that “his bark is worse than his bite,” in the words of Mr. Westmacott.

Mr. Trump acknowledges that being in office has changed him. “My original instinct was to pull out,” he said of Afghanistan, “and, historically, I like following my instincts. But all my life I’ve heard that decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office.”

Yet some things have not changed. Mr. Trump’s advisers have utterly failed to curb his Twitter posts, for example. Some gamely suggest that they create diplomatic openings. Others say they roll with the punches when he labels Mr. Kim of North Korea “Little Rocket Man.” For Mr. Tillerson, however, the tweets have severely tarnished his credibility in foreign capitals.

“All of them know they still can’t control the thunderbolt from on high,” said John D. Negroponte, who served as the director of national intelligence for Mr. Bush.

The tweets highlight that Mr. Trump still holds a radically different view of the United States’ role in the world than most of his predecessors. His advisers point to a revealing meeting at the Pentagon on July 20, when Mr. Mattis, Mr. Tillerson and Mr. Cohn walked the president through the country’s trade and security obligations around the world.

The group convened in the secure conference room of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a storied inner sanctum known as the tank. Mr. Mattis led off the session by declaring that “the greatest thing the ‘greatest generation’ left us was the rules-based postwar international order,” according to a person who was in the room.

After listening for about 50 minutes, this person said, Mr. Trump had heard enough. He began peppering Mr. Mattis and Mr. Tillerson with questions about who pays for NATO and the terms of the free trade agreements with South Korea and other countries.

The postwar international order, the president of the United States declared, is “not working at all.”

 

 

 

 

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What Japan can teach us about the future of nationalism

Robert Hellyer and David Leheny, Jan 3, 2018

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/01/03/what-japan-can-teach-us-about-the-future-of-the-nationalism/?sw_bypass=true&utm_term=.5d77f56571b1

accessed January 4, 2018

今年是明治維新150週年。但是如何紀念,如何說明要紀念,日本人拿不定主意。
●這篇由兩位歷史教授所寫的回顧,冷靜的剖析主流說法下的另類史實。非常推薦。

林中斌 2018.1.4

 

On Jan. 3, 1868, a cadre of samurai staged a coup at the Imperial Palace in Kyoto, setting Japan on a course to become Asia’s first nation-state. Japanese are not widely commemorating the event today, even though the coup, which began the dramatic transformation of the Meiji Restoration, should rank in global history alongside Bastille Day or July Fourth as a point of national origin.

Stopping to consider this anniversary’s uncelebrated relevance highlights not only the remarkable course of national creation in Japan but also, more importantly, the tenacity of the modernizing nation-state, and its accompanying zealous commitments to sovereignty, as a global political form that continues to influence geopolitics today.

The samurai who staged the coup that day toppled the nearly three-century-old Tokugawa regime. Their alliance of feudal domains from western Japan then went on to defeat an ill-organized resistance in a brief civil war. Upon their victory, they led a new government with the young Emperor Meiji at its head.

Initially, this government formed around a ruling oligarchy that “restored” the emperor’s political role, ultimately signaling a desire to govern by reviving imperial political structures employed in an ideal, ancient past.

But they soon changed course, sensing the need for even bolder change, given the rising tide of European imperialism that many feared might make Japan a European colony. A group of leaders embarked on a nearly two-year diplomatic mission to Europe and the United States to learn firsthand about the ascendant West. Seeing the industrial and military power contained in the modern nation-state, they returned keen to implement that model at home.

With breathtaking speed, the oligarchs initiated reforms that dismantled the politically diffuse feudal state in which samurai lords ruled over semi-independent domains and pledged personal loyalty to the Tokugawa shogun. Drawing inspiration from Western political structures, the leaders eliminated the domains, reorganizing Japan into regional administrative units headed by governors appointed by the new central government. They also eliminated the samurai class, who had served as the administrators of the domain governments, and instead developed an extensive central bureaucracy that acted in the name of Meiji, whose portrait was placed in schools.

 

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自由時報登載中國進步新聞

 

自由時報2017.12.29台灣獨家登載此項中國進步的新聞。同時,那一國際版面涵蓋台灣各報中最多的國際新聞內容。

林中斌 2018.1.3

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兩岸破冰的往例

accessed November 22, 2017

 

兩岸破冰的往例
林中斌
名人堂稿件
日期:20171118 本文字數:1100 目標字數:1100

「九二…歷史事實」。

中共十九大習近平政治報告選擇了這六字與去年五二○蔡英文總統就職演說重疊,似乎為兩岸「開展對話」撬開一縫空隙。然而習提「共識」,蔡提「諒解」。大多認為阻礙「蔡習會」的文字鴻溝不可跨越。難道「共識」與「諒解」的差異如此深廣嗎?歷史或可點亮目前困境下的昏暗。

一九九五年六月九日,我李前總統登輝赴美母校康乃爾講演,提「中華民國」十七次。北京認為我方搞「兩個中國」,極度不滿。

九五年六月十六日,北京海協會來函我方海基會中止兩岸協商及全面兩岸政府互動。我方持續呼籲恢復對話,超過兩年半,無效。北京堅持我方必須正式公開承認「一個中國」。

九八年二月廿日,當時行政院蕭萬長院長在立法院第三屆第五會期施政報告中說:「只要有助於海峽兩岸和平發展以及國家民主統一的議題,均可以一步步提出來展開溝通和對話…」

他並沒有提到「一個中國」。但四天後,似乎迫不及待,北京海協會來函我方海基會,文情並茂:同意兩岸恢復政治談判,兩會恢復交流,歡迎我方代表海基會董事長辜振甫「來訪」。兩岸超過兩年半冰封的僵局溶解了。九八年十月,辜先生赴上海與對口海協會董事長汪道涵共續九三年四月新加坡首度見面之前緣。

九八年二月廿日,我方並未如北京堅持的擁抱「一個中國」,而北京同意兩岸中止僵局。原因為何?對今日兩岸僵局的意涵為何?

 

●江澤民固權:九四年九月,中共第十四屆三中全會。鄧小平決定趁在世時讓江澤民成為實質第三代領導人,以避免毛澤東至死才放手引發的政權動盪。九五年,江權威備受內部黨軍挑戰。九五年一月,江大膽丟出「江八點」,對兩岸有所憧憬,引發內部異議。九七年二月,鄧小平過世。十月,中共十五大,江澤民權威上升,風光訪美,已非吳下阿蒙。

●北京新考量:九七年十一月台灣縣市長選舉,民進黨大勝。綠色人口首度超過全國總人口的七十趴。北京內部認為兩年多來杯葛兩岸互動使台灣人民與「祖國」漸行漸遠,不利「統一大業」。此兩岸冷凍政策應予調整。

●台北持重謹慎:九五/九六年兩岸飛彈危機之後,台北的大陸政策穩重。九六年二月新任命的陸委會主委張京育富國際視野力主「趨吉避凶」,持續呼籲兩岸恢復協商。台北政府對改善兩岸關係,上下口徑一致。

●華府穿梭:九八年一月,美前國防部長裴利率團赴北京見江澤民,關心兩岸何時復談。江說: 「去問汪道涵。」裴利一行南赴杭州見汪。汪說:「願復談。」裴利率團來台北見有關官員及總統,傳遞對岸願復談之訊息。這鋪陳了二月廿日蕭院長發言及廿四日海協會回應的有利背景。

 

以上往例對破解今日兩岸僵局的意涵有四:
●文字非障礙,雙方意願是關鍵。

●北京領導固權,有助開啟兩岸新局。

●台北政府兩岸立場,謹慎一致,亦然。

●有效高層管道實屬必要。

作者為前華府喬治大學外交學院講座教授,曾任國防部副部長,甫發表新書《撥雲見日:破解台美中三方困局》

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十九大後北京對台新作為

accessed December 8, 2017

12月7日下午5點有媒體電話訪問我有關今日共軍軍機接近我防空識別區並嗆我戰機飛行員之事。
以下是在下所說:

1.19大之後,北京對台軟硬兩手持續并進。
2.軟硬兩手的方式種類各自都增加。
3.軟手特色是"操之在他"。硬手特色是"可否認性"。
4.軟的新方案包括
- 2020前福建省將招募2,000台灣教授/教員。
- 國際上陸商企業機會將與台商共享。
- 台灣首次赴陸旅客每人將得3,000人民幣資助。
5. 硬的包括
- 軍機繞台的新路線、參與戰機數字、繞台運 作新行為如語言。
- 邦交國的新狀況,如帛流、梵蒂岡、多明尼加?、海地?。
北京不會承認對台施壓之意圖。軍機繞台可說是例行演習不針對任何一方。外交運作可說是他方要求。但對台灣人民心理 壓力之效果是真實的。
6. 這些軟硬作為之目的何在? 北京不會說。看來是逐漸轉變台灣多數的民意。
7. 其意涵是: 習近平認為對台北政府施壓或施惠效果有限。這是總結江澤民、胡錦濤多年對台政策成效的評估。因此,或許更有效的是直接對台灣人民的軟硬兩手的作為,希望由轉變台灣多數民意,影響台北政府。最近台灣本土媒體之微妙向現實主義的調整或許讓北京覺得其新對台做為值得持續施行。
8. 習近平其他對台的作為是間接的:轉變東亞原親美各國微調傾向北京,以及與美合作超過矛盾,限制華府挺台之程度。

以上淺見,敬請賜教。
林中斌 2017.12.7 (2017.12.8增修)

 

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本土言論新趨勢

accessed November 23, 2017

2017.11.22《自由時報》重要的第二版(A2)社論,出現以往沒有的言論:
●對本土執政的困境不掩飾
●對台灣一向自傲的民主自由不樂觀
●對台灣人認同衰退的民調不否認
這社論延續過去數周《自由時報》言論及報導的新趨勢。

以下為社論中的文句:
●「民主老大哥卻對專制老大哥推崇備至,連外孫女也成為討好天朝的表演者。」
●「過去西方國家所主導,講的是民主自由人權;如今中國經濟崛起,主題變成市場與工廠。」
●「本國的民主自由人權,無助於企業對外開拓」
●「當台灣人民以融入普世價值為榮之際,先進國家卻已琵琶別抱中國的市場與工廠,連台灣的商界也有人宣稱民主不能當飯吃。」
●「所謂的窮台政策不可忽視;而本土政權執政,台灣人認同反顯衰退,赴中就業則成統戰重點。歷史走到這一步,嚴厲考驗似乎才要開始」
敬請卓參。

 

 

《自由時報社論》世界最大的民主國家?
2017-11-22 06:00下載2017.11.23
http://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/1153891 

中共機關報「求是」稱:「中國才是世界最大的民主國家」。這樣的一個命題,很多人聽起來都覺得非常刺耳。不過,此話在中國被堂堂皇皇講出來,也不能簡簡單單地當笑話看,相反地,大家不妨透過此一現象深入解讀,到底世界範圍內的民主發生了什麼變化,以至於一個建國以來便打壓民主不遺餘力的政權,竟然在此時此刻出現「中國才是世界最大的民主國家」的「中國強話語」?


首先,此一「中國強話語」出現在川普訪中之後。習近平在紫禁城待客,至少表面上是賓主盡歡,川普甚至還讚美東道主是個「令人尊敬且強而有力的人民代表」。事實上,這位東道主才折磨死一位諾貝爾和平獎得主,而且對民運、維權毫不手軟,甚乃對周邊國家不斷秀肌肉。儘管如此,民主老大哥卻對專制老大哥推崇備至,連外孫女也成為討好天朝的表演者。國際體制,過去西方國家所主導,講的是民主自由人權;如今中國經濟崛起,主題變成市場與工廠。西方的民主國家,面對東方的開發獨裁國家,已少有領導人願意為抽象的普世價值,犧牲本國的具體經濟利益。於是,中國有市場與工廠,西方國家的領導人也就紛紛從政治人轉型成生意人了。政治人加上生意人的複合角色,川普與習近平的交往模式開創了東西國家的互動新模式,豈偶然哉?


事實上,這位東道主(習近平)才折磨死一位諾貝爾和平獎得主(劉曉波),而且對民運、維權毫不手軟,甚乃對周邊國家不斷秀肌肉。(美聯社)


問題的濫觴,其實不在川普,也不在現任的西方領導人,而是全球化的跨世紀轉變。鄧小平啟動的經濟改革,恰好銜接西方國家的全球化浪潮,原本西方對中國的盤算放在,打開竹幕的市場與工廠,進而促使和平演變,最後以資本主義的勝利作為劇終,一如蘇東波共產政權垮台。但這樣的盤算,很快就證明是西方的誤判。一九八九,天安門屠殺,西方對中國的經濟制裁,在爾虞我詐之下其實是光說不練。蘇東波,西方國家看到勝利的捷報;然而,當時中國的「有識之士」便決定不能步其後塵。這批人主要是當年的太子黨,也就是中共革命元老的政軍經二代。而習近平,正好是這樣的政軍經二代,豈偶然哉?


全球化行進至今,已出現不以設計者的意志為轉移的景觀,那就是,跨國企業變成沒有邊界的國家,他們可以跟民主的、專制的、野蠻的政府密切合作,獲得最大的商業擴張,從而回過頭來影響本國的政策。於是,本國的民主自由人權,無助於企業對外開拓,他們卻有辦法阻止本國政府干涉他國政治迫害。以故,新興國家的經濟無法拉動民主,例如中國經濟快速崛起,民主自由人權卻進入史無前例的黑暗期。北京,成為做生意的空間,而不是談普世價值的場域。習近平,所到之處不會受到干涉內政的尷尬,反而處處受到經貿與商業合作的探尋。市場、工廠、特許,取代了民主、自由、人權。這就是「中國強話語」的背景,不是嗎?


不論好惡,這是一個新的世界變局。半個世紀以來,台灣在西方國家的普世價值要求下,逐步走向今天的民主自由人權國度。令人遺憾的是,當台灣人民以融入普世價值為榮之際,先進國家卻已琵琶別抱中國的市場與工廠,連台灣的商界也有人宣稱民主不能當飯吃。也許,這是西方金融資本主義的自我反噬,經濟與金融危機層出不窮,貪婪資本主義搞得勞民傷財,從而賦予中國這種極大規模的開發獨裁新的價值。「中國才是世界最大的民主國家」,Money talks


而這,為台灣帶來了新挑戰。台灣要維護主權獨立現狀,要維護民主自由人權,要經濟成長與國際經貿,全球化也不可完全沒有中國這塊拼圖,這些內涵互相衝突的價值與行動,造成了近年來台灣的民主躁動,離中國太近也不安,離中國太遠也不利。在這樣的情況下,台灣的民主會產生什麼實踐動態?台灣對外簽署貿易協定,頻遭中國從中作梗,自由市場原則走樣,所謂的窮台政策不可忽視;而本土政權執政,台灣人認同反顯衰退,赴中就業則成統戰重點。歷史走到這一步,嚴厲考驗似乎才要開始;時代正在考驗台灣的執政者,台灣的執政者能創造新的時代嗎?

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學習曲線正加速發展

accessed November 20, 2017

-- 急獨緩獨一年來少了7%。這是2017.11.20 聯合報發表的最新民調。

-- 這是"藍色偏見"嗎?若注意到蔡總統9/24正視中國崛起的發言,和自由時報最近出現前所未見的社論、報導、和言論,恐怕很難如此判定。

--自從9/24蔡總統公開以民進黨領袖身份呼籲正視"中國的崛起", 台灣人民對去年520後我政府兩岸政策的走向連續表達之前未見的看法。

-- 自由時報 已有三篇令人耳目一新的社論、報導、及評論。 (更冷血現實的看兩岸實力的對比、看兩岸國際力量的對比、有勇氣表達台獨無望論)

-- 這就是趨勢發展的"潛流" 和"轉棙點"。

林中斌 2017.11.20

 

 

 

 

 

 

●2017.9.24蔡總統:
「中國的崛起,是現在全世界所有國家,都必須謹慎面對的趨勢,情緒式的仇恨,或者一味地討好,都無法誠實正視中國的崛起和發展。」

●2017.10.28社論 自由時報A2:
「台灣的頭家也要自問:堅持台灣主權獨立國家,遭到中國以蠻力無情欺壓,而導致國家尊嚴受挫、國計民生連帶受損,大家願意概括承受那些窮台力道嗎?」

●2017.11.5鍾麗華/台北報導,自由時報 A2:
「政府高層透露...雖說現在多明尼加是穩住了,但也是暫時的,'老實說,如果對方出重手,我們根本沒辦法。」

●2017.11.5 李中志/美國伊利諾州立大學教授、北美台灣人教授協會會長,自由時報 A14:
「民調也顯示,純粹的台灣人認同自二○一四達到高點以來,三年之間已掉了四%,而雙重認同則增加了四%,這不是警訊嗎?
我們也許能看到加泰隆尼亞獨立運動的無奈,但我們沒有看到自己,我們自認聰明高喊兩地不同,恐怕只是自我安慰。...如果漸漸地多數台灣人希望成為中國的自治區,那麼也只能這樣了。」

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跨越時空的巧合與喜悅

https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2017-12-06/106065

accessed December 5, 2017

● 廿八年前,我在美國智庫"美國企業研究院"任專任學者也在母校喬治城大學教書時,專書China's Nuclear Weaons Strategy 於1988年出版,紐約時報也登載我的評論 "China's Wild Nuclear Card"。"國家利益"雜誌邀稿,登載於1989年春季刊:Chong-Pin Lin,“From Panda to Dragon: China’s Nuclear Strategy,” National Interest 15 (Spring 1989), pp.49-57.

● 今天黃引珊的專文為"國家利益"雜誌轉載。非常欣慰喜悅。

林中斌 2017.12.5

 

 

致命弱點!陸若攻台海底電纜 恐擾亂國際金融市場

新頭殼newtalk | 中央社 台北市報導
發布 2017.12.06 | 00:38

美國「國家利益」雜誌刊文指出,海底電纜是台灣致命弱點,若遭中國大陸攻擊,將擾亂國際商業和金融市場,對日本、新加坡、印尼和澳洲造成嚴重經濟影響。

前國防部副部長林中斌特別助理黃引珊在「國家利益」(The National Interest)撰文表示,雖然海底電纜是支撐今日全球數據和語音通訊最關鍵的基礎設施,它們也出奇地脆弱。她指出,若台灣海峽發生衝突,海底電纜將成為中國主要攻擊目標,切斷電纜將癱瘓台灣的國際通訊,且損害範圍將不僅限於台灣。在台灣與亞太國家間,至少有10條國際海底電纜。攻擊台灣的電纜將擾亂國際商業和金融市場,對日本、新加坡、印尼和澳洲等區域國家造成嚴重經濟影響。

長期以來,中國的電纜策略對美國、台灣和亞太地區具有嚴肅的安全含意。中國正在建設的「海底長城」包括許多海底感測器,連接光纜到位於上海的中央處理與監控設施,將構成中國在南海海底觀測系統無可取代的一部分,可削弱美國在南海的海底軍事優勢。

2016年9月以來,中國電信集團以4G光纖電纜站,取代位於南沙群島永暑礁、渚碧礁和美濟礁的衛星站。光纖電纜傳輸速度遠較衛星系統快速及穩定。這項建設在海牙仲裁法庭一致做出,對中國在南海領土聲索不利的判決僅2個月後展開。這些光纖電纜站大幅強化中國對南海管轄和控制能力。

文章指出,美國和亞太盟邦應監控電纜線路安全,運用自動辨識系統精準定位損壞位置,也應建立多邊合作機制,以避免電纜維修延誤。這些努力某種程度上,將反擊中國正默默發展、可破壞這個地區的能力,也能避免台灣成為亞太海底電纜網絡最脆弱的一處。

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China’s cable strategy: exploring global undersea dominance

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-cable-strategy-exploring-global-undersea-dominance/

accessed December 4, 2017

This may be the only publication so far that observes a hitherto largely ignored but potentially important topic on East Asian security.
這是目前就我所知唯一的討論解放軍海底光纖戰略對東亞安全影響的專文。內容紮實,引人深省。

林中斌 2017.12.4

I am honored by my association with the author Eli Huang, and believe that more shall be so in the future.

Chong-Pin Lin December 4, 2017

China’s cable strategy: exploring global undersea dominance

4 Dec 2017|Eli Huang

Since September 2016, China Telecom has replaced satellite stations on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands with 4G fibre-optic cable stations. Fibre-optic cables are much faster and much more stable than satellite systems. Installation began just two months after an arbitral tribunal in the Hague unanimously found against Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. The stations significantly strengthen China’s command and control capabilities in the South China Sea. Over the longer term, China’s cable strategy holds serious security implications for the US, Taiwan and the Asia–Pacific community.

Undersea fibre-optic cable is the backbone of data transmission and intercontinental communications. A cable can transmit the equivalent of the entire printed collection of the Library of Congress in about 20 seconds. In 2014, roughly 98% of emails, telephone calls and internet traffic travelled through underwater cables.

The Chinese military, along with the Ministry of Information Industry, has concentrated on developing its submarine cable technology since the 1990s. In 2002, the PLA used a self-developed undersea cable-laying system for the first time. It deployed its first optical cable-laying ship in 2015. And last year, the PLA Naval University of Engineering, Hengton Optic-Electric, Zhongtian Technology Submarine Cables and Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications co-established the Joint Lab of Underwater Optical Networks, a science and engineering research facility.

Although undersea cables are the most critical infrastructure supporting today’s global data and voice communications, they’re surprisingly vulnerable. In general, cables have only a thin rubber sheath. Shipping and fishing activities are the most common sources of damage. China has taken steps to protect its submarine cables and conducts regular patrols. It has also imposed special submarine cable protection measures during major international events, such as the Expo Shanghai in 2010 and the Belt and Road Summit in May 2017, to prevent propaganda channels, live streams and international calls from being disrupted.

China’s cable industry has rapidly transformed itself. It used to rely heavily on imports, but today it competes strongly in international markets. In 2011, for example, Huawei Marine Networks constructed a 1,200 kilometre ultralong non-repeater cable system that connects five islands of Indonesia’s eastern archipelago. Between 2012 and 2015, Chinese companies’ market share of global cable projects was only 7%; that figure is projected to increase to 20% by 2019. Chinese companies currently lag behind only France’s Alcatel-Lucent and Switzerland’s TE Connectivity in the sector.

China sees cable networks as an essential element of its One Belt, One Road initiative. Undersea cables will ensure that Beijing is well placed to influence media and psychological operations as part of its ‘three warfares’ strategy. In the military arena, such a cable network creates a strategic advantage in anti-submarine warfare for the Chinese navy. It will form an irreplaceable part of China’s underwater observation system in the South China Sea. This ‘underwater great wall’ includes a number of subsurface sensors connected through optical cables to a central processing and monitoring facility in Shanghai. The system will function much like America’s SOSUS network, which employs fixed sensor arrays to detect Soviet submarines. A Chinese system could erode American undersea warfare advantages in the South China Sea.

Undersea cables have been described as Taiwan’s Achilles’ heel. In the event of a conflict across the Taiwan Strait, the cables will be prime Chinese targets: cutting them will cripple Taiwan’s international communications. And the damage wouldn’t be confined to Taiwan. There are at least 10 international submarine cables between Taiwan and Asia–Pacific countries. Damaging Taiwan’s cables would disrupt international business and financial markets, leading to severe economic effects on regional countries, including Japan, Singapore, Indonesia and Australia.

Articles 113 to 115 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea address the rights and obligations of states to adopt laws and regulations to protect submarine cables on the high seas.  Australia has established the world’s most advanced cable protection regime. It passed the Cable Protection Bill in 2005 and was the first state to join the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC). It’s also one of the few countries working with regional states amid security concerns about Chinese cable companies. Those actions demonstrate that Canberra could play a leading role in promoting regional cable protection. It could, for example, encourage Asia–Pacific countries to cooperate fully with the ICPC to focus international attention on cable security and to make China’s undersea monitoring in the South China Sea harder.

The US and its Asia–Pacific partners should also monitor the security of cable routes, using the automatic identification system to pinpoint the location of faults. And they should establish multilateral cooperation mechanisms to avoid delays to cable repairs. Such efforts would go some way to countering yet another area in which China is quietly developing a capability that could disrupt the region, and prevent Taiwan from being the weakest point in the Asia–Pacific submarine cable network.

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Sunset of the first sunny day in weeks

accessed November 28, 2017

Sunset of the first sunny day in weeks.
Hsintien (Xindian) Taipei, 17:15 November 28, 2017

Chong-Pin Lin

日落,江波華城
數周來首次晴天
2017年11月28日 下午5點一刻

林中斌

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China’s Singles Day is a shopping extravaganza heard around the world

By Alan Murray

accessed December 4, 2017

2017年12月4日時代雜誌引述Alan Murray, President of Fortune:

● "阿里巴巴的行動支付遠比西方任何類似系統還要複雜,也是反駁有人說中國科技創新落後西方最好的實證。"
(The event demonstrates the growing power of Alibaba's mobile payment system, Alipay, which is far more sophisticated than anything similar in the West and is the leading counter to the notion that China lags the U.S. ininnovaton.")

●"十一月十一日光棍節,阿里巴巴24小時營業額是250億美元,遠超過美國Black Friday Cyber Monday營業額的總和。"

●"十一月十一日在中國交易額1,680億人民幣,比去年上升39%,超過冰島一年的GDP"

 

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跨越專注國內政治的媒體

accessed November 26, 2017

- 自由時報花一整版涵蓋國際新聞及科學新聞。此現象已有數年。

- 由只關心本土草根議題媒體發展至今,實屬不易。

- 反諷的是原先以國際新聞為強項的媒體至今卻淪落至糾纏國內恩怨的擂台。

- 世事無常。歷史就是如此演變的。

 

 

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美國海軍擴建陷入困境

Accessed November 25, 2017

█2017年10月23日《國防新聞》報導:川普競選時所說要擴建海軍由原計劃的272艘軍艦到355艘。此355艘目標目前看來只是"口惠實不至("so far all talk and no action”)。最主要的原因是: 經費從何而來? 沒有著落。此外,此355艘軍艦海軍目的何在? 又,此355艘軍艦圖像為何?也不清楚!!
"The U.S. Navy ...can't say what the fleet will look like or how it's going to be paid for. "
“…Trump’s naval buildup aspirations must overcome a seeming lack of coherent vision of what a bigger Navy means or how it’s going to be paid for”
“The defense appropriations bill …is stalled in the Senate”
“Defense Secretary Jim Mattis …has told Congress that he isn’t going to rob the other services to ..pay for a larger fleet. Any substantial increase in the size of the fleet is contingent on a 3 to 5 percent annual budget growth, which would be impossible under the current Budget Control Act”


█2016年12月6日,幾乎一年以前,在下於《聯合報》名人堂拙文〈川普願景 有虛有實〉已點出目前美國國防預算的困境。全文附上於後,以下為摘錄片段,敬請賜教。
●"而十月下旬,仍在競選的川普,說當選後將要建造一個「三百五十軍艦的海軍」。美國海軍現有兩百七十二艘軍艦。每年花四十五億美元,卅年後,可有三百零八艘軍艦。如果要達到三五○艘,每年還要多花四億美元。那還不包括武器、人員、維修等費用。錢從哪來?”

●“川普說:要裁撤國防部裡重疊的機構,結束聯邦政府無必要的計畫,徵收未繳的稅款。某超黨派委員會CRFB算過,如此節省的錢只夠填補三分之二目前每年已被裁減的國防經費,四千五百億美元,勉強回到以往的國防開銷。這還不算額外的擴軍經費。
美國的GDP在二○一五年是十七點九兆美元。
美國的目前國家負債已達十九點八兆美元。美國負債已超過收入了。"

林中斌 2017.11.25
Chong-Pin Lin November 25, 2017

 

 

川普願景 有虛有實

林中斌
名人堂稿件
20161206 本文字數: 1100 目標字數:1100

「美國第一!」川普願景振奮人心。
「川普對外加強國防,對內提升經濟,孰先孰後?」我問川普交結團隊中的朋友。
「都先!」他回答。
魚與熊掌兩者得兼!可能嗎?請看美國國防現況。

川普十一月九日當選總統後兩週,美國最先進的驅逐艦Zumwalt在巴拿馬運河因漏水而拋錨。花了四十四億美元打造,十月才下水,它已故障過一次。

目前在波斯灣巡邏的美國艾森豪號航空母艦,原計劃明年一月在七個月海外執行任務後,回美國母港維修,換布希號航母上陣。但布希號原訂六個月維修,現需十三個月。美軍波灣部署出現空檔!因經費短缺,人員不足。

今年七月,美國宣佈:最先進的航空母艦福特號,經歷七年建造,原訂今年九月服役,因為戰機尚無法起降,再度延期到二○一七年。其實服役時間,一四年已延過一次。它耗資一百卅億美元,打破歷史紀錄,預算也追加過廿三億美元。

十一月底,美國之音報導,美國空軍戰機飛行訓練時數短缺,戰力滑退。因維修人員不足。二○一五年最嚴重,達三千八百人。 現在添了五百,仍缺三千三。

今年八月初, 美國F-35戰鬥機,耗時十五年,花費四千億美元後,終於宣佈成軍。這是人類歷史上最昂貴的武器計畫,原定研發建造十年,花費兩千三百億美元。但是,九月中,因為隔熱材料破碎剝落,已出廠的十五架F-35中十架被停飛。

而十月下旬,仍在競選的川普,說當選後將要建造一個「三百五十軍艦的海軍」。美國海軍現有兩百七十二艘軍艦。每年花四十五億美元,卅年後,可有三百零八艘軍艦。如果要達到三五○艘,每年還要多花四億美元。那還不包括武器、人員、維修等費用。此外,在九月初,他說:海軍陸戰隊要從從廿四營增加到卅六營。陸軍從五十四萬人增加到六十五萬。空軍將增加一千兩百架戰鬥機。

錢從哪來?

川普說:要裁撤國防部裡重疊的機構,結束聯邦政府無必要的計畫,徵收未繳的稅款。某超黨派委員會CRFB算過,如此節省的錢只夠填補三分之二目前每年已被裁減的國防經費,四千五百億美元,勉強回到以往的國防開銷。這還不算額外的擴軍經費。

美國的GDP在二○一五年是十七點九兆美元。

美國的目前國家負債已達十九點八兆美元。美國負債已超過收入了。明年三月,美國政府將面臨自己制定的負債上限廿點一兆美元。還有餘力增加國防預算嗎?

川普競選時許諾:十年增加兩千五百萬國內工作機會。如果沒有創造數百萬新工作,四年後別想連任。在他內心,提升經濟絕對高於加強國防。

為何他競選時描繪出擴軍的遠景呢? 

因為只強調國內經濟,選民會質疑「難道美國衰退了嗎?」

川普對外以打擊中東ISIS為主,因為它威脅國內安全。因此他任命兇悍將領為國防部長和中情局局長。

本來美國重返東亞的前提就是○九年二月宣布從中東撤軍。但現在中東更亂,美脫身不得。美國將無餘力在東亞與中國軍力較勁。

作者為前華府喬治大學外交學院講座教授,曾任國防部副部長

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