Despite debt woes, Africa still sees China as best bet for financing
accessed March 11, 2019
路透社2018年8月31日報導:
吉布提港的官員Aoubakar Omar Hadi, chairman of the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority, 感嘆道:
"許多國家雖然對中國負債已重仍然找北京幫忙。因為向中國借錢遠比西方銀行條件優厚。
"But many countries, even those heavily indebted to China, still say Beijing offers far better terms than Western banks, and that European nations and the United States fail to match its generosity.
尤其你找跨國金融機構，要花很長的時間。"⋯⋯
電影推薦：”為副不仁”、”幸福綠皮書”、
”真寵”
accessed March 11, 2019
--."Vice"(此自有兩意:副手，罪惡)
電影"為副不仁"°
特佳影片，深度研究，節奏緊湊，曝露不少，隱含更多。演技精堪!!
-- 一天看獲獎三片，上片最為推薦。其他為
--The Green Book 幸福綠皮書
-- Favourite 真寵
-- 三片皆有事實背景。
-- "Favourite "英國巴洛克音樂極為精緻之外，丘吉爾祖先英國歷史最偉大名將Duke of Marborough的事業轉點生動烘托。
-- 他從1702-1711連續十戰十勝，但反遭國內政治人物控訴，自我流放至歐陸。勿怪後世孫丘吉爾寫書為之平反，被Foreign Affairs 認為是廿世紀最重要名著之一:
Marlborough: His Life and Times.
“為副不仁”電影海報
“真寵”電影海報
“幸福綠皮書”電影海報
Manvar Camp & Jodhpur, Rajasthan,
India February 6 & 7, 2019
accessed March 11, 2019
相簿聯結：http://chongpinlin.pixnet.net/album/set/8351363-manvar-camp-%26-jodhpur%2c-rajasthan%2c-india
Lake by the tomb of a Sufi saint
Mehrangarh castle/palace
Lake by the tomb of a Sufi saint
Panaramic view from above the Mehrangarh castle/palace
為何包括華人的南亞人雖瘦卻易得心臟病並猝死?
accessed March 11, 2019
-- 甚至吃素、運動、不抽煙、血壓和膽固醇指數正常的南亞人也會心臟病突發？
-- 因為他們的脂肪傾向存於肝臟、腹腔、肌肉而非皮下。
-- 他們蔬菜、水果、堅果的攝取量不夠。
-- 在美國的南亞人習慣吃家鄉菜與食物的，比也吃西方食物的，心臟病比例高。
林中斌試摘譯 2019.3.4
New York Times 全文聯結：https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/well/live/why-do-south-asians-have-such-high-rates-of-heart-disease.html
沙烏地王儲下令全國學習中文
accessed March 11, 2019
●沙烏地王儲二月從北京回國後，下令全國學校學中文(根據Saudi Gazette 2019年2月22日報導)。
●沙烏地可能是全球華文國家以外，唯一訂中文為第二外語之國。(有待查證)
●沙烏地因受西方批評人權，已把外交重心移向向亞洲(紐約時報2019.2.22報導)。
●王儲二月底訪問巴基斯坦，答應投資$20 billion/美元200億於礦業、農業及其他基本建設。
●王儲訪問印度，將賣更多石油。
●王儲訪北京於去年11月30日G20宣告支持一帶一路之後再
見習近平，積極安排中國協助沙烏地 Vision 2030計畫。
●全球57個伊斯蘭國家的2/3基礎建設尚未開發。這正是北京一帶一路發展的沃土。來源：中阿關係資深學者熊高賢教授2019.3.2面告。
●進一步觀察： A.中國是唯一交好沙烏地、伊朗、以色列的
大國。北京有潛力成為未來斡旋中東複雜
關係的力量。
B. 沙烏地與伊朗兩大金主可能成為中國一
帶一路計畫的經濟助力(熊教授)。巴基
斯坦被認為債務陷阱高風險國，已得
到沙烏地援助而風險舒緩。
林中斌 整理 敬請賜教 2019.3.6
新聞全文與聯結：
Saudi Arabia plans to include Chinese language in education curriculum
Saudi Gazette 2019-02-22 20:18:00
BEIJING — A plan to include Chinese language as a curriculum at all stages of education — in schools and universities — across the Kingdom was agreed upon during a meeting between Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, deputy premier, minister of defense and a high-level Chinese delegation.
The proposal aims to strengthen friendship and cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the People’s Republic of China and to deepen the strategic partnership at all levels, Saudi Press Agency said on Friday.
The move seeks to forge a strategic partnership in order to achieve the aspirations of both Saudi and Chinese leaderships and to seize the promising opportunities between their peoples.
The inclusion of the Chinese language in Saudi schools and universities will enhance the cultural diversity of students in the Kingdom and contribute to the achievement of the future national goals in the field of education in line with the Kingdom’s Vision 2030.
Chinese language’s introduction into the Saudi curricula is an important step toward opening new academic horizons for students at the various educational levels in Saudi Arabia.
Learning Chinese language will serve as bridge between the peoples of the two countries that will contribute to promoting trade and cultural ties. – SPA
一帶一路背後的大戰略
accessed March 11, 2019
魏城 Financial Times 2019/2/25
Financial Times連結：http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001081589?full=y&archive
南華早報聯結(內容同上)：http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001081589?full=y&archive
倫敦政經學院演講
accessed March 11, 2019
在下於倫敦政經學院演講的場景、及內容。敬請賜教。
Dominating Eurasiafrica without War:
Beijing’s Grand Strategy behind Its Belt Road Initiative
Chong-Pin Lin
February 23, 2019
(A debate on the BRI: China’s debt-trap diplomacy or win-win cooperation? LSESU China Development Forum 2019
Embracing New Dynamics)
From 1949 to 1979, China waged six wars across its borders. From 1979 to 2019, the number of wars it waged beyond its borders is zero.
Why?
During the first 30 years, as China was poor, backward and struggling, it was prone to war-fighting. In the following 40 years, as China began to rise, it has become war-aversive.
“War is an instrument of ill-omen, use it only when left with no choice.” So said Laozi, a Chinese sage in the sixth century before Christ. As China gradually becomes prosperous, war as a foreign policy option falls to the last priority.
In strong contrast to the West, Sun Zi -- the most influential Chinese strategist over more than two thousand years -- said, “ Winning without fighting is the optimal strategy.” In other words, in war or any form of contest, violence is best to be avoided. The underlying spirit is to seek the approach that encounters the least resistance. As a result, to achieve victory with minimum casualties and bloodshed is the most desirable.
Whereas, Karl von Clausewitz, the equivalent of Sunzi in the West, said “War is violence pushed to its utmost bounds.” In other words, in war, violence is maximized and unavoidable. Crushing the enemy with overwhelming force is the best, regardless of casualties and bloodshed.
Deeply rooted in Chinese strategic tradition, Beijing’s grand strategy in the 21st century is “dominating Europe, Asia and Africa or Eurasiafrica without war”.
With what then？
With extra-military instruments such as economy, diplomacy, and culture on the front, but supported by China’s rapidly advancing military capabilities as the backbone. The idea, seemingly self-contradictory, is reminiscent of Teddy Roosevelt’s adage, “Speak softly and carry a big stick, you will go far.”
“Extra-military” differs from “non-military” in that it transcends, but not excludes, the military.
The purpose is to minimize resistance for Beijing to expand its geopolitical influence.
The decision for Beijing to go west first – over the World Island and Africa, --instead of east -– over the Pacific, -- also reflects choosing the route of the least resistance to avoid immediate confrontation with the U.S. and Japan.
In this context, Beijing’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) visibly manifests its unsaid grand strategy.
There is no denying that the BRI has encountered resistance. In Southeast Asia, by late 2018, China had only 12 large investment projects left, down from 33 a year earlier. In Malaysia, for example, the re-elected Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has recently canceled the “East Coast Rail Link” project with China for fear of sinking into bankruptcy by incurring heavy debt.
However, in Europe and the Middle East, increasing number of harbors, airports, railway stations are now run and even owned by China in countries far from bordering on bankruptcy.
Israel’s largest international seaport Haifa as well as its second largest, Ashdod, will be owned by China for 25 years starting in 2021 as a result of China’s work on port expansions for Haifa and Ashdod that started in 2015. Israel’s average GDP growth over the last five years was more than three percent (3.52%) higher than that of the U.S. at slightly over two percent (2.12%).
It would be quite contrived to term the case above a debt-trap deal. A win-win cooperation looks more like it.
Greece was bankrupt in 2008. Its GDP grew at minus 9.1% in 2011. China arrived in 2008 with some $9 billion investment on infrastructure constructions. In 2014, Greek GDP grew 0.7%, first time above zero in six years. In 2005, Athens let China manage its largest seaport Piraeus. In 2016, China’s seafaring company COSCO bought Piraeus for 35 years. In 2017, Greece’s GDP grew positively at 1.4% up from minus 0.2% in 2016. And on 26 August 2017, Piraeus was rated by New York Times the busiest seaport in Europe. From 2010 to 2018, Piraeus shot up the rankings of the world’s busiest container port from the 93rd to 38th.
Is Greece a victim of China’s debt-trap diplomacy? Hardly.
In 2017, COSCO bought Zeebrugge port, the second largest in the Netherlands. In the same year, COSCO bought Valencia port, the largest in Spain.
Are the Netherlands and Spain yet other victims of China’s debt-trap diplomacy? Apparently not.
As China applies the BRI to the developed countries, the outcomes resemble more win-win cooperation than debt-trap diplomacy. On the other hand, as China’s BRI applied to the developing world, sad cases resembling debt-trap diplomacy have occurred.
Are the problematic cases the intended consequences of Beijing’s strategic design or the outcomes of Beijing’s shortsighted conception and faulty implementations? An unequivocal judgement one way or the other is difficult to reach without peeping into the black box of Zhongnanhai’s decision-making apparatus which obviously is infeasible.
If the BRI is Beijing’s conceived route to realize its “China Dream”, win-win cooperation rather than debt-trap diplomacy is the pragmatic policy option to pursue. It is because win-win cooperation reduces resistance and enhances the chances of success while debt-trap diplomacy only self-obstructs and pushes its China Dream ever further away from realization.
弟子問佛
accessed Feb 18, 2019
弟子問佛：您既神通又慈悲，為何還有人受苦？ 佛說：我雖有最大的神通力，但依然有四件事情是做不到的：
第一，因果不可改：自因自果，别人是代替不了的；
第二，智慧不可賜：任何人要開智慧，離不開自身的磨練；
第三，妙法不可說：宇宙真相用語言講不明白，只能靠實證；
第四，無缘不能度：無缘之人，他是聽不進你的話的。天雨雖寬，不潤無根之草；佛門廣大，難度無缘之人。
"如是我聞"摘錄
accessed Feb 18, 2019
"...又如敵人，我們習慣以為是外在的，而沒想到是來自內心的嗔恨，所以當有人說摧毀敵人多困難，這是由於不能瞭解敵我是由嗔恨心相對而生的;..."
(宗薩蔣揚欽哲仁波切 1988.10.17-25訪問，如是我聞，頁236)
他是"高山上足球賽"電影的導演
林中斌摘錄 2019.1.29
Stealth F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Has Some Serious Problems: Report
accessed Feb 18, 2019
-- F-35 戰機的壽命將要比預先規劃的大為縮短，因為機件問題太多。
--這是根據即將公布的美國五角大廈的2018年評估報告。
--為海軍所特製的F-35 戰機壽命將為2,100小時，比起預期的8,000小時大為縮減。
--代理國防部長Patrick Shanahan說 F-35 戰機"曾有許多機會改進到比目前更好的成果"。意涵是實際狀況令他失望。
Thanks to Professor Lily Yu for providing the following article.
出版書籍/books published (9) 論文與評論/papers & opeds (4) 講演與受訪/speeches & interviews (2) 全球磁變/Global shift (1) 休閒/leisure (9) 授課資料/teaching (4) 心靈探索/Spiritual Exploration (2)
