美重量級議員提出「不首先使用核武」議案
Accessed Feb 18, 2019
Senator Elizabeth Warren may be the one to save America's soul from sinking and the entire world from Armageddon.
美國參議員伊麗莎白．華倫可能是拯救美國靈魂免於沉淪和全世界生靈朝向毀滅的領袖。
【美重量級議員提出「不首先使用核武」議案】
已宣佈爭取2020年美國總統大選民主黨總統候選人提名的參議員伊麗莎白．華倫，與眾議院軍事委員會主席聯名提出「不首先使用核武」法案動議。圖為華倫的檔案照片。（圖／美聯社）
China Offer to halve cost of Malaysia’s rail project—scources
accessed Feb 18, 2019
-- 92歲的馬哈迪再度當選後，反對前任與北京簽約的鐵路計劃。但親自跑北京解釋 "你不希望我們破產吧!"。
---同時令華裔副國防部長向亞洲週刊說:馬來西亞支持 一帶一路。
-- 一月底馬哈迪正式宣佈取消東岸鐵路計劃。
-- 北京迅速回應價格減半。
-- 馬哈迪習近平高手對招!!
林中斌 2019.2.1
--Being adroitly adapted to the rising resistance against and accusation on its "debt-trap diplomacy".
The Optimist 樂觀者
accessed Feb 18, 2019
Cicely Tyson Actor(actress) 94
瑟絲麗●泰森演員(也是模特兒,歌星 導演 得奧斯卡 金球獎 無數) 今日年齡 94 (此為近照)
Time February 18, 2019 pp.84&85
時代雜誌 2019.2.18 頁84-85
Jaisalmer Fort, Rajasthan, India February 5, 2019
accessed Feb 18, 2019
天主教教宗歷史上首次訪問伊斯蘭教發源地阿拉伯半島
accessed Feb 18, 2019
天主教教宗歷史上首次訪問伊斯蘭教發源地阿拉伯半島。
時代雜誌 2019.2.18 頁9
全文聯結：http://time.com/5523781/pope-francis-trip-arabian-peninsula-yemen/
為何全球參與一帶一路計劃68國家中3分之2受益個案幾乎不見於國際媒體報導?
accessed Feb 18, 2019
According to a March 4, 2018 report based on the study of Center for Global Development in Washington DC:
根據2018年3月4號美國智庫「全球研究中心」的一份報告指出：
-Among 68 countries hosting China's BRI project, 34% (23 countries )were at risk of "debt distress" as of March 2018.
68個牽涉一帶一路的國家中，有23個國家(23%)在2018年3月時，被債務問題所困擾。
- Among the 68, 12% (8 countries)were at "significant' risk" of，"debt distress".
這68個國家中，8個(12%)國家具有重大的債務問題。
-In other words, 66% of the 68 countries probably have benefited from BRI.
換句話說，這68個國家當中，有66%可能從一帶一路中受益。
- Interestingly enough, 2/3 of the 68 total have received scant
international media attention.
有趣的是，這68個國家當中，2/3的國家只受到國際媒體相當有限的關注。
Chong-Pin Lin February 16, 2019
西安，古中國14朝代首都
Accessed Jan 21 , 2019
“China launches more rockets than US, Russia in 2018”
Li Ruohan, Global Times Dec 28, 2018 pp3
Accessed Jan 21 , 2019
2018年中國發射37枚衛星，美國34枚，俄國18枚。
“Putin: A Leader made for the Russian Federation”
Ruslan Pukhov, Defense News Dec.10, 2018
Accessed Jan 21 , 2019
From Defense News Dec.10, 2018
國防新聞 2018年12月10日
-- According to a Russian security expert in Moscow, Putin, though portrayed in the West as "an architect of an anti-Western approach" , is "far more liberal and pro-Western than most of the Russian public or majority of the Russian elites."
根據莫斯科的俄羅斯安全專家所寫，普丁雖然在西方被認為是反西方的領袖，卻比大多數俄羅斯菁英更親西方而且更傾向自由主義。
-- He also writes that " In the general public opinion in Russia...even Moscow were to capitulate on all key foreign policy fronts, there would be no tangible easing of U.S. sanctions."
他同時寫道：「俄羅斯輿論普遍認為，即使俄羅斯在所有關鍵的外交戰線上屈服，美國的制裁也不會實際解除」。
-- Look at what former US security officials say about Putin. Sure enough:
端看美國前國防官員們是如何敘述普丁的，便知確實如此：
"Putin is a bully" (Leon Paneta, former secretary of defense)
前國防部長李昂・潘內達：「普丁是個惡霸」。
"Putin...operates ...opportunistically ...but has a vision based on fear..."(H.R.McMaster, former national security advisor)
前國家安全顧問H.R.麥馬斯特：「行事上，普丁是個被恐懼所驅動的機會主義者」。
"Putin is afraid of his middle class coming out in the streets.(Mike Morels, former acting director of the CIA)
前中情局代理局長麥克・莫里斯：「普丁害怕俄羅斯的中產階級走上街頭」。
文章全文
The main Russian event of 2018 was President Vladimir Putin’s re-election for another six-year term. In view of the nature of the Putin regime, the re-election itself came as no surprise. But it has also demonstrated that there is still no alternative to Putin as the Russian national leader — the president continues to enjoy broad grassroot support and has the unanimous backing of the Russian elites.
As a result, Russia’s domestic and foreign policy course is set to remain unchanged for many years to come; no one is in any doubt that one way or another, Putin will remain in charge even after his current presidential term runs out in 2024. In fact, most Russians perceive that continuity and stability of Putin’s course as his main achievement because he has been instrumental in the steady improvement of the Russian economy, prosperity, and law and order. Putin has basically put into practice the famous strategy formulated by the early 20th century Russian Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin: “Give me 20 years of calm and you won’t recognize Russia.”
In that sense, by voting for Putin, the Russian electorate votes primarily for a continued “calm” that is fundamental to the country’s modernization. The success of that modernization, the rapid growth in Russian prosperity and the impressive improvement in the Russian infrastructure were amply demonstrated by the success of the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
Putin and his administration still remain a powerful engine of Russia’s Western-style modernization. In that sense, we can only admire the president’s determination to maintain the country’s pro-Western course — which is especially impressive given the ongoing foreign policy confrontation with the West.
In the West itself, Putin is portrayed as an architect of an anti-Western approach, a leader of the global anti-Western forces and a man determined to undermine Western democracy. It is clear, however, that in the Russian context, Putin is far more liberal and pro-Western than most of the Russian public or the majority of the Russian elites.
According to opinion surveys and election results, most Russians are far less liberal and far more populist, or socialist-minded, on economic issues than their president. They also advocate a far more forceful and conservative domestic and foreign policy course. In that sense, Putin embodies Alexander Puskhin’s 200-year-old dictum that “the government are the only Europeans in this country.”
The authoritarian nature of Putin’s rule enables the Russian government to pursue a sensible and responsible financial policy, taking unpopular measures — such as the recent rise in the retirement age — when the situation calls for it. As a result, Russia’s macroeconomic indicators remain sound, despite the growing pressure of U.S. sanctions.
In his domestic policy and on matters of defense, Putin is likely to carry on with the cautious approach that aims to minimize the costs of the confrontation with the West. A case in point is the draft federal budget for 2019-2021, which includes real-term defense spending cuts. (Based on our own estimates, defense spending will remain flat thanks to various budgetary chicanery, but there will certainly be no increase.)
Russia will continue to pursue a cautious and conservative program of bolstering its military capability, with an emphasis on gradual technological modernization — including a continued buildup of forces stationed along the border with Ukraine in order to give Moscow more instruments for intervening in the course of the Ukrainian conflict. At the same time, Moscow will desist from any tangible military buildup in the European (northwestern) theater, despite the mutually belligerent rhetoric by NATO and Russia, and the growing U.S. military presence in Europe.
Judging from the new State Armament Program for 2018-2027, which Putin signed off in December 2017, many of the most ambitious and expensive aerospace and naval weapons programs have effectively been pushed back to the mid-2020s or even beyond 2027.
In Syria, Putin will keep trying to convert the military success of the Russian intervention into political and diplomatic gains, but he will be hampered by the growing Syrian involvement of the United States. Unlike Moscow, Washington has no constructive agenda in Syria, which gives the Americans a greater freedom of maneuver.
The growing U.S. pressure in recent years, including the constant ramping up of anti-Russian sanctions, has led the Russian political elite to believe that there are no tangible prospects for any political normalization with the United States anytime soon, and that the sanctions are here to stay. It is now the general opinion in Russia that even if Moscow were to capitulate on all the key foreign policy fronts, there would be no tangible easing of U.S. sanctions — and the sanctions themselves would be vindicated as an effective instrument of pressure.
As a result, the Russian public opinion is increasingly determined to endure a long-term confrontation with the West and with the United States in particular. Long-term stability of the Russian economy and society will be crucial if Russia is to emerge relatively unscathed from that confrontation.
In fact, Russia can probably survive 10 to 15 years of such confrontation without too much damage to itself. It is believed, however, that the West will gradually become weary of that confrontation in the absence of any ideological underpinnings for it. That Western weariness — as well as the changing global balance of power, reinforced by the growing Sino-U.S. confrontation — will eventually open up a window of opportunity for Moscow to achieve a normalization with the West without relinquishing any of its key holdings (such as Crimea and the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics).
In the eyes of the Russian people, Vladimir Putin is the ideal leader to steer their country during such a period of confrontation.
“American Companies Need Chinese Consumers”
Weijian Shan, New York Times January 7, 2019
Accessed Jan 21 , 2019
-- China accounts for about $52 billion in sales for Apple, and its third largest market.
大中華地區(含大陸、香港、台灣)2018年為蘋果貢獻了約520億美元的營收，是蘋果第三大市場。
-- Others with big bets on China include Intel (24% of sales), Micron Technology (51%), and Texas Instruments (44%).
其他在中國押大注的還包括了Intel(24%的銷售額)，美光科技(51%)，以及德州儀器(44%)。
-- The perception of China as the "factory of the world" is badly out of date...
“中國是世界工廠”的看法已經嚴重過時了。
-- Exports have dropped from 36% of China's gross domestic product in 2006 to 20% in 2018.
出口額佔中國GDP的比例已經從2006年的36%下降到2018年的20%。
-- General Motors sells more car in China than in North America.
通用汽車在中國賣出的車比在美國還多。
-- And the threat of trade war with the U.S. is real (for China). But the long-term outlook has not changed. The Chinese consumer market will continue to grow, albeit at a slower pace.
貿易戰的威脅是真實的，但是長遠的展望仍然不變。中國的消費力道會以較為緩和的方式持續成長。
文章全文
In a rare bit of bad news for its investors, Apple last week laid the blame for lower than expected revenue on its performance in China. The news sent Apple’s stock price plunging, and investors also ditched other companies with significant exposure in China. The scale of the damage, both to Apple’s bottom line and to the broader market, underscores how critically important China — and Chinese consumers — have become for American companies.
China accounts for about $52 billion in sales for Apple, and is its third-largest market. Apple is not the only technology company that relies on sales in China. For Qualcomm, a chip maker whose technology is used in many Apple smartphones, the figure is $15 billion, or about 65 percent of its total sales, according to an estimate by FactSet. Others with big bets on China include Intel (24 percent of sales), Micron Technology (51 percent), and Texas Instruments (44 percent).
These numbers make it very clear that the perception of China as the “factory of the world,” flooding global markets with cheap goods, is badly out of date. Exports and capital investments such as buildings and roads are no longer the main engines of China’s growth. Exports have dropped from 36 percent of China’s gross domestic product in 2006 to 20 percent in 2018. Going after China’s exports with tariffs, as the Trump administration is attempting, is, to a certain extent, fighting yesterday’s war.
In recent years, China’s economy has shifted to one that is much more dependent on domestic household consumption — ordinary Chinese people buying things for themselves and their families. In China over the last decade, the growth in private consumption has outpaced overall economic growth rate. In 2018, G.D.P. in China grew by 6.5 percent, and household consumption accounted for about four-fifths of that growth.
China is now the fastest-growing consumer market in the world, with private consumption amounting to about $5 trillion, more than 10 percent of the world’s total. Competition for Chinese consumers’ hard-earned renminbi has become intense.
Consider the smartphone market. As recently as 2016, Apple was China’s leading maker of handsets. But by the third quarter of 2018, China’s dominant telecommunications company, Huawei, was on top, with 23 percent of the market. The Chinese smartphone makers Oppo, Vivo and Xiaomi occupy the next three spots, while Apple ranked fifth, with 9 percent. South Korea’s Samsung, the global leader in smartphone sales, has all but disappeared from China, having failed to recover from the fiasco over its dangerously overheating Galaxy Note 7 batteries.
Even industries where American consumers once reigned supreme are now increasingly shifting toward China. General Motors, for example, sells more cars in China than in North America. For global filmmakers, box office sales in 2018 totaled about $9 billion in China, compared with almost $12 billion for North America in 2018.
My company made a decision more than a decade ago not to invest in China’s export sector. Costs for Chinese manufacturers are rising, and prices for their exports are flat or falling. Instead, I feel strongly that there is much greater potential for companies — inside and outside China — that cater to the Chinese consumer market.
Yes, China’s economic growth has begun to slow, and there has been a decrease in investments as Beijing has moved to tighten credit. And the threat of a trade war with the United States is real. But my long-term outlook has not changed. The Chinese consumer market will continue to grow, albeit at a slower pace, and it will continue to be a market that any global company must pay serious attention to if it wants to remain competitive.
So where does this leave companies like Apple that find themselves caught in the middle of the trade war? They must hope, first of all, for a swift conclusion to the latest round of trade negotiations between China and the United States, which began in Beijing on Monday. The best possible outcome is a deal that will encourage China to open its economy further, commit to shrinking its bloated state-owned sector and ease barriers to further foreign investment and trade.
Tariffs were supposed to hurt China by hitting its exports to the United States. That hasn’t happened. Should it persist, the trade war will, of course, hurt Chinese companies, just as it has already hurt so many American companies. But if the conflict eventually drags down Chinese consumer demand, businesses all over the world will be the losers.
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