林中斌 部落格 / Blog Chong-Pin Lin

菲律賓最近在親中與親美之間擺盪

accessed July 29, 2020

菲律賓最近在親中與親美之間擺盪。

●菲律賓2020年6月初開親近美國，計畫購買武裝直升飛機。

●6月中，美菲疏遠的關係逆轉，馬尼拉加強與美軍事合作。

●7月中，菲律賓外長及國防部長同時要求中國遵守2016年的南海仲裁，無談判空間。 (杜特蒂曾於2016當選總統後宣布無限期擱置)

●7月底，杜特蒂說在南海打不過中國，疫情也得求援北京。

以上所爬梳的事件顯示馬尼拉施展兩手策略，或是

杜特蒂與菲國親美的將領及外交官較勁？（時間恰好是美國國務卿在運作反中聯盟之時）

■2020.7.28 杜特蒂：南海打不過陸 疫情也得求援

■2020.6.15 南海局勢緊張 菲美關係逆轉

■2020.6.1 菲加強海防應對南海衝突 (菲律賓計畫向美購買武裝直升飛機)

■20190915 菲總統第五次訪華 中菲擬合作開發油氣

■20190710 杜特蒂嗆美 拒當誘餌 別把菲律賓當蚯蚓

“美國能成功地擊退中國攻台嗎？”《國家利益雜誌》2020年8月6日

accessed Aug 13, 2020

“美國能成功地擊退中國攻台嗎？”《國家利益雜誌》2020年8月6日

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/can-america-successfully-repel-chinese-invasion-taiwan-166350

作者Daniel L. Davis為2015年以美國陸軍中校退伍的智庫學者。曾四次參加戰鬥，並獲勳數次。2012年他從阿富汗回國公開揭露軍事高層說戰事順利其實不然。那年他獲得說真話獎Ridenhour Prize for Truth-telling .

重點摘錄如下，全文隨後：

●最近美國國防部和蘭德公司所做的兵推顯示中美為為台灣軍事衝突的結果是美國戰敗。

Recent wargames jointly conducted by the Pentagon and RAND Corporation have shown that a military clash between the United States and China, especially over the Taiwan issue, would likely result in a U.S. defeat.

●中國要拿台灣不會打機場，而是打海上航空母艦、打美國衛星。

If China committed all-out to seize Taiwan, RAND analyst David Ochmanek explained, then it could accomplish its objective “in a finite time period, measured in days to weeks.” The reason, he said, is because it’s not, “just that they’ll be attacking air bases in the region. They’ll be attacking aircraft carriers at sea . . . They’ll be attacking our sensors in space. They’ll be attacking our communications links that largely run through space.”

●也許美國最後能抵抗中國攻台，但如此的勝利代價太大。除了人員損失、飛機被擊落、軍艦下沉以外，美國要花數千億美元建造防禦工事以防中國再犯台。

Perhaps America could eventually repulse China’s assault on Taiwan. Such a “victory,” however, would have a staggeringly high price for the country.

In addition to the cost to America in terms of lives lost, ships sunk, and airplanes shot down, the United States would then have the unenviable obligation to build a massive military presence on Taiwan and build up bases throughout the region to secure the country and prevent the next Chinese attempt to retake it. America would have to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on perpetually maintaining such defenses and constantly be at risk of a new attack.

●台灣到中國大陸的距離相當於美國佛羅里達州到古巴，而美國大陸到台灣的距離是6千海里。

Taiwan is roughly the same distance from the Chinese mainland as Cuba is from the tip of Florida; it’s almost six thousand nautical miles from Taiwan to the U.S. mainland.

●總之，美國若敗於中國，結果是災難；美國若為台灣打贏，結果是破產。

In short, losing a war with China would be catastrophic while “winning” a war over Taiwan would bankrupt America.

●美國最好遏止中國拿台灣的方法是鼓勵盟國包括台灣強化自己的防禦。

The best way America can help Taiwan and dissuade China from using force is to encourage all the friendly countries of the Asia-Pacific region—not only Taiwan—to engage in a buildup of its own self-defense capabilities.

●台北應以A2/AD “反介入與區域拒止”強化自己。

Taipei should continue to bolster its defenses through an A2/AD strategy of its own

August 6, 2020

Can America Successfully Repel a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan?

Few leaders in “establishment Washington” have taken the time to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

by Daniel L. Davis Follow @DanielLDavis1 on TwitterL

https://nationalinterest.org/…/can-america-successfully-rep… accessed August 13, 2020

There has long been heated debate over whether the United States should defend Taiwan in the case of a Chinese invasion, but little consideration to whether it successfully can. An unemotional assessment of the military capabilities of both China and the United States reveals the odds are uncomfortably high that the U.S. forces would be defeated in a war with China over Taiwan. What’s worse, even achieving a tactical victory could result in a devastating strategic loss. That’s not to say, however, that there aren’t alternative strategies to effectively preserve U.S. interests and at an affordable cost.

Few leaders in “establishment Washington” have taken the time to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Instead, decisionmakers routinely engage in seemingly cost-free rhetorical declarations about U.S. political preferences devoid of context. Policymakers have long argued to jettison the idea of “strategic ambiguity” that has underscored decades of America’s Asia policy, and outright declare that the United States would militarily defend Taiwan in the event of an attack.

Former Pentagon official Joseph Bosco reflected the desire of many this summer when he argued that Congress should pass the Taiwan Defense Act because “it will move U.S. policy just one step short of an open defense commitment to Taiwan.”

If signed into law, the act would obligate the U.S. government to “delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to [use military force to seize control of Taiwan].” It would be useful to stop and consider what those confident words would mean for America in practical terms on the ground, on and under the seas, and in the skies of the Asia-Pacific region. It doesn’t take long to realize it would be bad for the United States.

Any act or treaty the United States enters into should unequivocally have the net result of a more secure America, preserving (or expanding) the country’s ability to prosper. It is obviously not in America’s interest to tie itself to another state or entity if America must absorb all the risks and costs while the other party reaps the majority of the benefits. Extending a security guarantee to Taiwan fails in the first requirement and thoroughly meets the second.

Recent wargames jointly conducted by the Pentagon and RAND Corporation have shown that a military clash between the United States and China, especially over the Taiwan issue, would likely result in a U.S. defeat. In simulated wargames between the United States and China, RAND analyst David Ochmanek bluntly said America got “its ass handed to it.”

If China committed all-out to seize Taiwan, Ochmanek explained, then it could accomplish its objective “in a finite time period, measured in days to weeks.” The reason, he said, is because it’s not, “just that they’ll be attacking air bases in the region. They’ll be attacking aircraft carriers at sea . . . They’ll be attacking our sensors in space. They’ll be attacking our communications links that largely run through space.”

Perhaps the wargames underestimate America’s ability to counterattack or overestimate China’s ability to perform the operations. Perhaps America could eventually repulse China’s assault on Taiwan. Such a “victory,” however, would have a staggeringly high price for the country.

In addition to the cost to America in terms of lives lost, ships sunk, and airplanes shot down, the United States would then have the unenviable obligation to build a massive military presence on Taiwan and build up bases throughout the region to secure the country and prevent the next Chinese attempt to retake it. America would have to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on perpetually maintaining such defenses and constantly be at risk of a new attack.

Moreover, the geography would be a problem. Taiwan is roughly the same distance from the Chinese mainland as Cuba is from the tip of Florida; it’s almost six thousand nautical miles from Taiwan to the U.S. mainland. At a time when defense budgets are already causing more strain owing to the economic effects of coronavirus, it would cripple America were its defense budget to explode to cover a war with China. In short, losing a war with China would be catastrophic while “winning” a war over Taiwan would bankrupt America. Clearly, Washington needs a better way to compete with Beijing. Fortunately, there is a superior alternative.

The best way America can help Taiwan and dissuade China from using force is to encourage all the friendly countries of the Asia-Pacific region—not only Taiwan—to engage in a buildup of its own self-defense capabilities. China has famously hardened its defenses against the United States by means of anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) which would impose a severe cost on the United States for any attack against China. Taiwan should do the same.

Taipei should continue to bolster its defenses through an A2/AD strategy of its own so that the cost of forcible unification by China would be so significant—and ultimate success would not be guaranteed—that the Communist Party leaders in Beijing would not risk the potential loss. Even that, it must be admitted, would be no guarantee that China would never attack Taiwan. But for American policy, it doesn’t make sense to risk military defeat or financial ruin when our interests are not directly threatened.

Daniel L. Davis is a senior fellow for Defense Priorities and a former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army who retired in 2015 after twenty-one years, including four combat deployments. Follow him @DanielLDavis1.

Richard Haass，"What Mike Pompeo doesn’t understand about China, Richard Nixon and U.S. foreign policy" Washngton Post July 26, 2020

accessed July 30, 2020

My Relatives in Wuhan Survived. My Uncle in New York Did Not.

My father, a Chinese pulmonologist, believes his brother could have been saved.

By Yi Rao 饒毅是首都醫科大學校長、北京大學講席教授和北京腦科學與類腦研究中心主任。

繁體中文版請見後

Dr. Rao is a molecular neurobiologist in China.

(Yi Rao is the president of Capital Medical University, a chair professor at Peking University and the director of the Chinese Institute for Brain Research, in Beijing)

●But then 9/11 happened, and this axis of evil emerged: Dick Cheney (vice president); Paul Wolfowitz (deputy secretary of defense); David Addington (counsel to the vice president); John Yoo (Justice Department lawyer and author of the “Torture Memos”). These men were ready to do anything to advance their agenda, ...That period proved to me that America was not the democratic beacon many of us had thought it to be.

●For a long time, the United States seemed like the better place to live — for those lucky enough to have such a choice.This time that outcome doesn’t speak well of America.

New York Times July 22, 2020

https://www.nytimes.com/…/22/opin…/coronavirus-china-us.html accessed July 30, 2020

繁體中文版請見後

BEIJING — Eight is thought to be a lucky number in China because in Chinese it sounds like the word for “fortune”; 444 is a bad number because it rings like “death”; 520 sounds like “I love you.”

Having always disliked superstition, I was dismayed to receive a message by WeChat at 4:44 p.m. on May 20, Beijing time, informing me that my Uncle Eric, who lived in New York, had died from Covid-19. He was 74.

Uncle Eric was a pharmacist, so presumably he contracted the virus from a patient who had visited his shop in Queens. Infected in March, he was sick for more than two months. He was kept on a ventilator until his last 10 days: By then, he was deemed incurable and the ventilator was redirected to other patients who might be saved.

The medical trade runs in my family. I now preside over a medical university in Beijing with 19 affiliated hospitals. I studied medicine because my father was a doctor, a pulmonary physician. He decided to study medicine after losing his mother to a minor infection when he was 13. My father did not expect to lose a brother 15 years his junior to a disease in his own specialty: the respiratory system.

My father (Weihua) and Eric (Houhua) were first separated in 1947. My father, then 17, stayed behind in Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi Province, in central-southern China, to finish his education, while Eric, age 2, and other brothers and a sister sailed to Taiwan with their parents. With the end of World War II, Taiwan had been returned to China after five decades of Japanese occupation, and there were job opportunities there.

The family did not anticipate what would happen in 1949: The Communist takeover of mainland China — and, for them, the beginning of another kind of, and very long, separation.

My father completed his medical education in Nanchang and had graduate training with one of the top respiratory physicians in Shanghai, but in the 1960s the Cultural Revolution then took him to a small town and after that to a village, where he was the sole doctor. He moved back to a major hospital in Nanchang in 1972.

In the mid-1970s, my grandfather sent him — by way of Fiji — a letter at a previous address, and miraculously it arrived.

Soon, Uncle Eric became their emissary.

Uncle Eric was the first member of my family to become an American citizen. He arrived in San Francisco in the late 1970s, drawn to an economic powerhouse of a country, so starkly different from what he had grown up with in Taiwan.

It was 35 years before the brothers met again, in 1982. My father was a visiting scholar for a year at the Cardiovascular Research Institute at the University of California, San Francisco, where he conducted research on pulmonary edema, and he received a few months of clinical training in the intensive care unit at what is now called the Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital and Trauma Center.

In the early 1980s, the gap between China and the United States was gigantic. And my father has always been grateful for the education he received at U.C.S.F. and the kindness and generosity of the Americans he met.

He brought his American training back to Nanchang to establish the first I.C.U. in Jiangxi Province and one of the first I.C.U.s in China. He also established one of the first — if not the very first — institute of molecular medicine in China.

In 1985, I followed in his footsteps and in those of my uncles — Uncle Tim (Xinghua) had immigrated to California as well: I went to San Francisco to study for my Ph.D., also at U.C.S.F. My younger brother moved to the United States a few years later.

In the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet model, America seemed to be the only other exemplar left. Having studied in the United States and with plans to work and live there for the long haul, I applied for American citizenship and obtained it in 2000. My children were born in the United States.

But then 9/11 happened, and this axis of evil emerged: Dick Cheney (vice president); Paul Wolfowitz (deputy secretary of defense); David Addington (counsel to the vice president); John Yoo (Justice Department lawyer and author of the “Torture Memos”). These men were ready to do anything to advance their agenda, imposing their own law — meaning, really, no proper laws and no rule of law — in Iraq, at Guantánamo and elsewhere. And too many Americans went along. That period proved to me that America was not the democratic beacon many of us had thought it to be.

I first started looking into how to renounce my U.S. citizenship while I lived in Chicago and then again after moving back to China in 2007. I completed the process in 2011 — a decision that has been validated since by the advent of President Trump and Trumpism, which are a natural expansion of what was put in motion after 9/11.

Uncle Eric never returned to mainland China.

By the time my father retired in 2005, at 75, he had treated countless respiratory and I.C.U. patients in China. He had worked through the SARS epidemic in 2002-3, issuing dark predictions that the virus, or something like it, would come back. He and I debate whether the new coronavirus proves his prediction right.

As Covid-19 began to spread earlier this year, my father, now 90 and long retired, would send me advice about how to treat the disease so that I could relay it to other doctors, including the one leading response efforts in the city of Wuhan, the pandemic’s epicenter early on.

Our family has 12 members in Wuhan, mostly on my mother’s side, and six in New York, mostly on my father’s side. All my relatives in Wuhan are safe. Uncle Eric died in New York after the pandemic had moved to the United States — the world’s strongest country militarily, the richest economically and the most advanced medically.

The United States had two months or more to learn from China’s experience with this coronavirus, and it could have done much more to lower infection rates and fatalities. My father is struggling to accept his brother’s death partly, too, because he believes that he could have treated Uncle Eric — that in China Uncle Eric would have been saved.

As the pandemic rages on in the United States and throughout the world, with some smaller outbreaks in China, the United States and China are not collaborating, but competing, in the search for a successful vaccine for the virus and treatment measures for the disease.

My father’s family has been divided for most of his life, separated mostly by the decisions of political leaders.

For a long time, the United States seemed like the better place to live — for those lucky enough to have such a choice.

Now, my father and Uncle Eric have been separated once again. This time that outcome doesn’t speak well of America.

●

Yi Rao is the president of Capital Medical University, a chair professor at Peking University and the director of the Chinese Institute for Brain Research, in Beijing.

我在武漢的親人活了下來，但紐約的叔叔沒有

饒毅

紐約時報 2020年7月23日

https://cn.nytimes.com/…/2020…/coronavirus-china-us/zh-hant/ 下載2020.7.30

北京——在中國，數字8因發音似「發」而被視為幸運的數字、444似「死」為壞數字，520似「我愛你」。

向來討厭迷信的我，非常難過地於5月20日下午4時44分收到一條微信消息：我居住在紐約的叔叔厚華逝於新冠病毒，終年74歲。

叔叔厚華是一名藥劑師，很可能是被到他位於皇后區的店中取藥的病人傳染的。3月被感染後，他病了兩個多月。他曾使用呼吸機，直到最後十天被認為不可治癒後，呼吸機被轉移用於救助其他病人。

我家與醫藥關係不淺。我自己現在北京任職一家有19個附屬醫院的醫科大學。我學醫是因為我的父親是一名肺科醫生。父親學醫是因為他13歲時，他的母親因簡單的感染而去世。父親沒有預料到，比自己年輕15歲的弟弟會逝於自己專科的呼吸系統疾病。

父親緯華和叔叔厚華第一次分開是在1947年。父親那年17歲，留在中國中南部江西省省會南昌繼續學業，當時兩歲的厚華和其他弟弟及一個姐姐與他們的父母從上海渡船到台灣。二戰後，台灣在被日本佔領50年後回歸中國，有較多工作機會。

全家未能預見1949年會發生什麼：共產黨接管了中國大陸，而對他們來說，這意味著另一種長期分離的開始。

父親在南昌完成醫學教育、其後在上海師從最好的肺科醫生獲得研究生教育。但1960年代的文革使他下放到縣城、後來到一個只有他一名醫生的村莊。1972年，父親回到南昌一個主要醫院工作。

1970年代中期，祖父經由斐濟寄了一封信到父親以前的地址，這封信奇蹟般地到了父親手中。

很快，厚華成為他們之間的信使。

厚華是我家第一位美國公民，他於1970年代後期到舊金山，被美國的發達所吸引，那裡與他成長的台灣有天壤之別。

1982年，分離35年後的厚華與我父親兄弟倆重逢。父親當時在加州大學舊金山分校(University of California, San Francisco)醫學院心血管研究所進修，為期一年，做肺水腫研究，後在目前被稱為祖克柏舊金山綜合醫院和創傷中心(Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital and Trauma Center)的醫院重症監護室臨床見習數月。

1980年代初期，中國和美國的差別巨大。父親一直非常感謝在加州大學舊金山分校接受的教育，以及美國人民對他的善良和慷慨。

自美國學成回南昌後，父親建立了全省第一個、也是全國較早的重症監護室之一。他還建立了分子醫學研究所，是中國最早的類似機構之一——如果不是首個的話。

1985年，我跟隨父親和叔叔們（那時叔叔興華也已移民加州）的腳步，到加州大學舊金山分校念研究生。幾年後我弟弟也赴美留學。

1990年代，蘇聯模式坍塌，美國似乎是唯一留存的模式。我在美國留學後計劃長期在美國生活和工作，所以申請了美國公民，並於2000年獲得。我的子女在美國出生。

但後來發生了9·11事件，美國出現了邪惡的軸線：副總統迪克·錢尼(Dick Cheney)、國防次長保羅·沃爾福威茨(Paul Wolfowitz)、副總統法律顧問戴維·阿丁頓(David Addington)，以及司法部律師、《酷刑備忘錄》作者柳約翰(John Yoo)。這些人為了自己的目的可以任意作為，將他們的法律（其實是不合適的法律、不符合法治）強加於伊拉克、關塔那摩和其他地方。而太多美國人也並不反對。那一時期對我來說證明美國不是很多人以前認為的民主燈塔。

在芝加哥時我開始查詢如何放棄美國國籍，2007年回中國之後再一次繼續，到2011年完成退籍。這一決定為其後的事件所驗證是對的——川普選總統和川普主義是9·11開始的變化之自然擴展。

厚華從未返回中國大陸。

至2005年父親於75歲退休前，他治療了很多呼吸病和重症監護病人。父親經歷了2002至2003年的SARS疫情，他預計SARS或類似的病毒還會發生。我和父親還在爭論此次新冠病毒算不算證明了他的預測。

新冠病毒流行後，已經90歲的父親經常給我治療建議，讓我轉給其他醫生，包括此次協調早期疫情中心武漢抗疫的醫學領袖。

我們家在武漢有12位親戚，大部分是母親家的；在紐約有六位親戚、大部分是父親家的。在武漢的親戚皆安然無恙，而紐約的厚華在疫情傳播到美國後去世——他去世於當今世界軍事上最強大、經濟上最富裕、醫學上最先進的國家。

美國有兩個月甚至更多時間可以汲取中國的新冠病毒流行經驗，本可以做更多努力降低感染率和病死率。父親很難接受弟弟去世的部分原因是認為自己就可以救助弟弟——厚華如果在中國也許就被治癒了。

當新冠在美國和一些國家繼續兇猛地流行、在中國偶有小發時，美國和中國並沒有合作，而是在競爭尋找疫苗和其他治療方式。

在父親一生的大部分時間裡，他的家庭因政治人物的決定而分離。在很長時間內，美國是更好的生活之地——如果有幸可以選擇的話。

現在，父親和叔叔再度分離。這一次的結果，不能說美國好。

饒毅是首都醫科大學校長、北京大學講席教授和北京腦科學與類腦研究中心主任。

日本投降幕後

accessed Aug 15, 2020

以下是在下的日本教授朋友提供的寶貴史料。孤陋寡聞的在下前所未聞，不敢藏私。呈上敬請卓參。

林中斌 2020.8.15

1945年8月9日上午11時2分，長崎核爆。原來的黒白照片施以彩色補正。

■當時日本政府内部對是否接受波茨坦宣言，兩派意見對立衝突。在「最高戰爭指導會議」（首相、外相、陸軍相、海軍相、参謀總長〔陸軍〕、軍令部總長〔海軍〕），外相東郷茂德（祖先是16世紀豊臣秀吉侵略朝鮮時被俘，帯到九州的朝鮮陶工）主張接受，海相米内光政支持；陸相阿南惟幾反對，参謀總長梅津美治郎和軍令部總長豊田副武附和。77歳高齢的首相鈴木貫太郎不表態，暗中準備由天皇裁決結束戰爭。

■兩次核爆並未改變主戰派態度，因當時日本政府希望透過蘇聯和盟軍談判（在中國戰場，日本派遣軍司令部也試圖和重慶國民政府接觸希望和談）。

■真正改變日本政府態度的，是蘇對日宣戰，馬上蘇軍就侵入中國東北，解除満州國和關東軍的武装。此時鈴木首相才表態接受波宣言，但陸相等人還是不接受，結果首相按準備好的劇本請天皇召開御前會議，裁決接受波宣言。日本憲法學者宮澤俊義稱日本接受波宣言是憲法的「8月革命」，從此刻開始，明治憲法雖未被修改，内容已有重大變化，即天皇主權移轉到由美國占領軍代行的國民主權，所以形式上依照明治憲法，但將憲法内容做革命性變更的「修憲」，只是確認8月革命的成果。

■在日本廟議未定同時，美國已準備對日本第三次核爆，地點可能就接近東京。曾獲諾貝爾文學奨的日本作家大江健三郎説，日本的和平憲法是「廣島、長崎、沖縄」的憲法，因日本只有這三個地方遭受最惨烈的、人類幾乎滅絶的戰禍。

■阿南陸相曾任天皇的侍從武官，對天皇忠誠；但他同時是右派民族主義史學家平泉澄的信徒，認為接受波宣言會毀滅日本是天皇國家的「國體」，他同時也要面對陸軍中生代課長級軍官強烈的主戰情緒，不得不演戯。結果8月15日他自己切腹自殺，陸軍中生代軍官扇動近衛師團一部試圖阻止天皇廣播接受無條件投降。

■阿南的小兒子，阿南惟茂，東大畢業後進入外務省，大半時間在中國課服務，為知名的China School, 後來做到日本駐中國大使。日本出版業巨頭講談社現在的董事長，是阿南陸相的孫子。

■相對的，一向是軍政優位，以大臣為首的海軍，米内海相早在1945年6月做了人事調整，確保海軍上下完全在大臣命令下動作。但還是發生8月15日第五航空艦隊長官宇垣纒中將率機做自殺特攻，和厚木航空隊司令小園安名上校抗命拒絶投降事件。

■由於厚木是美軍先遣部隊和麥帥座機預定使用的基地（現在也是美軍在管理使用），米内海相下令鎮壓。不久後，小園被騙呑安眠薬被制伏，在8月19日前事件就平息。海軍横須賀軍法會議對小園的審判是日本最後的軍法審判。

井上成美：反對轟炸重慶的日本最後海軍上將

accessed Aug 15, 2020

以下是在下的日本教授朋友提供的寶貴史料。孤陋寡聞的在下前所未聞，不敢藏私。呈上敬請卓參。

林中斌 2020.8.15

■我的恩師，憲法學的樋口陽一教授，是仙台市出身的日本東北人。他是戰後日本採用美國學制後新制仙台第一高中（舊制仙台一中）畢業的。著名作家井上Hisashi是同學，黑社會電影明星級演員菅原文太是高一期的學長。三個人職業各不同，但都在1990年代開始出來擁護日本國憲法保障的人權及和平，現在井上和菅原都過世了。

■樋口教授十分尊敬仙台一中時期的學長，日本最後的海軍上將井上成美（1975年去世）。他是日本海軍兵學校（海軍官校）37期第一名畢業，是海軍軍政的優秀人材，做過駐義大利武官，歴任海軍中央和艦隊要職（軍務局一課長、艦長、横須賀軍區参謀長、軍務局長、中國方面艦隊参謀長、海軍航空本部長、第四艦隊司令長官、海軍兵學校校長、海軍次官）。

■井上非常有個性，命令不合道理的據理力争，不惜請辭或得罪長官，但他的行政能力強，講道理海軍無人講得過他。所以井上的長官對他忍耐，他的部屬對他敬畏，被稱為「刮͡鬍刀」。在1930年代中期海軍軍政系的人材被大量清掃退役，他是少數存活下來的。

■井上有兩面性，一方面精通外語（法、德、英），在米内光政（海兵29期）第一次做海軍大臣時代（1937-39），井上做為海軍軍政總管的海軍省軍務局長，和大臣、山本五十六次官（海兵32期）一起反對三國軸心盟約，在任兵學校長時反對廢英語教育，是日本海軍的親英美自由派；但在中國方面艦隊参謀長任内（1939-40），主導對重慶違反國際人道法轟炸的也是井上（戰前日本軍隊，不設副職，司令官基本上必須尊重参謀長）。

■戰爭末期的1944年7月，米内復出再度就任海軍大臣，8月初就任命井上為海軍次官，兩人的共識是戰敗無法避免，必須儘快和談。但井上認為就算無條件投降也必須結束戰爭，多次要求米内「動作加快」。米内当時已患有重度的腎臓、心臓病，又必須面對軍部内部強硬的主戰聲浪，好像蝋燭焼盡，所以反過來對井上説「我不幹，你接大臣」。但井上認為自己「刮͡鬍刀」的個性只適合做副手或幕僚長，米内在海軍内部有威望，又做過首相，又得天皇和文官重臣的信任，對米内表示「大臣一定要您繼續幹」。

■米内三度請辭海相，三度要井上接手，甚至要人事局長對井上報告井上接大臣後的人事布局（日本海軍人事的傳統，將官級人事由海軍省人事局長直接報告大臣，不經過次官），卻都被井上拒絶。

■最後米内想出絶招，奏請天皇升井上為上將。井上連續上書米内，力陳自己没有資格升上將的理由，並對米内發「最後通牒」，説「一定要升我上將，我會認定您就是要抜我次官的職務」（次官是中將）。但米内不聽，得到天皇裁可，1945年5月15日人令發布井上為上將，任軍事参議官。其實米内的用意，一面是確立「漸進式終戰」路線，避免井上急進路線壊事；一面是確保井上在自己出意外時繼任大臣（上將，當然就無法質疑井上做大臣的資格）。但井上非常生氣，認為米内背信，寫了一首打油詩「敗戰還能升上將，什麼意思」，自此就没有再和米内見面，甚至在1948年米内病逝後也没有出席喪禮。但井上私底下對米内還是非常推崇，認為米内是唯一能統率海軍的將領，在1945年8月米内以戰敗負責為由請辭時，主導軍事参議官会議決議要求米内留任，等於是讓米内做「海軍治喪委員會」主委。

■戰後井上以「痛感戰爭責任」為理由，引退住在海邊的破房子，遠離公職，也不参加舊軍人的活動，靠教附近中學生英文為生，非常困窮。井上只對軍人年金執着，因戰後10年所謂「軍人恩給」因政府財政困難被停止。認為那是國家對軍人的契約，國家不應該違約。

■1960年代軍人年金恢復後，井上有比較安定的収入，再婚，以前海軍兵學校長時代的學生又説服他就任公司顧問，其實是要用付顧問費接濟他的生活，被井上看破，堅持要把自己房子抵押給學生的公司。過去的學生，青年軍官，有人重新考上大學成為學者；也有過去有交往的軍事記者想寫戰爭歴史；也有戰後加入海上自衛隊的前軍官邀他去講話，他開始接受這些人的訪問，但是還是以「待罪之身」不接受宴會款待。井上曾對過去的上司、A級戰犯坐監服刑過的前海軍大臣嶋田繁太郎（和山本五十六同是海兵33期）参加海上自衛隊練習艦隊（敦睦艦隊）遠洋航海出航祝賀會表示憤怒，直斥「不知恥也有限度，那個人是能公開在外見人的嗎」。井上在戰後舊海軍將領内部的戰爭反省會上，直指三個學長海軍大臣（吉田32期、及川31期、嶋田32期）對戰爭有責任，還明言：「戰爭就像刑法上的死刑是必要之悪，因國家要生存。但國家在生存目的之外使用國軍，就是擴張主義、軍國主義、帝國主義」「参加他國的戰爭違反國軍的本質，日本参加第一次世界大戰也是邪道。

“霸權如何終結：美國國力的解體”

《外交事務》2020年7-8月號頁143-156

accessed July 13, 2020

■作者為美國哥倫比亞大學講座教授

Alexander Cooley及華府喬治城大學副教授Daniel Nexon

■「美國的世界領導腳色不只在後退，它在解體。而且它的衰落不是周期性的，而是永久性的。」

■「中國和俄羅斯在帶頭創造新的國際組織卻排除美國在外。」

■「中國政府有關的銀行打開普遍對發展中國家的借貸的方便。」

■「自由民主國家主導的體系在崩解，而其原因來自美國自己內部。」

■「美國政策規劃人必須對霸權結束後的世界預作準備。」

Robert Gates, "Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy"

Foreign Affairs July-August 2020 pp.121-232

accessed July 13, 2020

《外交事務》雙月刊2020年7月8月頁121—232. “美國外交政策的過度軍事化”

■「美國軍隊不應該試圖塑造其他國家的未來。不是每一件惡行、每一次侵略、每一樁壓迫、每一件危機都該引發美國的軍事反應。」

■美國2006-2011年國防部長羅波特．蓋茲（跨越小布希及歐巴馬總統內閣）如是寫道。

Trump's Own Appointees Join in Decisions Declairing Judiciary's Independence

New York Times international edition July 11, 2020 pp. 1, 15

accessed July 15, 2020

■川普提名第兩位最高法官同時否定他有權利免交出自己就任總統以前的交稅資料。

■這兩位法官挺川普政策的紀錄是九位最高法官中的第三名(67.6% Justice Brett Kavanaugh) 和第五名(56.1% Justice Neil Gorsuch)，不是第一名和第二名。

■意涵1： 川普自己任命的最高法官都不同意他可免除提供交稅資料。

■意涵2： 這是美國的強項。三權鼎立的制度即使在總統表現失序下仍屹立不搖。

世界上抗疫(Covid-19)成功的女姓國家領袖又多了一位

accessed July 15, 2020

■世界上抗疫(Covid-19)成功的女姓國家領袖又多了一位。

■蘇格蘭政府領袖 (First Minister) Nicola Sturgeon表現亮麗，遠勝於英國的首相Boris Johnson。

■她很早就聚集了一組專家(有別於倫敦聯合王國的疫情負責會議)，並請教於德國的衛生官員。這種謙虛務實的態度是世界上成功抗疫女性領導人的共同特點，有別於美國、英國、巴西領導人強烈的自我意識。

2014蘇格蘭獨立公投失敗。它反對脫歐，但被英格蘭帶著脫歐。目前疫情處理遠優於英格蘭，蘇格蘭人民贊成獨立達55%。

關係惡化 兩岸上半年貿易仍成長

accessed July 15, 2020

聯合報 2020.7.15 A9

川普民調落後拜登繼續擴大

accessed July 17, 2020

川普民調落後拜登繼續擴大。

■一項民調顯示他已落後15%。

自由時報 2020.7.17A2

■五個川普在2016年領先的搖擺州目前他民調以43%落後拜登的49%。

中國時報2020.7.17A10

Business warms to Hong Kong security law

accessed July 3, 2020

紐約時報國際版2020.7.1頁1,8

“商業對香港安全法反應熱情。大量中國錢滾入香港增加這是做生意好地方的信心”

小池百合子明日日本首相？

accessed June 29, 2020

■東京知事小池百合子抗疫明快，表現明顯優於民調低落但似乎「無人可取代」的首相安倍。

■她連任選舉聲勢極旺，全國最大黨居然放棄競爭！

■她呆過五個黨，如今獨立於政黨外。

■她也有留學埃及大學的學歷爭議，但無損她政治聲望（與另位強勢政治女領袖類似）。

■趨勢探測：她將取代安倍成日本首相？

☆自由時報2020.6.28A10
 

東協取代歐盟成為中國最大貿易夥伴

accessed June 29, 2020

今年第一季度，東協取代歐盟成為中國最大貿易夥伴；去年東協取代美國成為中國第二大貿易夥伴。

自由時報2020.6.29 A6

美國大公司破產的巨浪要來了

紐約時報國際版2020.6.20. p.8

accessed June 22, 2020

■今年欠債10億美金的公司至少有66家，超過2009有49家的記錄。

■已經欠債嚴重的大公開有Hertz, J. Crew, Neiman Marcus, Jos. A. Bank等。

■去年美國有6,800家公司宣告破產。今年會有更多家。
 

A lack of diversity in U.S. diplomacy

accessed July 1, 2020

■美國選外交官“白人，男性，耶魯畢業”優先。耶魯包括其他長春藤大學如哈佛等。

■意涵：歧視非白人，女性，非長春藤大學畢業生。

■美國社會（尚未包括美國政府）能自我檢討，就是它的強項。

State Department culture scrutinized over affinity for "pale, male, and Yale" envoys

(International New York Times June 29, 2020 p.5)
 

Vladimir Putin: The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II

accessed July 2, 2020

鄭重推薦普丁的力作。
感謝包淳亮博士分享。
中文版連接見後。
■這篇登在美國National Interest 雜誌(總編輯是前？史丹福大學教授福山Fukuyama)的論文不只是有尊嚴而有氣度的俄羅斯政治立塲說明，還是有深度有新意的歷史研究｡
■最後的前瞻性呼籲，理智、公平、建設性｡今日世界領袖能如此有情有理的論述恐怕不作第二人想了。
■希特勒攻波蘭勢如破竹。其實是英、法背叛他們盟友波蘭。部署在德國西線的重兵居然按奈不動！本來英法波聯盟要瓜分捷克！
■不只希特勒和史大林簽互不侵犯條約，其他西方大國或明或暗都與希特勒談好互不侵犯！
■普丁引述了許多英美法解密的文件！他們自私自利原型畢露！
以下為中文版：
https://m.sohu.com/a/403884869_115479/?pvid=000115_3w_a

民粹與疫情

accessed June 19, 2020

全球國家瘟疫死亡人數

排名：1.美國（217,717）

         2.巴西 （46,510）

         3.英國 （42,238）

此三國領導人皆所謂民粹主義者(populists),其支持者主要是低教育程度、有排外等特性。

Businesses Struggle to Stop Relying on China

紐約時報國際版2020.6.17 頁1、4

accessed June 18, 2020

國際貨幣資金組織最近報告中國在2020年將是少數經濟正成長國家之一，而美國經濟將呈現萎縮約6%，歐元區萎縮約7.5%。

"The International Monetary Fund has reported that China will be one of the few countries to record economic growth in 2020, while the U.S. economy is expected to contract by about. 6 percent and the eurozone by 7.5 percent."

Source: "Business struggle to break the China habit" International New York Times June 7, 2020 pp. 1 & 4.

美國大公司破產的巨浪要來了

紐約時報國際版2020.6.20. p.8

accessed June 22, 2020

■今年欠債10億美金的公司至少有66家，超過2009有49家的記錄。
■已經欠債嚴重的大公開有Hertz, J. Crew, Neiman Marcus, Jos. A. Bank等。
■去年美國有6,800家公司宣告破產。今年會有更多家。